













NARRATIVE  
SCENES AND EVENTS  
IN  
ITALY

FROM 1847 TO 1849.

INCLUDING  
THE SIEGE OF VENICE.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL PEPE,

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF EXPEDITION OF NAUIG,  
AND OF THE FORCES OF THE VULIA, FEBRUARY 1848.

TRANSLATED FROM  
THE UNPUBLISHED ITALIAN MANUSCRIPT

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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NARRATIVE OF  
EVENTS IN ITALY.

FROM 1847 TO 1849.

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CHAPTER I.

*A* sortie on Caorle decided on.—Reasons against it.—The young men of Naples send a sword of honour to the Author.—Leonardo da Vinci.—Several corps organised into a Brigade.—The Author named deputy in Naples.—Départure of the Legions from Rome, and Ferrari.—Stratagems of the enemy.—Theatre of Venice.

I HAD sufficient experience and knowledge of history, to foresee the complaints of the superior officers who followed me to Mestre. Each believed himself to have co-operated in the victory more than his companions, and therefore desired to obtain the largest share of praise. After the battle of Marathon, all yielded the first place to Miltiades ; but every one believed himself the second.

Remembering the proverb, that “ we must



miserable government, jointly subscribed to purchase a handsome sword of honour, which they sent me by an excellent young officer belonging to the National Guard. On arriving in Venice he was named Lieutenant of the republican army; and on all occasions he conducted himself with great valour. His name was Montuoro. I accepted the sword with great satisfaction, and it never quitted my side during the rest of the campaign. These patriotic youths accompanied the gift with the following inscription:—

“AL BENEMERITO DELLA PATRIA  
CITADINO GUGLIELMO PEPE  
COMMANDANTE IN CAPO LE ARME ITALIANE NEL VENETO  
IL QUALE, DI SPRONE AI VALOROSI CHE LO SEGUIVANO  
A TRAVERSO COTANTE LAGRIMEVOLI SCIAGURE  
SI NOBILMENTE SALVAVA L'ONOR NAPOLITANO!  
I NAPOLITANI RICONOSCENTI  
QUESTO TRIBUTO DI OMAGGIO, E DI GRATITUDINE OFFRIVANO  
A DI 24 OTTOBRE 1848.”\*

\* TO A CITIZEN DESERVING WELL OF HIS COUNTRY,  
WILLIAM PEPE,  
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ITALIAN FORCES IN THE VENETIAN  
TERRITORY,  
WHO, URGING ON HIS BRAVE FOLLOWERS,  
THROUGH SO MANY LAMENTABLE DISASTERS,  
SO NOBLY UPHELD THE HONOUR OF NAPLES,  
THE GRATEFUL NEAPOLITANS  
OFFERED THIS TRIBUTE OF HOMAGE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENT,  
THE 24TH OF OCTOBER, 1848.

I answered as follows :—

“ Young men of Naples ! In 1820, I commanded the Neapolitan army, which had been chiefly trained to arms in the Russian, Italian, and Spanish campaigns, and they nobly seconded me in overthrowing the slavery under which our country groaned. The Regent, who was afterwards Francis I., offered me at that time the rank of Captain-General, as I have shown in my Memoirs. I refused to accept it, as being an insidious and inopportune honour. In my eyes it had not the merit of the sword, which you, with such touching kindness and so much moral courage, have sent me ; exposing yourselves by this act to the rigours of an unreasonable government.

“ Beloved fellow-countrymen ! I thank you from the bottom of my heart for this act of patriotism, which I consider a happy omen of the future destinies of our country, on which the fate of the entire peninsula in great measure depends. In this peninsula, the love of independence, the firm will to obtain it at any price, are such, that it would already have been ours, had our Princes been guided

by Italian feelings, or had we been freed from their yoke.

“GUGLIELMO PEPE.”

I had observed with pain that Italy had not been generous to Venice, on the resistance of which so much of the safety of the peninsula depended. I had, as I before explained, given up to the treasury all my emoluments ; I determined on a further proof of my affection for Venice, by sending to the government a portrait of Cesar Borgia, Duke of Valentino, painted by Leonardo da Vinci, to have it sold for the public benefit. This picture was a gift from my good brother Florestano, which accompanied me everywhere. By means of a lottery they might have obtained 100,000 frs. for it ; but they preferred retaining it as a remembrance, and the President, Manin, graciously sent me the following letter :—

“GENERAL,

“No magnanimous act comes unexpectedly from you. By nature, and by long habit, all noble sacrifices are dear and



## EVENTS IN ITALY.

mand numerous provinces, but we shall be the bulwark of all Italy, whose sons will repair hither from the north and south, to shed their blood for the common safety." Thus saying, these truly liberal and Italian minds sent to the treasury all they could dispose of. The ladies excelled in generosity; and it was observed, that those who before had most indulged in luxuries, now repressed their desires, and adorned themselves with the more noble ornament of Italian independence.

The organisation of the troops in the Estuary necessarily differed from that of the other corps, who were not dispersed among the islands and the smaller and larger fortresses: therefore, instead of being divided into brigades and divisions, it was better they should remain in legions; so much the more, that experienced brigadiers were wanting. Even had this not been the case, still, surrounded as we were on all sides by a numerous enemy, it was unadvisable that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief should have to pass through brigadiers, colonels, and commanders of battalions, scattered about the Lagoon and its shores; yet, to satisfy the



self-love of some brigadiers, four brigades were organised. In truth, the reverses of Charles Albert had not made me lose all hope of entering on open campaign warfare, but in that case the whole organisation would have been changed.

Towards the end of November, my nomination to the national parliament of Naples reached me; the official information was dated November 25th, and sent by Signor Campitelli, president of the central commission for the elections of the district of Naples. The ministers, I was informed, had opposed my election with all their power, but in vain. The Government considered this election as a new scandal, confirming the first, the gift of a sword, which had become public. In my answer to the President Campitelli I accepted the honourable mission; I said that we must not aim at pleasing a despicable government; and I ended by expressing a hope that the war in Venice might be speedily terminated, in which event I would return to my post of deputy. This last sentence so frightened the Government that they hastened to decree, that if the deputy,

General Guglielmo Pepe, entered the kingdom, he should be arrested and brought to trial. I was thus proscribed for the third time.

The armistice obtained by the Sardinian King, the unjust suspicions which were thrown on his good faith, the threats of Austria, and the movement of her troops, alarmed the people of the Roman states with the dread of an invasion of the enemy. Both the Government and myself accordingly determined on sending back the four legions belonging to Rome. There remained in Venice, out of these legions, only one battalion of 1000 men, whom I proposed, after the first feat of arms, to salute by the appellation of "The Thousand Romans," in order to excite their valour. At the same time, there arrived daily out of the ancient Venetian provinces, many young men who were determined, at all risks, to escape from the Austrian conscription : many others deserted their banners to join the Italians in the defence of Venice. Colonel Cavedalis, one of the triumvirs, had the charge of uniting these youths, and forming with them a fine battalion. These young men came from the

surrounding provinces of Padua, Treviso, Udine, and Bellona. I formed them into legions.

I bade adieu to the four Roman legions who had fought so willingly for the Italian cause, and endured difficulties, privations, and sickness, in the following order of the day :—

“VENICE, 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec., 1848.

“The Government decreed yesterday that the Roman division, now fighting in the defence of the Estuary, shall return into their native provinces. The present condition of these provinces has induced the Venetian government to come to this determination ; it has also been formed in consequence of the fevers which have been so prevalent during the past year, enfeebling the health of many of the volunteers, who will revive on breathing their natal air.

“The General-in-Chief will never forget a single one of the military virtues which have adorned the Roman volunteers whom he has had the honour to command during seven months. If they have defended Venice with so much ardour, they will not fail to main-

tain the liberty of their fellow-countrymen against its internal enemies wherever they may arise, and against the attacks of the foreigner.

“The General is grieved at parting from so many warm defenders of this classic land ; but he derives consolation from the thought that both they, and the other volunteers who remain in the Estuary, having the independence of the Peninsula for ever engraven on their hearts, will soon again be seen in the Venetian camp, in order to shake off entirely the humiliating yoke of Austria, who will surely be driven beyond the mountains by the bayonets which fought with such valour at Mestre.

“GILMO. PEPE,  
‘*The General-in-Chief.*’

If in this order of the day no mention was made of General Ferrari, who was to lead back these legions of which Charles Albert had asked me to give him the command, it was his own fault. Eight months before, his Government, dissatisfied with his conduct, had recalled him through the medium of their commissioner, Count Carlo Pepoli.

In the affair of Cavanella on the Adige, I sinned on the side of indulgence, and not of severity, in regard to him. The triumvirs in a letter of the 18th September had urged me to send him back to Rome, yet I retained him in Venice. The Venetian government wrote on the 29th October to the Roman government, greatly blaming Ferrari. Notwithstanding this, he was raised to the rank of Lieutenant-General in Rome, where, as in Naples, this grade is on a par with that of General in Piedmont. In fact, the Minister of War in Rome wrote to inform me that that Government had established generals of brigade, generals of division, and lieutenant-generals. Ferrari had arrived from France where he had the rank of a retired Lieutenant-Colonel.

I have explained this subject fully, to show that all the new Italian governments, from Sicily to Piedmont, had the fatal mania of conferring promotion without considering the evil it is of to discipline, and to the organisation of an army. I shall have further occasion to point out some serious inconveniences resulting from this practice, in order that



Italy may not fall into the same error when she has regained her independence.

In the time of the first French Republic, if advancement was rapid, it was only given to officers who had signally distinguished themselves. The rapid careers of Massena and Murat do not belie my assertion ; the grades they obtained were merited, one by one, on the field of battle. General Haxo, who united experience to great good sense, said that Napoleon, when Emperor, often showed that he had never been colonel of a regiment.

Many and various were the wiles employed by the enemy to subdue the persevering love of liberty which was shown in Venice both by the people, and by the valorous and patriotic garrison. Among other means, they endeavoured to inspire distrust of many superior officers and persons in civil employment, particularly of the commanders of the forts, such as that of Malghera. To destroy these baneful calumnies, I published the following order of the day :—

“ VENICE, 16th Dec., 1848.

“ Vague rumours of a speedy attack by the wily enemy not long ago gave the alert to the garrison of the Estuary. It was the artful act, either of the enemy, or of wicked malevolence, or rather of timid and ill-advised levity. Persons of conspicuous honour were made marks for blind and perfidious suspicions. The General-in-Chief takes this opportunity of again assuring the citizens and the military that both he and the government attentively watch over the punctual service of the garrison, as well as over the zeal and fidelity of the commanders. It is a matter of gratification to the General, who has so often rendered a just tribute of praise to the soldiers, now to offer one, not less deserved, to all the commanders without exception; for intelligence, for unblemished honour, for ardent love of their country, they all deserve the commendations of the garrison, and of the city which they defend. The General wishes especially to signalise Colonel Mattei for his indefatigable activity, his tried patriotism, his intelligent and zealous services in the defence of

Malghera. The officers of that fort, and the council of defence have given in writing a similar well-deserved testimony to this deserving Colonel.

“LIEUT.-GENERAL G. PEPE,

“*Commander-in-Chief.*”

When an honest man is calumniated, and is aware of the calumny, he has often the appearance of being guilty. As to myself, I confess that I had so often seen the valour of the Italians called in question in newspapers and pamphlets, in spite of the well-deserved praise they had earned in all the provinces of the Peninsula, as well as in the wars of the French empire, that I always abstained from going to the Italian Theatre in Paris, where all the applause showered on the performers seemed to me to mean, “You can always sing, but never fight.” But, after the day of Mestre, I went to the finest theatre in Venice, where, if I mistake not, a performance was given for the benefit of the Treasury, and in one of the scenes nearly thirty young ladies sang in chorus. I said to myself, “If in Italy we are superior in all the fine arts, after



Mestre, we are ourselves at least convinced that we can fight with more valour than our enemies.” This idea, and this train of reasoning made me, for the first time since many long years, take pleasure in an Italian theatre, and in seeing my countrymen sing and dance.

## CHAPTER II.

Political and military situation of Italy in the beginning of 1849.

—Letter of Count Gherardo Freschi, of Turin.—General Olivaro and Deputy Correnti are sent by the King of Sardinia to Venice.—They return with a letter from the Author, and two projects for the approaching campaign.—The King's answer.—Instructions for Colonel Fabbrizi sent to Rome.—

Demand that the Roman battalion of the Union should remain.—Letter of Manin.—Charles Albert decides on resuming hostilities.—Departure of the Author for Chioggia, where he concentrates a small corps.—Reconnoissance by the Lombards.—Letter from the Government to suspend all operations.—Return to Venice.

In the commencement of 1849, Italy was, both in a military and political point of view, in a wretched condition.

Sicily, though desirous of maintaining her newly acquired liberty, possessed neither an army nor a fleet to contend against the enemy, nor a general capable of organising troops, and then assuming the command of them.

The kingdom of Naples was groaning under the despotic yoke of a prince, who, to consolidate his power, shaken by recent

commotions, and by the still unsubdued state of Sicily, employed corruption with both the people and the army, and again called the Jesuits to his assistance.

The Roman States were the focus of all the intrigues of the European courts, who rivalled one another in suggesting to Pius IX. the basest means of reducing that energetic people under the temporal power of the clergy; and the Pope, by calling in the aid of foreign bayonets, deservedly obliterated his former acts, which were worthy of the Vicar of Christ, and had filled the two hemispheres with his name.

The Grand Duke of Tuscany wanted only a cowl to become a complete Jesuit. From the right of the Po to Trapani not a bayonet could show itself in favour of Italian independence. From the left bank of the Po to the Alps there remained means sufficient to drive the Austrians beyond the mountains at the point of the bayonet; if Carlo Alberto had been as expert and energetic a general as he was a valiant Italian-minded soldier. I will examine in this chapter the difficulties by which this prince was surrounded, and the

vigour which he wanted to enable him to surmount them.

Several letters which I received from Turin, and especially from Signor Gherardo Freschi, deputed by the Venetian government to the Sardinian, filled my mind with more sorrow than ever.

Count Freschi, in a letter dated the 2nd of November 1848, told me, among other things, that the Lombard Consulta had declared that it would dissolve itself, if the insurrection was not assisted by the rest of Italy. He also said that the King, his sons, and his ministers, declared to Durini, to Prince Canino, and to Mamiani, that they would continue the war; that the enormous expenses incurred, the calling out of the reserve, the nomination of a number of officers, and, still more, the generous proclamation of the Duke of Savoy, confirmed these promises. But, at the same time, the Lombard insurrection was premature, and there were two opinions abroad: some believed that the army was not yet prepared for war; many others maintained that the Lombard brethren, who had compromised

themselves, must be assisted at any cost. Freschi added, that he was alarmed at the evil spirit which had shown itself in the army, and which was caused by the reactionary spirit of the aristocracy, who worked secretly, but not without the culpable assistance of the ministry. . Hence the continual desertions in the army, and the incapacity of many generals. He also pointed out the sad example recently given by the Casale brigade, which almost entirely disbanded itself. He concluded by relating to me other circumstances, very disheartening to those who were devoted to Italian independence.

In another letter, dated the 2nd of January, 1849, Count Freschi writes as follows :

“ILLUSTRIOUS GENERAL,

“I must inform you, that although I have seen the King several times, and he has always asked me for an account of your proceedings, and spoken of you as a man whom he highly esteems, nevertheless, from my knowledge of the character of that

prince, the moment has never seemed propitious for communicating to him your ideas concerning the plan of campaign. But now that a new ministry, more in unison with the parliamentary majority, has liberated Carlo Alberto from the fetters which impeded his movements, and has electrified him in such a manner that he seems finally resolved to attempt every possible means of redressing the wrongs of Italy, and avenging the honour of her arms, the moment seemed to have come when your letter might be shown to him with profit ; and therefore, a few days ago, I presented myself to him. He received me with his usual affability, and appeared only more joyful and better disposed than ever. He was the first to turn the conversation on you. I then directly laid before him the tenor of your letter,—that is to say, your idea of making Venice the basis of operations in the new war, and the certain results which you anticipate from enterprises undertaken in concert, the plan of which you would communicate, when needful, to a person sent by his Majesty, and possessing his entire confidence. His Majesty answered



me with the greatest praises of your patriotism, and of your military talents: he was most satisfied with the confidence you show in him; and he added, 'Our minds are ready for war, and we shall soon be in the field, with all the means at our disposal.

When the moment for commencing the campaign is arrived, you will permit me, Signor Conte, to make use of you to concert opportunely with General Pepe. In the mean time, I beg you to offer him my best greetings.'—These are the precise words spoken by his Majesty, whom I thanked, on my own account, for the confidence he had honoured me with; but I represented to him respectfully that it would be more useful to expedite to you an expert and faithful officer, who could comprehend your views better than myself, and refer them to the King.

'I will now answer your last question, whether we are acting here with good sense and good faith. I believe we are, at least as far as the King, the ministry, and the chamber are concerned. But King, ministers, and chamber, who, when they act in concert, should be omnipotent, yet are not so, because

there is something more potent than they ; I mean the old aristocracy, who throw their Jesuitical cunning, and their experience in the management of affairs, into the opposite scale, and employ all their power to serve the ends of their incurable egotism. I cannot express the suspicions I feel when I see all these persons, before so openly averse to war, now hastening it on as indispensable. This occasions presentiments which are most sorrowful. I should almost be tempted to believe that they will lead us to new disasters. Take note that the army, which is apparently most flourishing, is far from having recovered from the deep wounds of which I spoke to you at the end of last autumn. As to the King, I believe him to be sincere in following the lofty aim he has in view, whether moved to it by love of glory, or of ambition, or of aggrandisement. Some believe him false ; but this is an accusation born and bred in the minds of the aristocracy, who cannot forgive him the wrongs he has done them,—most grievous wrongs, were there no others than the *Statuto* and the *Fusion* ; and to see them



smile on him, with kindly countenances ! The King has neither been able to subdue the party which betrays him, nor to reconcile it with the other. This is a great fact. God grant that the consequences be not fatal to him and to Italy.

“ Your devoted, &c.

“ GHERARDO FRESCHI.” “

Charles Albert was pleased to send me his general of engineers, Olivaro, accompanied by the deputy Cesare Correnti. The first was an intelligent person, and, what was better, he talked on military affairs with great good sense ; Correnti united the most devoted patriotism to great information. I conducted them both round the islands of the Lagoon ; I made them examine the fortifications ; I reviewed in their presence the militia of the garrison ; and it was with much satisfaction that I heard them declare they had not believed it possible to put Venice on the military footing in which they found it.

As the King desired to know my views on the approaching campaign, I sent him,

by General Olivaro, two projects along with a letter. As these treated of the salvation or the ruin of Italy, I think it right to transcribe here both the projects and the letter. Of the first project I will only give a succinct idea ; the second I give in full.

. .

• ABSTRACT OF THE FIRST PROJECT.

“I PROPOSED that the Sardinian forces should be divided into two corps : the first to number about 60,000 men of the best troops ; the second to be composed of the remaining troops of the line, augmented by the national and movable guards. The latter would have occupied Alexandria, Genoa, and the positions contiguous to the Alps, where Moreau, in 1799, kept the numerous Austro-Russian army at bay.

“The first corps would have advanced into the Venetian provinces, have made Padua the centre of its operations, and availed itself of the entrenched camp there. I pointed out the manner in which this corps might have reached the Venetian provinces, and assisted the Tyrolese insurrection, which might have extended into Lombardy. I reasoned on the

expediency of intercepting the communications between Austria and Radetzky ; and should this general advance into the heart of Piedmont, I demonstrated that he would be exposed to complete defeat. I pointed out the advantages the first corps, concentrated at Padua, would derive from the support of the Sardo-Venetian squadron, which was mistress of the Adriatic : and I concluded with these words : ‘Sire, your Majesty will not undertake these operations, because they appear arduous, without really being so ; and because the human mind is more disposed to adopt half measures than bold ones, or those which are considered so.’ I therefore pass to the explanation of my second project.”

#### SECOND PROJECT.

“I. THE proposal to divide Lombardy, and place the chosen troops of the army between Padua on the left, and Tyrol on the right, being rejected, I should counsel the sending a division of not fewer than 12,000 men into the Venetian provinces. To these would be added 9000 men from Venice, and between Romans and Tuscans a third more :

in all 30,000 men, independently of the garrison necessary in the Lagoon.

“II. This corps should not amount to less than the number named, in order to be able to act independently, and protect the insurrection in the mountainous Venetian provinces. It should be independent of the Sardinian army, from which it would be separated by more than one river; and it would be protected from the enemy by four strong places. Nevertheless, should the vicissitudes of the war require it, this corps could join the mass of the Sardinian army, either by the Tyrol, or by Ferrara, or even by Verona, in case the Austrians should have entered Piedmont.

“III. General Pepe, commanding the said division, proposes to execute the following movements :—After making some demonstrations against the enemy in the Venetian provinces, less for the purpose of engaging them, than to mask a more essential movement, he will embark rapidly with 12,000 picked men, in order to occupy Trieste, Pola, Fiume, and other places; in each of which he will remain only as long as may be

necessary in order to send to Venice the prisoners, and the naval and military stores that may be captured. If, in these provinces, the population should show themselves disposed to throw off the Imperial dominion, or if, at Fiume, a correspondence should be opened with Hungary, this expedition might be still further utilised ; and the number of the said brigade might be doubled, without endangering the defence of Venice, if chances should present themselves of any grand operation favourable to Italy.

“ IV. In the Venetian provinces the same corps might perform many most useful operations. Suppose the enemy coming out of Verona with considerable forces, even as many as 40,000 men, in order to attack the Italian corps in the Venetian territory. This corps might then retreat into Padua, which is surrounded by walls, by two rivers, and a canal ; and from thence it would face the Austrians with advantage. It might also disembark considerable detachments at the mouth of the Piave, and of the Tagliamento, in order to attack the enemy in their rear, and cut off their communication with the



Austrian provinces. If the Sardinian army should require succour, either on the side of Mantua, of Verona, or of the Tyrol, the corps stationed in Venice would speedily arrive. In fine, if the King should decide on advancing towards the Austrian frontiers, the same corps would be ready to assist him.

“ V. With regard to the operations of the bulk of the Sardinian army in Lombardy, much would depend on the numerical difference between their forces and those of the enemy ; on the advantages which the Italic-Venetian corps might have obtained ; and on the insurrections going on among the Venetian, Tyrolese, and Brescian mountaineers.

“ VI. In every case the Sardinian army, not possessing any fortified place opposite the line of the enemy, should place its strength in compact organisation, and not, as formerly, in the occupation of a long line of country. If it could recover a walled city in the Tyrol, to serve us as an entrenched camp, it might from thence communicate with the corps in the Venetian provinces ; and, in that case, its military position would be fatal to the

enemy, who would be deprived of all communication with the empire ; since from Venice the troops could act both by sea and land. On the other hand, if the Austrians, in order to open a means of communication, should leave Verona, it is evident that they could probably never return there. These advantages and many others would be obtained by the support of an Italian corps in the Lagoon.

“ VII. In opposition to this project it may be observed that the Sardinian army, the Lombard army in the Tyrol, and the Venetian corps, would be separated, and each exposed singly to the assault of all the united Austrian force. But this observation falls to the ground, since the Sardinian army, by retreating towards Genoa or the Alps, would give an opportunity to the Lombard and Venetian divisions of attacking the enemy in the rear ; the Lombards would be favoured by strong positions, and supported by the Sardinian and Italico-Venetian corps ; and the latter would have a retreat open to Padua and the Lagoon. Moreover, it is demonstrated that it would be easy to unite the three camps.”

Both these projects were accompanied by a letter to the King from myself, which I delivered, unsealed, to General Olivaro and Correnti, in order that it might be read by persons of sense and influence ; it being understood, that it was to be delivered to his Majesty sealed. The letter was as follows :

*“ To his Sardinian Majesty. ”*

“ VENICE, 15th February, 1849.

“ SIRE,

“ My conduct towards the five last Neapolitan kings, beginning with Joseph, all of whom were kindly disposed towards me, must prove that the sole motive of all my political acts has ever been the independence and the glory of Italy. This persevering and unchanged love of Italy urges me now to address your Majesty.

“ I have never judged human actions by their results, and, therefore, I am impressed only by the noble Italian attitude of Carlo Alberto, when he drew his sword against Austria, and in defence of the audacious Lombards. In the eyes of the inexperienced and the disloyal alone does misfortune become a fault.



“In these last moments, your Majesty must choose either pre-eminent glory, or eternal blame ; and decide between the crown of Italy or the humiliation of the rest of your line.

“Let your Majesty, without hesitation, again take up arms : hardly will the war of independence have been proclaimed, than all differences will cease ; and that concord will revive which it is sought in vain to disturb by sonorous but insignificant words, dictated by inexperienced enthusiasm, or by the foolish desire to seem foremost in patriotic sentiments. The inhabitants of the Lagoon, more than ever devoted to liberty, will be promptly ready to proclaim the Italian kingdom as soon as they see you again on your battle-horse, and throwing away the scabbard of the sword of your ancestors.

“In every assault and reconnoissance, the enemy has been repulsed at the point of the bayonet by the young volunteers now combating in the Lagoon. How, then, could the Austrians hope to resist the Sardinian army, led on by chiefs devoted to their country ? The two projects which I have had the honour to present to your Majesty,

are not dictated by mere enthusiasm, but by experience, which, in warfare, is more valuable than all else.

“ I will not dwell on the deeds of the Italian Legion, which, a few days before the battle of Marengo, combated an Austrian division near Darello, and, unassisted, put them to flight. I had then scarcely passed my fifteenth year, and was a simple volunteer. But, in the campaign of 1815, I commanded, as General, Murat’s advanced guard ; and I had frequent opportunities of examining closely the attitude of the Austrian troops, whom I afterwards combated in the fields of Rieti, having with me then only a few troops of ordnance and a National Guard recently organised, and being secretly betrayed by the prince and his satellites. Hence my knowledge of our adversaries, which has, on my side, been dearly bought.

“ Let your Majesty place confidence in the Italian people and in their destiny ; thus united to the Peninsula, your dynasty will be saved, and yours alone. I myself, Sire, though by nature averse to princes, shall be the first cordially to salute Carlo Alberto,

King of Italy, when he has only passed the Isonzo.

“Your Majesty’s devoted, &c., &c.,  
“GUGLIELMO PEPE.”

As the King had, of his own accord, sent General Olivaro and the Deputy Correnti to me, I flattered myself that their reports, my projects, and my letter, would have brought me such assistance as would have enabled me to avail myself of the magnificent military and political position of Venice. But my hope was vain. The only reply I obtained from Charles Albert was the following letter:

“TURIN, 5th March, 1849.

“ILLUSTRIOUS GENERAL,

His Majesty, my august Sovereign, has received the letter which your Excellency has addressed to him, of the 15th of February, and has charged me to reply to you in his name. I comply most readily with my Sovereign’s orders, as His Majesty has desired me to assure you that he appreciates most fully the ideas and observations developed in your letter, as those of an experienced and valiant

general, whose devotion to the Italian cause, and whose sincere love of our common country, are well known, and receive fresh confirmation from the expressions of your letter.

“While obeying the Royal commands, I seize this opportunity of recalling myself to the recollection of your Excellency, and of offering you the sentiments of distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be your Excellency’s devoted servant,

“COLLJ.” •

I cannot express the impression which this letter produced on my mind. It was evident that I could not expect the smallest aid, and that Carlo Alberto, in spite of the promises made to me, and of all he had said so often of the importance of Venice, was, unfortunately for Italy, by no means disposed to derive any advantage from it. It was clear, also, that in spite of the encômiums lavished on me in this last letter, he did not choose to communicate to me his plans for the approaching campaign. Yet he was not ignorant that I commanded in the whole

Lagoon nearly 20,000 men, without reckoning the National Guard, which, in case of extreme need, could have guarded the greater part of the forts ; he was not ignorant that among the officers who surrounded him, not one had ever risen to the command of a military corps, or a division, or even a brigade, by regular promotion, but only by favour, which undermines the organisation of an army, instead of giving it solidity, and of bringing forward men able to advise and to act well.

• Notwithstanding these mischances, I remained firmly determined never to commit a sin of omission against Italy. On the one hand, I prepared myself at home ; and externally, I turned my eyes towards Tuscany and Rome. In Florence, I corresponded with Mandrini, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, formerly a captain on my staff ; in Rome, with the triumvir Salicetti, whom I had proposed for a minister in Naples. Much that might have been done was not done. Fortune had turned her back on Italy, and, not for the first time, on the most willing and intrepid of her sons.

I dispatched the colonel of my staff, Fab-

brizi, a Modenese, with the following letter and instructions to Rome. I sent the same to Florence.

*“ To Colonel Fabbrizi.*

“ COLONEL

“ The military and political position of the Peninsula at this moment is such as to render it the duty of every truly Italian citizen to co-operate for its safety by every means in his power. Commanding in Venice, which is situated between Piedmont and Rome, it is my duty to endeavour to stimulate each of these governments in augmenting the number of their forces, in ameliorating their organisation, and in studying their good direction.

“ You are aware of all I wrote to the King of Sardinia, and of what, through General Olivaro and Correnti, I suggested to his government. You also know that I am expecting an answer from Turin.

“ In the mean time, and through you, I turn my mind to the Minister of War, and to Salicetti, in Rome ; nor could I find a superior officer more capable than yourself of



explaining my views, and putting me in possession of theirs.

“I think that the Roman government should concentrate their forces between Sinigaglia, Ancona, Jeri, Osima, and Macerata, and there give them regularity and instruction.

“The corps thus formed might be employed in offensive and defensive operations, both against the Neapolitan, and the Austrian troops. A defensive position is generally chosen, not on the frontier, but either beyond or within it. I could cite many examples in support of this opinion : among others, Cromwell, with only 10,000 men, subdued Scotland ; the Scots, with 40,000 men, trusting to their superior numbers, combated on their frontiers, instead of drawing the enemy into the heart of their country.

“Whether the Roman troops be attacked, or penetrate into the Neapolitan kingdom, I offer myself, in either case, to defend or to attack : the result of the latter operation might prove the salvation of Italy, for, among my contemporaries, not a few would join me ; a circumstance which is not unknown to Salicetti.

“In every case, let the Government be

careful of the organisation of the troops ; let them purchase arms of a good quality ; let them, by means of the patriots, obtain exact notice of the enemy's forces, and of the public spirit of that people.

“ If the Austrians should pass the Po, all the Roman and Tuscan forces must again be concentrated in Bologna. In 1815, near Bologna, I contended successfully on the Reno with 7,000 Neapolitans against 18,000 Austrians. Now, with 20,000 Romans and Tuscans, with nearly 10,000 of the National Guard, I promise to defend Bologna, which is the key of the Roman states, against 30,000, or even a greater number, of the enemy. Bologna is a city formed for defence, as I proved in my *Italia Militare*, published many years ago ; and though this city is situated on the frontiers, and not in the interior of the country, yet local circumstances and the energy of its population, make it form an exception to the general rule. The Reno, the mountains, the cultivated and shaded fields which surround it, greatly facilitate its defence. I should esteem myself fortunate to have to defend Bologna.



“I recommend to you, Colonel, the improvement of the fortifications in Ancona. Say that, as soon as Carlo Alberto has decided on recommencing hostilities, the city of Ferrara must be besieged. The siege will be of short duration ; I will send there, Colonel Ulloa and other distinguished Neapolitan artillery officers.

“For the good of the Italian cause, I have thought it my duty” to communicate my thoughts, and to offer my services, to the Roman government. In case Piedmont should act, as I hope it will, in concert with the Venetian troops, I feel certain that the Romans and Tuscans will not abandon us.

“Write to me often. I will let you know the intentions of Carlo Alberto the moment I receive his answer ; and you will communicate them to the governments of Rome and Tuscany.

“I have given the President Manin notice of your departure. Accept, &c. &c.

“GUGLIELMO PEPE.”

While considering all that might be advantageous outside of the Lagoon, I did not lose

sight of our internal affairs. The Roman government desired to recal its battalion of about 1,000 men, for the improvement of which I had taken such pains. I would not allow them to depart, and I wrote on the subject to the President Manin, who answered me thus, on the 10th of March :—

“ GENERAL,

“ I fully appreciate the considerations contained in your letter of yesterday, regarding the propriety of retaining in Venice the battalion of the Union, sent by the Roman States, and now claimed by the Minister Campello, &c., &c.”

One of the considerations contained in my letter of the 8th of March to Manin, to demonstrate the necessity of retaining the said battalion, was the following :—

“ At this moment,” I said, “ it appears that the enemy is preparing to attack our forts on *terra firma*. The best method of defending these forts is continually to attack the besiegers by frequent sorties, which require

numerous troops, and occasion much loss. Massena and Rapp defended Genoa and Dantzic by sorties rather than cannon. For want of these, Antwerp, Saragossa, Gaeta, Terragona, and Mervieda fell. In ancient times Alessia fell, though it contained numerous defenders, but who dared not confront Cæsar's legions. You will see whether the enemy will re-commence their works for the investment of Malghera, Brondolo, and Treporti ; we shall be defended as long as we have men to lose—as long as we can make use of the bayonet as we did in Mestre.”

In all Italy, excepting Naples, there existed a serious defect in military institutions, from which even the Sardinian army was not exempt ; and this was the mode of promotion of officers of every rank, from the subaltern to the general. I can understand that two, three, or even four steps should be gained, by the same individual in a short period of time, provided it be by actual service, by gaining advantages over the enemy, or by giving proofs of valour and intelligence. But advancement accorded without these circumstances is most prejudicial to discipline, and

in a short time degrades the best troops, because, among other reasons, the honour of a military grade becomes a derision, and loses all prestige. As it was proposed that promotion should be given by the Government on the representation of the War Director, I wrote in this sense to Manin, who answered me as follows:—

*“ From the Provisional Government of Venice,  
14th March, 1849.*

“ GENERAL,

“ I have the pleasure to send you the circular of the 30th January, p.p., in which you will perceive that your legitimate request has been forestalled, and that no advancement can take place among the officers without your approbation. Accept, General, the assurance of my profound esteem.

“ MANIN, *President.*”

The information reached us that Carlo Alberto had decided on renewing hostilities on the 20th of the current month of March. Manin, the President, announced this news to the people, and adjourned the National

Assembly for fifteen days, as he had the right to do. It was a joyful day for the inhabitants of Venice, and for the military who composed the garrison ; for they believed that the same order, good will, and subordination, existed elsewhere as with us.

I calculated what would be the force necessary for the defence, and I reckoned not a little on the good will of the National Guard. I divided those who could be spared into four brigades ; one remained in readiness to throw itself at my orders from Malghera on, *terra firma*, and second my operations ; the other three followed me to Chioggia, with a field battery, commanded by the active Major Boldoni, and 120 horsemen led by Captain Dioz, both Neapolitans. These three brigades were commanded by General Rizzardi, and Colonels Belluzzi and Novaro, who had arrived in Venice with the Lombard battalion.

When I embarked with my staff for Chioggia on a small steamboat, the people of Venice, advertised of my movements I know not how, followed me to the shore with shouts of applause which could not have been greater had I returned from some brilliant victory.

I had been promised the assistance of a Roman division as soon as hostilities were commenced ; but I counted on them very little, if at all ; for not only had they not commenced their march, but they were not even brought together. On the part of the Sardinian King profound silence was observed. Assistance was neither offered nor requested from the left of the Po.

The Estuary was blockaded by eighteen or twenty thousand Austrians. My endeavours could not go beyond obliging the enemy to augment, rather than diminish, the number of their forces round the Lagoon, and at the same time attempting some *coup-de-main* against the besiegers, encouraged as I was by the moral advantage which my soldiers had gained over the enemy. Though my exploring expeditions and my assaults on the enemy during nearly ten months had been successful, it must not therefore be supposed that I had not encountered difficulties of great moment in my movements.

It should be remembered that in 1815, the French, while they were besieged in Venice, only attempted a single sortie against Cavanella



on the Adige. They not only failed in taking it, as happened to myself, through General Ferrari's fault, but they were thrown for a short time on the left of the river. The fields which environ the Lagoon, are all surrounded by stagnant water, and by canals and streams, which are sometimes small, sometimes navigable. Often the banks are so narrow that a few men are sufficient to prevent the approach or the retreat of the enemy, by means of barricades, which can be constructed in a moment. These peculiarities of position sufficiently show the difficulties attending military movements there.

Florestano, who from Naples had his eyes attentively directed towards my operations, wrote to me that I could not be too careful in securing the means of retreating. I wished to advance to Rovigo, and I might perhaps have executed this movement with impunity ; but certainly if the enemy had been well furnished with spies, and had decided on attacking me boldly to cut off my retreat, they might have accomplished their purpose, since my column was not sufficiently numerous to allow me to leave echelons on my line of march according

as circumstances might require. Moreover, I could not trust much to chance without endangering the more useful defence of Venice.

However, not to remain with my hands idle, and in the hope that one favourable movement might lead to another, I made a Lombard battalion advance on Conche. It entered beyond the spot I had indicated, constructed a barricade, and established itself regularly in that position. The enemy, advertised of their numbers, advanced with four times their forces, and two field pieces. Our men being without artillery, after making a brave resistance with their muskets, were obliged to sound the retreat. I, who counted much on the moral energy of my troops, said that the valour showed by the Lombards could not efface the fault of retreating before the enemy, and that, therefore, they must retake the position, with the Lombards in the front rank. As I was ignorant of the forces by which the Austrians would be supported, I disposed seven battalions in echelons, with only a small distance between them and the Lombards. It was a gratifying sight for me, on passing in front of them, to observe the



excellent spirit with which they were animated. In the midst of the sounds of military music all exclaimed, “*Viva l’Italia! Viva il nostro Generale!*” One of the battalions added to these shouts the singular exclamation of “*Viva pure la morte!*”\* and I answered in a loud voice, “Yes, dear and valiant sons, ‘*Viva la morte!*’ for from that will redound liberty and glory to Italy.”

The valour of the Lombards was as usual successful; preceded by two guns, they attacked and took the position they had lost two days before. This column was led by Major Sirtori, and by Virgilio, Captain of Artillery, both belonging to my staff, and both officers of great courage; not only they regained Conche at the point of the bayonet, but they pursued the enemy to the heights of St. Margherita. A Roman detachment of the Union were along with the Lombards, and another detachment of the Euganei.

Other exploring expeditions were made, about the same time in the direction of Cavarzere, and all had the desired result.

While from these minor successes I was

\* “Long live death itself!”

hoping for others of greater importance, I received a letter from the government, in which it was said that reasons, which would be communicated to me by word of mouth, had determined them to inform me that I must suspend all offensive operations, whether on a small, or on a large scale.

I immediately understood that some disaster which had befallen the Piedmontese army had dictated this dismal letter, which was dated 27th March, 1849.

The misfortunes of the Sardinian army became public before the Venetian government communicated them to me. After giving orders that the troops who had been called to Chioggia should go back to their posts, and join the corps destined to encamp outside the Lagoon, I returned to Venice followed by my staff.

## CHAPTER III.

CHARLES ALBERT'S SECOND CAMPAIGN, MARCH, 1849.

IN giving a rapid account of Charles Albert's first campaign, I rendered full justice to his loyal and Italian heart, while I also pointed out the errors he had committed. In the second campaign, of which I now propose to give a short account, the errors were unhappily more numerous and important than in the first.

Instead of acting together, the government, the populace, the higher classes, and the most fervent patriots, without being aware of it, all followed a course which ruined Italian independence. In the opinion of those who were most impartial, and most experienced in military affairs, it was not the soldiers alone who deserved blame ; their faults arose from the wrong direction given to them, and should be more justly attributed to their chiefs.

It seems strange that the Italians who have given so many captains to other nations, Pescara, Farnese, Montecucoli, Eugène of Savoy, Massena, and Bonaparte, should not, in this last campaign for independence, have possessed a single general of distinguished merit. It is true that military capacity is acquired in the field, and that we had had a long European peace. This disadvantage might indeed be alleged by both parties, and the incidents of Milan, Brescia, &c. are a proof of its weight. But the enemy's successes in the field may be attributed to the more solid discipline of old troops opposed to new recruits, and to the steadiness usual to those who combat out of their own country. Beyond the Isonzo, Charles Albert's army would not have been urged to disorganisation by a needy aristocracy, by demagogues, and by Jesuits, as was the case on the right of the Ticino.

I will first point out the defects of the administration and organisation of the Sardinian army, adding a few words on its morality; and I will then show the errors of the plan of campaign. It will then appear

that the Piedmontese soldiers did not lack that constant valour, with which they have honoured the standard of the Princes of Savoy, as well as that of Napoleon.

It is my firm conviction, that there was no treachery whatever, and that all Italy should be grateful to the Piedmontese army, and still more to Charles Albert and his two sons, who without hesitation exposed their lives and fortunes for the Italian cause, without being discouraged by the misfortunes of the first campaign. Italians! There is no citizen who more than myself has had occasion to show how much more he is devoted to his country, than to kings. From kings I desire nothing; nor could I, without being wanting to myself, accept any person's favour from them. Nevertheless, I repeat that we should all remember Charles Albert with gratitude, as well as his sons, who valiantly followed him to the field of battle, and who could not now ever deviate in Italy from the line of policy embraced by their father, without exposing themselves to dishonour, as well as to the loss of their throne.

The basis of the administration of the

Sardinian army is money ; whatever the cause, it is notorious that that system failed. I cannot here discuss their financial measures ; I will only say, that instead of 100,000 men, it would have been better to limit the number to 80,000, and to have selected the most eligible in all respects. Quality, rather than numbers, constitutes the strength of an army. In the Sardinian kingdom (as indeed everywhere) the national guard should be well organised, and it would then furnish 20,000 men, both for internal defence and for garrison service. These 20,000 men would require to be paid only when taken away from their homes. Allow me to recal the fact, that in 1820, by means of telegraphic orders, I made no fewer than eighty battalions of the civic guard march to the frontiers ; and that thirty of these fought under my command at Rieti, from dawn until sunset. They were all clothed and armed at their own expense, though only with fowling-pieces. By reducing the Sardinian army to 80,000 men, both the quality of the troops and the administration would have gained. True it is, that with only 80,000 men



there would have been no commands of large and useless detachments to distribute. To the want of money, must be added the absence of that regularity in all branches of the service, which can alone insure good results. There was a confusion in the administration of the different corps, which, during seven months, the military superintendents were unable to overcome; and it is well known to all experienced officers that want of discipline is the sure result. At seven-and-twenty years of age I commanded a brigade in Spain, under Marshal Suchet. His troops were the best disciplined, because they were the best administered, of any in the empire.

In the Sardinian army the commissariat was confided to favoured and inexperienced persons. Hence it happened that in the second, as in the first campaign, provisions failed, and the biscuits destined for a last resource were consumed the first day.

The military superintendents had so completely neglected the organisation of the sanitary service of the army, that many of the ambulances only joined the divisions to

which they belonged, after the battle of Novara. The service of the baggage trains was not at all in proportion with the wants of the army, which, if it had advanced into Lombardy, would have fallen into great confusion. With regard to their armament, I will only say that they always had the cartridge-box fixed to their girdles, which contained a few cartridges without any wadding to protect them.

We now come to the organic part of the army. The squadrons of the infantry, on which every army depends, were deprived of two classes of soldiers who served in the first campaign, and who had been replaced by two classes of the reserve. At the same time, partial leave of absence had been given to many soldiers, and the regiments found themselves in this manner without their oldest soldiers, who, although fathers of families, had proved brave under fire, and in the pursuit of the Austrians. On the eve of hostilities, these were replaced by young conscripts, newly arrived in the ranks, with the remembrance of recent defeat, and this alone was sufficient to compromise the suc-



cess of the campaign. Moreover, at the moment when the commencement of hostilities was notified, the formation of a fourth battalion in every regiment was ordered. Thus, in all the squadrons, the officers and subaltern officers were displaced, and found themselves separated from their soldiers and from each other ; and by this means was destroyed the reciprocal confidence which can only be acquired by time, and in the field. This displacement was effected between the 11th and 14th of March ; but the evil results of it were so striking, that on the 15th, when hostilities were first announced, orders were given to re-establish the squadrons as before. This operation was performed in haste ; disorder and confusion followed. Those corps, which, from want of time could not reconstruct their squadrons, experienced the fatal effects of conducting young conscripts, who had seen only two months' service, to the enemy's fire. Such was the detriment done to the morals, discipline, and administration of the infantry.

In March 1848, the Piedmontese army which entered Lombardy consisted of an effective force of 70,000 men.

All the troops of the kingdom, including Lombardy, with many battalions of reserve, amounted to 120,000 men : it became necessary, therefore, to enlarge the *cadres*. New promotions of officers and subaltern officers greatly injured discipline, for they were generally conferred with much partiality, on young men, new to the career, and to the Italian provinces. These inconveniences, with their evil results, extended from the lowest to the highest grades in the army. Almost all the general and superior officers saw their brigades, their regiments, their battalions, for the first time. General Penon, killed on the field of honour, first saw the division which he commanded only three days before the battle of Novara, and was not known to a single regiment. The new rules of promotion had not produced able chiefs, and had irritated the minds of all.

Passing from the organic defects of the army, to the germs of demoralisation which existed in the minds of the soldiers, I will remark, that circumstances were not exactly similar in 1848, and in 1849. The enthusiasm for the sacred war was enfeebled in

the latter year ; the sad recollections of the retreat of the Nuncio, and the deplorable events which had occurred in the city of Milan, had left an impression on the minds both of officers and soldiers, which weakened the fraternal ties between the Piedmontese and the Lombards, those two contiguous nations, belonging to the same country. The peasantry of those provinces in which the political measures of Pius IX., during the first months of his government, had been influential, now asked the reason of his change. In every party demagogues exist ; those who fawn on power are the most ignoble of all. At the opening of the campaign the warmest patriotism was tinged with the vices of demagogues. One fault was committed, which, rightly or wrongly, boasted of patriotism ; it was that of not shouldering a musket and saying, "If we have been first in speech, we will be first also in deeds." In Greece and Rome, who would have dared to excite the people to arms, without combating or having combated themselves ?

We now come to the plan of the campaign, if, indeed, any plan ever existed. In the

12th chapter, Vol. I., we demonstrated the superiority of the position of the Sardinian army over that of Radetzky. If Charles Albert had chosen the city of Padua as an entrenched camp, with all the advantages to be derived from Venice, I pointed out the sorties which might have been made from Padua through the Lagoon, and supported by the Sardo-Venetian squadron, with 20,000 men at a time. I indicated the manner in which the Italians might have invaded Trieste, Fiume, and all the Austrian ports in the Adriatic, and destroyed their navy ; also how 20,000 men, manœuvring in concert with the King's land forces, might have interrupted all communication between our enemy and their empire. On the opening of the second campaign the King had, some days previously, received my views, and further details which he had asked for, through the medium of General Olivaro and the Deputy Correnti, who were sent to confer with me in Venice. But he acted as if Venice had not been a province devoted to the Italian cause, and ready to sacrifice all to Italy.

Setting aside the operations which might

have been executed on the left of the Adige, the Piedmontese army, if the war had been conducted in those provinces, would have found there neither Jesuits, nor a retrograde party, endeavouring to turn it from the cause of independence, and exciting desertion, in order to ruin that cause. This reflection, alone, should have been sufficient to induce Charles Albert to prefer a war which was distant from his own provinces.

But, since he fatally renounced the scheme of combating the enemy in their weakest positions, that is to say, in their communications with the Empire, and in the city of that Empire, washed by the Adriatic, why, at least, did he not decide whether the war should be offensive or defensive? There were advantages in each system ; but offensive warfare was best adapted to the Italian nature ; it would have revived the weakened love between the Piedmontese and the Lombards ; and, in fine, the latter, supported by 70,000 organised Piedmontese troops, would again have exhibited their former valour in Milan. But nothing was prepared for a war in Lombardy ; neither arms nor ammunition



were ready for distribution ; for Marshal Radetzky had punished, with the utmost rigour, all who had dared to preserve a single offensive weapon. Still less had the Sardinian government thought of organising those numerous light-armed bands, so well adapted to the Italian agility and ardour, as was often proved in the middle ages. Thirteen years ago, I treated of this subject in my “Italia Militare,” and, above all, I combated the false idea entertained of the plains of Lombardy in supposing them not adapted to guerilla warfare. In these plains, the highest cultivation exists ; the richest lands, rendered swampy from the snow and rain, are easily inundated ; and the numerous canals do not permit artillery and cavalry to act, nor even infantry to move regularly. Small bodies of troops can, therefore, combat advantageously *alla spicciolata*, if they only take care to avoid the more solid plains which are occasionally met with.

Supposing a defensive war to have been decided on, the skirts of the Alps, Genoa, and Alessandria, gave admirable positions for the defence, which might have been converted

into offensive movements in the same manner as this was done in Portugal, by Wellington, who had before him no less a general than Massena. It would have been necessary to abandon Turin to the enemy, but this sacrifice would not have been great, and would have ultimately proved of immense advantage; thanks to the wise, vigorous, and prompt strategic movements, which might have taken place. To point these out now would be impossible, depending as they would have done on the positions and forces of the enemy.

Besides the two plans of either attacking Radetzky in Lombardy, or drawing him on towards Genoa and the Alps, there remained a third plan, which was, to form a camp of 70,000 men in Novara, and, according to the movements of the enemy, either to march on Milan, or to transfer the camp to Alessandria, *viâ* Vercelli. But, in order to be in a position which should leave the choice of these movements, it was indispensable that the Sardinian troops should remain united behind Novara, in case circumstances should compel a battle.



For this plan a large provision of ammunition of all kinds was necessary, as well as campaign fortifications, brought from the city to flank the troops; in fine, then, as ever, a good spy system was quite indispensable. With this the enemy was well provided; while there was absolutely none in the first campaign on our side. The Sardinian army being thus posted behind Novara, it is more than probable that they would have defeated the enemy.

They had the choice either of penetrating into Milan, or of retiring to the many strong positions which Piedmont possesses, beginning with Alessandria and Genoa; or they might have waited for Radetzky in Novara with all their forces. It is an immense advantage for an army to have a city in front of them, and their flanks defended by campaign fortifications. Towers and steeples give great opportunities of examining, with precision, the enemy's forces and movements, while they obstruct his view of his opponent. In a field of battle, it is a piece of good fortune to meet with a village, or even a cottage.

At the battle of Waterloo, the English had

some small buildings in front of them, which it cost the French an immense loss to take. If it may be permitted to compare small things with great, I might add that in 1815, in King Joachim's campaign against Austria, I had to defend the left of the Reno, near Bologna, with 7000 men against 18,000 Austrians. Among the circumstances which enabled me to repel such a numerous enemy from the Reno during the whole day, was the position of some farm-houses, which protected me from the shots of the enemy, and concealed many of my movements, while, from three small buildings, I discovered every operation of my adversary. In Novara, 70,000, or even fewer, Piedmontese might have conquered the enemy.

But the passing and repassing the Ticino with two divisions; hastening breathless to Mortara, and then returning demoralised to Novara; the weakness of occupying a long line from Arone to Sarzane; in fine, keeping the divisions of Marmora and Romarino far from the centre of operations;—all these were dispositions never yet heard of in the annals of war. Marshal Radetzky, though

occupying a hostile country, in marching against the Piedmontese, left in all Lombardy only 10,000 men, and kept all the rest of his army united under himself. To send out large detachments, forces very superior to those of the enemy are necessary.

It only remains for me to add to this sad chapter, that the Sardinian troops were wanting neither in valour nor in Italian feelings. As long as the people of Northern Italy have an army, they are, and will be, truly Italian.

## CHAPTER IV.

## INSURRECTION IN BRESCIA.

AMONG the many popular movements which have occurred in Italy during the last two years, the insurrection of Brescia shows, perhaps more evidently than any other, that the nation is ripe for definitive emancipation.

This is proved by the heroic sacrifice which this city made of its best citizens, daring, with a population of only 35,000 inhabitants, to expose itself to the attacks of 20,000 Austrians, who surrounded and besieged it. This fact also proves, that, where valour and resolution are united, a people may attempt everything with a probability of success.

If we rapidly survey the attempts made

\* This chapter is from the pen of my friend, Dr. Fossati, a fervent Italian, who has always remained devoted to the common cause.

by the Italians since 1796 to obtain their liberty, it will be seen that their movements were never truly unanimous and popular as in the recent struggle.

In 1796, the French army, led by the republican general Bonaparte, drove the Germans from Lombardy ; and though the people spontaneously ran to their aid, yet they were still under a foreign yoke. At the same time, the French despoiled them of many objects of art, and of large sums of money. Many thousands of men were compelled to fight, not for the advantage of their country, but for that of a foreign nation ; and the final result of so many sacrifices was the total loss of liberty and Italian independence. The only two republics which existed in Italy before the arrival of the French, those of Genoa and Venice, disappeared in the general catastrophe ; and these valorous people, like a flock of sheep, were assigned to despotic governments.

Towards the end of 1814, when the Italian army had proved its valour in Spain, in Germany, and Russia, and was still united in Lombardy and Venice, some of its chiefs,

with other valiant citizens, dared to project the liberation of Italy ; but their daring was punished, before an overt act had been committed, by many years of captivity in the prisons of Mantua and Milan.

The movement at Naples in 1820 was both military and popular ; but, being confined to that kingdom, it could neither resist the Austrian arms, nor all Europe leagued against Italian liberty ; and the causes of this disaster are well known.

The movement in Piëdmont, in 1821, was military, rather than popular or national. Few citizens took part in it ; and no resistance was opposed to the invasion of the Austrians.

The insurrections of Modena and Bologna, in 1831, had a popular commencement ; but the Italians confided too implicitly in the solemn promises of the French, which were shamefully violated. They were discouraged, abandoned, and vanquished, before they had had time to prepare for the combat.

• In the present times, French promises have again failed ; and it may be well to recal to the memory of the Italians that true and



famous sentence of Salviati, who says of the French : “ Frangunt ridendo fidem.”

The true National Italian insurrection commenced, then, in 1848, and the daring enterprise of Brescia proves, not only that the Italians have not lost their ancient valour, but that they are resolved to throw off a foreign yoke, and to cancel with their blood all the acts of unjust oppression which they have endured.

We shall endeavour, in a few pages, to recount all the valorous deeds of the Brescians during the days of the late insurrection. The Brescians possess in Italy an ancient reputation for courage, determination, and independence, and history confirms this opinion. Recent facts surpass all that their ancestors recount of them.

After the precipitate and inexplicable retreat of the Piedmontese army from Mincio to the other side of the Ticino, the Brescians did not give up all hope of the liberation of Italy. In the midst of the most atrocious persecutions, and despite the dangers of imprisonment and of the scaffold, they continued to prepare for the combat, for



vengeance; and for liberty. ° On the 14th of March, the news reached Brescia that the armistice between Austria and Piedmont was broken; on the 20th, that hostilities were commenced, and 100,000 Italian soldiers ready to take the field! On the 19th, the struggle had already begun. Mountain bands, guided by the valiant Carolo di Serle, came and stationed themselves on the suburban hills, and from thence attacked the trains and defences of the Austrian army. On the 20th the people assembled in crowds, demanding that the advocate Saleri, an excellent citizen, should be proclaimed (as he afterwards was) chief of the municipality, instead of Zambelli, who was leagued with the Austrians. On the same day, a quantity of flour was sent into the city by the insurrectionary committee, with instructions from General Chernowski, with a plan of the Lombard insurrection, and with directions to commence the movement on the 21st of March. The city of Brescia was the most suitable centre for the Lombard insurrection, and the inhabitants held themselves prepared.

On the morning of the 23rd, the military commandant, at the invitation of the municipality, who endeavoured to preserve order in the city, promised two hundred swords to the citizens, and proposed that two hundred of them, forming a sort of civic guard, should use these arms, and guard the city by turns. At this moment the Austrians demanded a contribution of 130,000 lire,—an injustice equal to that by which Haynau compelled the city to pay for its own degradation.

The populace assembled on the Piazza, and hearing of this demand, began to exclaim that lead, and not gold, should be sent to their oppressors. This commenced the popular movement. Several cart-loads of provisions and wood, which were stationed at the castle, were seized; the soldiers and gendarmes were put to flight; every Austrian ensign was torn down, and cries of “Viva l’Italia! Death to the barbarians!” were alone heard. While this first movement was in progress, the Commandant of the Piazza and the Chief of the Commissariat reached the municipality to receive the sum demanded; but the people arrived, and invading the municipal saloon,

made them both prisoners. They were with difficulty saved from the popular fury.

The Commandant of the Piazza, now in the hands of the people, was compelled to give his soldiers orders to surrender their guns to the National Guard. Some only obeyed; but at this moment advice arrived that a large supply of ammunition and arms was on the road from Iseo, and that the column of emigrants was moving towards Bergamo; in fine, it was said that the war was begun, and that the Piedmontese divisions had entered Lombardy *viâ* Alagenta. Inflamed by these hopes, the people unanimously cried, "To arms!"

The Castle of Brescia, recently restored and put in a state of defence by Radetzky, was armed with fourteen large guns, and contained about nine hundred men, under the command of Captain Leshke. The Germans required prompt submission; but the people were not subdued. In the middle of the night, Leshke began to bombard the city. In the midst of this fiery tempest, the people ran boldly to arms; some extinguished the fires, some cleared the streets. The women

and children repaired to the belfries and rang a peal. Already bands of deserters came down to clear the streets and erect barricades.

This nocturnal battle was almost like a festival long desired and promised, so great was the popular fury, and faith in their country's deliverance. On the following day, the 24th, Leshke found means to send some gendarmes out of the castle, two of whom went to Mantua to demand succour. In the meantime the Brescians, wishing to increase and fortify the insurrection, chose for their chiefs the citizens Contratti and Cassola, men of rare devotion to the Italian cause. These made the best possible arrangements both for the defence and the attack. The 150,000 lire, which the city had collected to satisfy Haynau's extortion, were devoted to sustain the contest.

This day was passed between fear and hope in anxious expectation of the succours from Ticino. The Imperialists were also impatiently waiting for news from the camp ; and on that day intelligence of the events of Mantua, and of the first flight of the Piedmontese, reached the city.

The 25th passed quietly.\* Each side held itself ready for the combat: no one could credit the news which arrived from the army on the Ticino.

In the meantime, the Imperialists, under the command of Nugent, came by rapid marches from Mantua towards Brescia. At dawn, on the 26th, a column of 1000 men, with two cannons, appeared at Montechiaro, and from thence proceeded to Rezzatto, to wait for reinforcements from Verona. The most expert company of citizens and deserters were posted at St. Eufemia, a large village two miles from Brescia. Bold marksmen defended them on one side towards the plain, and on the other from the mountains of Cajonvico. A small corps of reserve was placed at St. Francesco di Paulo, half way between Brescia and St. Eufemia.

A little before mid-day, the Austrians opened their fire. They were most numerous on the left of the Brescians, whose courage in this first encounter was almost miraculous. Their numbers were few, and they were unused to arms; but they repulsed the Croats, and would have pursued them with



the bayonet, if Speri, a brave and intelligent youth, who commanded this handful of heroes, had not stopped them. The Italians both fight and die gaily. An Austrian ball first struck a man named Raboldi on the breast : he expired exclaiming, "Happy that I am ! I have the honour of dying first on the field of battle !" and he recommended the captain not to forget to write his name first ; "And mine second !" cried another, struck by a ball in the stomach. A third refused the assistance of his comrades, saying, "My loss is enough, without making a fourth leave his post." The Brescian rifles disdained to fight from behind trees or hedges, saying, that this was not the Brescian mode of combat. The bravery of these men, scarcely more than a hundred in number, was prodigious : they stood firm for three hours against Nugent's battalions. The committee of defence ordered them to retire in good order, still keeping the enemy in check.

The committee at the same time sent a parley to Marshal Nugent, to know with what intention he came to the city. He replied, that he meant to enter Brescia either

freely, or forcibly. The people assembled in the Piazza, and deliberated on their position : they unanimously agreed that Brescia should be defended to the last. It was admirable to see the manly courage with which the women themselves exhorted their husbands and sons not to allow themselves to be moved by words, but to reply haughtily to haughty threats. Everything concurred to inflame the multitude, so that the cry of war alone was heard. This reply was sent to Nugent, and the promptest measures adopted for the defence. Some bands of villagers arrived in the city, and some ammunition was sent to it from Piedmont.

The struggle commenced at two o'clock, p.m., and the inhabitants, running to the barricades and the walls, cried "Viva !" for the war and for Italy ; and thus, with heroic though inexperienced valour, they resisted a warlike and well-provided enemy.

The morning of the 27th dawned happily. Mid-day passed, and Nugent had not yet moved ; but when the expected reinforcements arrived, Leshke, from the castle, fired on the city with bombs and grenades ; while



Nugent attacked our men on all sides. These combated joyfully to shouts of "Viva l'Italia !" nor did the wounded deign to interrupt with lamentations the warlike festival ; but all, in one way or another, showed themselves happy to die for the liberty of their country. The populace, seeing that the artillery made more noise than mischief, asked leave to charge the enemy ; and soon, at the gates of the city, every one wished to be first to act. About two hundred men ran boldly against the lines of the Imperialists, who were repulsed and forced to retreat. In the meantime deserters descended from their castle, and gave their aid to the common cause. On the approach of night, the chiefs thought it wisest for the citizens to return to safety and repose under the walls, and the bands of the curate Boifava again returned to the summit of the rocks where they were posted.

The citizens, finding they could repulse the Germans, gained fresh courage and confidence in the future. The administration of the municipality promised the citizens to repair the damages of the bombardment. At the dawn of the 28th, the committee of

defence posted the most expert fusileers on the declivities of the rocks, and in the Tower del Popolo, to fire down on the sentinels and the gunners placed in the castle. The enemy on the side of St. Eufemia moved slowly, which induced the belief that the Austrians were retiring ; but Speri, who had sharp eyes, thought this hesitation only a *ruse de guerre*, and wished the people to remain at the barricades.

However, the general wish was to go out tumultuously against the enemy's advanced posts, and drive them to St. Francisco. Nugent allowed our men to advance ; but when the foremost bands of citizens, though contrary to orders, had gone into the snare, the others would not abandon them. Two squadrons were therefore formed. One, led by Speri, ascended the rocks ; the other endeavoured to prevent the Austrians from surrounding the Brescians on the plain.

The fire then commenced along all the line ; the citizens rushed upon the Austrians with such impetuosity that their retreat was soon real and not simulated. It is said that Nugent, astonished and indignant, seeing

himself on the point of being driven away from the spot where, only two days before, he had with such harshness received their messenger, giving them four hours to repent and ask for mercy, came forward in person, and encouraged his soldiers ; and while he was giving orders to advance a cannon, and point it against the infuriated Brescians, he fell, struck by a ball, which, in a few days, brought him to death's door. Our people feared to throw themselves into St. Eufemia ; but the enemy, who surrounded it, left them no time for counsel, and their success was complete. But the Brescians, oppressed by the number of the enemy, endeavoured to regain their streets. Assailed by the Austrians, they fought valiantly. Speri's company, which had all Nugent's forces behind them, were forced to throw themselves off their hills ; they then encountered the battalion, which Nugent had posted in reserve, and two-thirds of the Brescians were either killed or wounded. The rest were driven back under the hills, where not a tenth arrived. The crowd of the enemy pressed on them ; five were taken alive, and shot ; the rest died

fighting. Out of fifty men who were with Speri, he was almost the only one to escape, having fulfilled the part both of soldier and captain.

The 28th was a cruel but glorious day for Brescia. The indomitable pride of the wounded and the prisoners seems incredible ; they never condescended to beg for life, as is usually the case. On this day, the Brescians lost near one hundred men ; the loss of the enemy was double. With a handful of men, Brescia resisted forces immeasurably superior, and confided in the destiny of Italy.

The news of the armistice of Novara reached Brescia on the 29th, in the morning, and seemed so monstrous and improbable, that no one could believe it true. Divers messengers arrived with news of Charles Albert's abdication ; but some affirmed that Chernowski had engaged and defeated Radetzky.

In the midst of these reports, the Brescians remained armed on the walls and the barricades. Firing recommenced at mid-day, the Imperialists having received succours from Peschiera and Verona. While the combat

continued with dubious fortune outside the walls, Leshke bombarded the city with great fury. Many bombs fell on the Civil Hospital, and the committee sent word to the military physician that the enemy must respect the sanitary banners, or expect reprisals. The people suspected that the municipality were treating for the surrender of the city ; and if Speri and some others had not sworn that they were only in treaty for the hospitals, which, according to the laws of warfare, are always respected, they could not have calmed the populace. But the Germans took the opportunity of this momentary truce, to penetrate insidiously under the gates, and set fire to many surrounding houses. At this sight, the Brescians became furious ; they threw the flag of truce into the dirt, and exclaimed that they would rather bury themselves with their wives and children under the ruins of the city, than suffer such infamy. While the breathless multitude was confusedly consulting how to avenge the insult, a large shell burst on the Piazza ; some one took up the largest fragment, and placed it in the midst of the people, who stretched out their hands and



swore, as on the Gospel, to die rather than yield. Such was the noble courage and unanimity inspired by this act, that many knelt down and wept with emotion. In the midst of this excitement the cry was heard of "To the gates!" and nothing could restrain them. The enemy, who had already experienced Brescian fury, retreated to St. Francisco.

On the 30th, firing began early in the morning: the Brescians fought with their usual courage; if they had had only one cannon, they could have prevented the enemy from receiving succours, and the city would never have been taken with the means they then possessed.

On this day, letters arrived from Crema and Lodi, saying that the Austrians had been completely beaten by General Chernowsky. The articles of a new armistice were sent to Brescia, by which Austria was to retire beyond the Adige, and on that condition the lives and properties of the citizens were to be respected.

The Brescians, thus deceived by their own friends, were fed with vain hopes. The

enemy, in the meantime, reinforced the garrison of the castle. Haynau arrived with fresh troops : he took the command of the siege, and soon set about the destruction of that city, which a few months before he had so basely insulted.

The morning of the 31st commenced gloomily. At nine o'clock, some soldiers were seen to issue from the castle with a white flag, bearing a dispatch from Haynau. They now began to suspect that all the forces engaged in the Italian war were assembled round the walls of Brescia. The Marshal demanded the surrender of the city without any conditions ; and if, by mid-day, a free entry was not given to his troops, he threatened the Brescians with assault, pillage, devastation, and entire ruin. The letter was most insulting, and concluded, ironically saying : “ Brescians ! you know me—I shall keep my word ! ”

The municipality and the committee, stifling their indignation, deliberated on sending commissaries to the castle. Five citizens exposed themselves to the peril, aware that Haynau was a very tiger. On being introduced to



him, they narrated the facts which had occurred, and the other reasons which, they conceived, justified the citizens in their enterprise. They produced a copy of the armistice, which they believed to be true, and by which the Austrians were to evacuate Lombardy. Haynau answered, with a perfidious smile, "I know all ; I am informed of everything ; but I will not speak of these things, —the only question is the surrender of the city, which I have fixed for mid-day." Thus, neither he, nor any of his officers, informed the Brescians of their error regarding the armistice ; and it seems that they purposely excited those valiant citizens, for fear they should surrender, and deprive them of the power of revenging themselves by their utter extermination.

When the Marshal's answer was received, no other honourable and reasonable means remained for the Brescians, but to oppose force to force. Saugervagio, in the name of the municipality, explained to the assembled multitude what had taken place. When the proud words of Haynau were related, and the people heard that two hours only were

granted for the surrender of Brescia, supposed to be vanquished by fear, one formidable cry arose : “ *War, give us war !* ” the sound of which reached the enemy’s camp. The people were silent, and ran to take their arms after placing their women and children in safety in the cellars. These applauded the determination to resist, and showed no fear at the gravity of the danger ; they prepared their husbands’ arms and their own, cartridges, stones, tiles, boiling water. The citizens, comforting one another, passed two sublime hours, breathing an atmosphere of sacrifice and love, as if it were a preparation for a holy death. At two o’clock, the answer of the Brescians to the ferocious Haynau was the sound of a peal of bells. Shortly after, a sharp firing commenced against the advanced posts of the Austrians, who placed a battery of large mortars against the gate Torrelunga. The troops assembled before all the other gates of the city to make a simultaneous attack, when the artillery from the castle should give the signal.

About three o’clock the firing commenced, and the city was attacked on all sides. The

artillery destroyed the external barricades and the Brescians retreated within the gates, but still fighting and repulsing the enemy. In spite of the repeated attacks of the infantry, and the tempest of shells, grenades, and balls, all maintained their posts, and Speri's brigade remained intrepidly guarding that gate, which no professional soldier ever dared to pass. Haynau made his thousands descend towards the streets which led into the centre of the city, but they were thrown back by the frequent and well-aimed shots of the defenders.

The leaders of the Brescians decided on combating the enemy in the very streets of the city ! They therefore ordered their men to retire by degrees ; and then, after a show of defence, they abandoned the barricade of St. Urbano. The 'Austrians, thinking this a real retreat, pursued their enemy through the streets which led to the Piazza 'dell' Albera. There the Brescians waited for them, posted all around in the houses and behind entrenchments. The first company of their fortunate enemy was completely destroyed, and the others, which hastened forwards at the noise of the battle, could neither advance nor

recede. They charged resolutely with their bayonets on the barricades, but such was the slaughter they met with, that no more ventured to the trial. When Haynau saw so much bravery he was said to be moved, and to have exclaimed : “ If I had 30,000 of these indomitable Brescians I would march to the gates of Paris ! ”

The Austrians again ventured to the assault, but the troops were scarcely in movement when Lieutenant-Colonel Milez fell, struck by a ball from a carbine. At this sight the Brescians shouted victory ; they sprang from behind their shelter, destroying whatever they encountered. The sword of the dead colonel was given to his destroyer, a brave youth of the people, who by a stratagem had killed several of the enemy’s officers. He posted himself on a barricade till a ball struck him on the breast. Haynau sent forward more troops from the eastern bastions towards that part where for two hours the contest had been the hottest between Speri’s company and Nugent’s brigade, which was commanded that day by Colonel Favencourt, who was afterwards killed. Neither the prayers nor

the commands of their chiefs could persuade the Brescians to retire ; and thus many valourous men fell exhausted at their post, the victims of their unconquered valour.

In the meantime, Nugent's brigade penetrated into the city, and breaking through the internal barricades, they reached the Bruttanome. Here the citizens and peasants ran on them from all the surrounding streets ; a close contest ensued with bayonets, pistols, and sticks, and the Imperialists were driven to the gates. In this encounter the Brescians had to lament the serious wounds received by the most intrepid of their heroic youths, Oposa, endowed with talents and extraordinary beauty, who, despising death and danger, repaired to where the fighting was the fiercest ; all knew how often the eyes of the combatants and the dying sought his angelic figure.

In the evening, the Germans fortified themselves in their posts ; but, the city was still almost intact. The ferocious Haynau raged with impatience, and while expecting the third corps of the army, together with strong reinforcements of artillery, he attempted to storm the city before their arrival. He set fire to



the houses outside the city, so that it appeared enveloped in flames. When the darkness of night was come, the soldiers were ordered to penetrate over the walls and into the houses, to set fire to them everywhere without mercy, and to employ the most diabolical and infamous means. The light of the fire was seen over almost all Lombardy.

It would be impossible to describe the ferocious acts of the Croats on that last night of Lombard liberty ; the atrocities committed by the most barbarous people would be mild in comparison.

The Brescians then deliberated on the resolution to be taken, and finding that men and ammunition still remained sufficient for another day's combat, they determined to defend themselves while hope and a single cartridge remained.

On the morning of the 1st of April, the city resounded with one fierce cry of "*War*," and the Brescians, protected by the barricades, drove the enemy from the posts they had occupied in the night in consequence of the fire ; and from the Bruttanome in particular, they drove them with such impetus that the



first lines were thrown back, and they were on the point of taking two of the enemy's cannon. This was the last victory of the Brescians. Fresh artillery and battalions now arrived to Haynau, who made them instantly enter into battle; and with such superiority of forces, and such means of devastation, they penetrated into the houses, destroying everything that came in their way.

The following paragraph, which is literally copied from an authentic pamphlet, I think it due to history to preserve and recommend to the frequent perusal of the Italians, that they may not forget what they owe to Austria :—

“ The sight of the horrible deeds committed by the Imperialists, whether in drunkenness, or by command, or in consequence of their stupidly ferocious natures, was such as to overwhelm the mind and freeze the blood in men's veins : they were beyond the limits of imagination or belief. Not only were they ferocious towards women, children, and the sick, but the tortures they inflicted were refined in such a manner as to show how much the cruelty of man exceeds that of the

most ferocious animals. Limbs torn from their victims were flung from the windows and the barricades as food for the dogs. The heads of young children cut from their bodies, women's arms, and fragments of human flesh, were thrown into the midst of the Brescian troops, to whom bombs then seemed merciful. Above all, the Imperial cannibals delighted in the horrible convulsions of those whom they burnt to death ; therefore they covered the prisoners with pitch, then set them on fire, and often compelled the women to assist at their husbands' martyrdom. Sometimes, to make game of the noble blood of the Brescians, which boiled with magnanimous wrath, they tightly bound the men, and then, before their eyes, they dishonoured and cut the throats of their wives and children ; and sometimes (God forgive us if we remember such a horrid fact) they forced them to swallow the mangled entrails of their nearest friends. Many died of anguish, and many fell fainting with horror."

The populace, whose fury of vengeance was excited to delirium, resolved to be killed on the corpses of their enemies, when some one

recalled to their recollection that there were many spies unpunished in the prisons. The most ferocious rushed to the prisons and killed them : these had almost all been already condemned to death by the judges as felons and murderers.

The municipality fearing that the people, blinded by just rage and grief, should become more cruel, consented that their chief should interpose for peace. • Accompanied by his brother, and preceded by a certain Marchesini, one of the people, whom the love of his country inspired with the eloquence of a Tribune and the courage of a martyr, the father of the municipality used every effort to obtain a mild answer from the Marshal ; but Haynau, silent and implacable, only consented to a suspension of arms during the conference ; and this species of truce, only on the part of the Brescians, was more fatal to them than many days of battle, since the enemies' troops ceased not to commit numerous assassinations. Finally, after two hours, the Marshal dismissed the father of the municipality with a written paper, where, in the midst of harsh words, unsuited to such misfortunes and such bravery,

it was stated that the peaceful citizens need fear no hostility. The Brescians resigned themselves to their destiny, expecting to be again treated as enemies and vassals, but not as slaves pardoned, and returned to their yoke.

Almost all the citizens yielded to their cruel fate, except a few who had absolutely determined to die fighting, and the Marshal took on himself the task of breaking their cruel obduracy. But the Imperial soldiers demanded pillage and carnage ; already they had robbed the houses nearest the walls. More than twenty battalions, with cavalry and artillery in proportion, were encamped in the Piazza and in the country round. It was necessary to find food for many persons, and the municipality performed miracles in these circumstances, distributing 15,000 rations of bread, wine, and forage.

In the night a ray of hope shone on the desolate Brescians. The valorous and intrepid Camezzi, with near 800 men, had hastened from Bergamo to aid the Brescians. They fought desperately, but being informed that they were surrounded by numerous troops, and considering the fatal armistice of

Novara, these bands were dissolved in the midst of universal grief.

Let the reader imagine the murders, the burning, the pillage, the violence of those frantic soldiers. Neither generals nor officers showed themselves anxious for their honour and humanity. Colonel Jellachich, brother of the celebrated Ban, was an exception. Seeing the Church of St. Affra menaced, where many women had taken refuge, he hastened to guard the entrance, and remained there till his men had departed. Some few officers who had lodged in Brescia endeavoured to preserve the houses of their hosts from pillage. But the ferocious Haynau clearly showed that his mind was turned to vengeance rather than to the government of a brave and unfortunate people. It is believed that more than a hundred among the best and most intrepid of the citizens were in a few hours dragged to the castle, bastinadoed, tortured, and finally shot. A fine of 7,000,000 of livres was imposed on the provinces, and on the city a special charge of 300,000 livres, as a reward for his officers.

The command of the city was given to



Lieut.-General Appel, who speedily demanded with threats, that the heads of the insurrection should be given up to him. Slaughter was now organised. Women and children, the aged and the helpless, were first horribly macerated. We will retail a few facts to illustrate the wickedness of the conquerors. The priest Gabetti, a school-master, trusting in the terms of the surrender, went outside the walls to visit his cottage, which had been set fire to on the preceding night, and in which his mother lived; but scarcely had he gone out, when he was seized and conducted to Haynau in the castle, where on the following day he was shot as a patriot priest.

A more horrible martyrdom closed the life of Pietro Venturini, a member of the legal profession, and popular among the Brescians: weighed down by years and by gout, he was pressed with threats to swear fidelity to the Imperial Banners; he boldly threw himself on the bayonets pointed to his heart, and cursing the enemies of Italy, and lovingly saluting his country and liberty, he sought and obtained death.

Some iniquitous Croats laid their hands on



a poor workman, and deliberated on burning him for their amusement ; as he was small and deformed, they supposed he could make but little resistance, and would perhaps die in more laughable convulsions. Carlo Zima possessed the strength of a plebeian : when in the flames, he seized on one of his executioners, and held him so firmly that they burned and died together.

Thus fell Brescia, glorious and avenged. The contest lasted ten days, without more than two or three thousand men, without artillery, without any regular soldiers, or an officer of experience to counsel the townspeople ; the patriots of the greatest weight, the young men who were bravest and most expert in arms, were absent ; yet, notwithstanding, more than fifteen hundred of the enemy were killed : among these, were thirty-seven officers, three captains, a lieutenant-colonel, and General Nugent, who, before he surrendered his soul to God, named the city of Brescia his legatee.

The damage done by war and fire was computed at twelve millions. The conquerors, not content with fines, pillage, the losses by

fire, and other war taxes, amounting to seven millions and a half, insulted the municipality by sending them the bills for provisions and powder, demanding that the city should pay these expenses. Moreover, they ordered them to collect money for the erection of a triumphal monument, on the Piazza, to the soldiers who had fallen before Brescia. We shall one day see that all Italy will erect a worthy funeral monument to the memory of Austria.

The high-minded Brescians did not lose courage ; they did not break out into discord and calumny ; they felt that their dignity was saved ; they fell under the superiority of physical force, after the highest proofs of courage and valour.

The people did not reproach their chiefs with the fatal issue of the insurrection, though the destruction of their houses and the death of their companions was before their eyes ; at the risk of their lives, they placed the most noted authors of the insurrection in safety out of the city.

Haynau and Appel, however vigilant, had only laid hands on those who had taken no part in leading the revolt. This may perhaps,

have induced the two Lieutenant-marshals to institute, in July, the infamous process against twelve of the populace; when all Italy was prostrate, and four months had elapsed for the first fury of vengeance to be appeased. They were sentenced to die the death of thieves, and twelve gallows were expressly erected on the bulwarks of the city, where they were executed.

## CHAPTER V.

Possibility for the Venetian Government of avoiding the failure of food and ammunition.—Project addressed to the Roman and Tuscan Governments for continuing the War in Italy.—Letter received in reply by the Roman Envoy, Anace.—The manner in which the Author might thrice have contributed to Italian Independence.—Address of the Venetian Government to France and England.—General Haynau hastens to inform the Venetians of the Victory of Novara.—Memorable Decree of the Venetian Government on the 2nd of April.—Contrarieties experienced by the Author.—What kind of Warfare might possibly be continued round the Lagoon.—Letter received by the Head of the Staff from the popular Venetian Circolo.—Strange and ridiculous means employed by the enemy to obtain the surrender of Venice.

THERE was much discussion in Venice on our military and political position, especially when we were reduced to the last extremities. Among the points of discussion, the most important, after the loss of the battle of Novara, was whether the government might have been able to provide for a long defence in the Estuary. There is no doubt that two steam frigates, added to the sailing and steam vessels we already possessed, with a better

command and organisation of the navy, would have made us masters of the Adriatic, and consequently neither food nor gunpowder would have failed, which were the immediate causes of our surrender. To form an exact opinion on this subject, it would be necessary to show that the government possessed the means required for the purchase of the vessels, as well as of the food and gunpowder, and likewise for the daily pay of the land and sea forces. It is certain that great economy might have been practised in the war and other departments ; but this economy, according to my impression, would have been wholly inadequate to meet our numerous wants. From press of time, I did not always preside at the council of defence, in which case, Major Ulloa, the head of my staff, reported to me all that occurred. One day that I was presiding at this council, after the last disasters in Piedmont, the question was agitated what provision should be made for the subsistence of the troops and of the population. It was decided that, besides what there already was, provision for three months more must be got, and I was in favour of that resolution. Not

that I did not desire to procure provisions even for a year ; but they made me believe, by a thousand reasons impossible to verify, that it was a most difficult thing to provide for the entire Estuary, even for three months. Immense sums were spent to put the navy in a state for immediate use, without the smallest result ; and this was certainly the fault of the government. As for the administrative department, I leave it to men more versed in these matters, to give their opinion. I will conclude by saying, that many members of the commission maintained that there were individuals who had provisions for a year. Time will bring to light many circumstances which, perchance, were concealed during the fifteen months of the siege.

It being now impossible for Piedmont to operate in favour of the Italian cause, its only remaining supports were the governments of Venice, Tuscany, and Rome. Feeble supports, truly ! Venice, besieged by land and by sea, had to defend not only the forts on terra firma, but also the islands, particularly those of Lido and Malamoco, exposed to the landing of the enemy. Moreover, the Austrians, being



no longer held in check by the Piedmontese army, might at pleasure increase the forces which besieged the Lagoon ; whereas the garrison of the Lagoon was only sufficient for its own defence. As to the governments of Tuscany and Rome, had they even set about raising troops with alacrity, they would never have united a sufficient number in time to combat the Austrians. There was but one bold move, one way of attempting the salvation of Italy,—that which I had proposed to the Romans, through Colonel Fabbrizi, and which I explained in a preceding chapter.\* My idea then was, though only hinted at, to march upon Naples, and, in the project which follows, Naples appears a secondary view. But as then, on the 2nd of March, so now, on the 8th of April, the principal, the unique object to me was Naples, and I veiled it in part with other suppositions and other movements. If the Neapolitan government had fallen, the substituted government, created under different auspices, would also have been animated by sentiments more Italian, and would have united their naval division with

\* Chap. ii. of this volume.

that of Sardinia—8000 Neapolitans would have joined 8000 Sardinians. The two armies, vying with each other, would have dictated peace to Austria. As for the success of this scheme, no Neapolitan out of Venice, with whom I ever conversed on the subject, formed the slightest doubt of it. We should scarcely have passed the Tronto, when the population would have flocked round my banner, or rather round the flag of Italy, as they did in 1820. The army would not now, as then, have instantly declared themselves; but many officers and soldiers would have joined my ranks, sufficient in number, together with the troops following me, to place me in a position to overthrow a government unworthy of Italy and of humanity.

Through the medium of the officers on my staff, I wrote to the Tuscan and Roman governments in the following terms:—

“VENICE, 8th April, 1849. *Head-quarters.*

“SOME hints which deserve greater development on my new project of an Italian war:—

“If the Romans and Tuscans would unite

about 30,000 men in Bologna, I believe that this corps, if well commanded, though composed of new and inexperienced troops, might save Italy.

“ 1. The existence of such a corps would probably stimulate the Piedmontese to forget their late disasters, and to organise another corps near Genoa, and among the fine positions which touch the Alps, from whence Moreau, with a handful of men, combated the numerous Austro-Russian troops, in 1799.

“ 2. Bologna, surrounded by hills and well cultivated land, might, with 30,000 new soldiers, defend itself against the attack of 30,000 of the enemy, who, not being able to use their artillery or their cavalry, except in the post roads, nor to combat in battalions or in columns, would be compelled to adopt a war of detail, in which the advantages are in favour of enthusiasm over discipline and order.

“ 3. Should the Austrians present themselves before Bologna with more than 30,000 men, and succeed in establishing heavy batteries, the Italian corps must then enter the Apennines, where artillery and cavalry would

be mere impediments, and where the infantry could not combat in regular order.

“ 4. This corps of middle Italy, and the other of Piedmont and Lombardy (supposing such a one organised) might unite according to circumstances, either at the foot of the Alps, or on the chain of the Apennines, and then concealing their movements, might enter the kingdom of Naples. In this case the fall of the Neapolitan government would be inevitable, and the salvation of Italy would be the consequence.”

“ 5. Should the troops of King Ferdinand, already occupied with Sicily, seek in conjunction with the Austrians to surround the Italian corps, the latter, profiting by the favourable positions which the Peninsula offers, would fall on one of the columns with the boldness and celerity which patriotic enthusiasm excites, and which effected such prodigies in Milan, in Brescia, and even yet in Venice.

“ 6. This war must be carried on after the manner of Spartacus and Sertorius. The first put the glory of Crassus in peril, though he had shut up his adversary in the

last province of Calabria by means of the celebrated ditch, the extremities of which touched the opposite 'seas of Gonio and Tirreno.

“ 7. If at last the Sardinian army should retire under the skirts of the Alps, and overthrow the vain Radetzky in Turin, the discomfiture of this General would be inevitable. Thus, if Murat in 1815, when I, a young General, commanded his vanguard, had had the moral courage to abandon his kingdom to the Austrian forces, and after reaching the Alps had returned into central Italy on the heels of the enemy, their defeat would have been inevitable.

“ 8. The Italian army, until it is victorious, should never go far from positions which are inaccessible to cavalry and artillery, since its presence in any part of Italy would always produce a general rising.

“ 9. By means of Orders of the Day full of national sentiments, and by means of a paternal severity, the discipline of our troops would be maintained, and they would equal the young soldiers who at Mestre drove their bayonets into the flanks of veterans strong



by their numbers, their artillery, and their barricades.

“Much might be added, and will be added, if the Roman and Tuscan governments have the courage to accept this project, instead of daring only to scribble idle speeches.”

It will scarcely be believed that I received no answer either to this project, or to the former one sent on the 2nd of March. I am ignorant of the reasons of a silence so culpable towards Italy. Instead of answering propositions of such moment in a manner suited to the sad condition of the Peninsula, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Rome wrote the following letter, on the 12th May, to Salvato Anace, their envoy in Venice :—

“CITIZEN ENVOY,

“I have received your letter of the 5th and 6th instant, and am truly moved to hear of the new wonders of heroic Venice, supported by the mind of Manin, and defended by the valour of the brave Italians who now form its garrison. Tell them that Rome admires with affection the new proofs



of devotion given by this her sister in the Lagoon ; tell the ardent veteran of Italy, the valorous General Pepé, that Rome is not the last of the cities of Italy to admire and bless him, to prepare for him a wreath of leaves plucked from that tree, of yore the pride of the capitol, which now blooms again. Tell him that the festival he celebrated in Malghera, in the midst of the enemy's bombs, is worthy of his name and of Italian valour. In fine, tell him, tell Manin, tell the soldiers, tell all Venice, that our *Triumvirs*, our assembly, our people, among the glorious deeds of Italy, have engraved the day of Malghera, &c."

It was thus, that instead of deeds to save Italy, they sent me empty words of praise, dictated, no doubt, by patriotic affection.

From what I have hitherto said it results that, since I set foot in Italy, three times I might have contributed to free it from the Austrian yoke. It would have been free, if King Ferdinand, encouraged by the advantages he obtained on the 15th of May, had not recalled the troops I commanded. It would have been free, if Charles Albert,

before the loss of the battle of Novara, adhering to my second project and to the contents of my letter, had sent me 12,000 Piedmontese. In fine, the Austrians would have been driven beyond the Alps if the Roman government alone, or in conjunction with Tuscany, had placed me in a position to enter the kingdom of Naples.

In the midst of these vicissitudes, the Venetian government was busily occupied in treating with France and England, asking their good offices in favour of Venice, and imploring that it might experience the effects of that sympathy of which we had heard so much, and of that mediation which we had so often been made to hope for.

About this time there were many tempests at sea, which caused more disasters among our small craft than in the enemy's squadron, either when they were entering the Lagoon, or carrying despatches to terra firma. General Haynau, hoping that our population and our garrison would lose courage on hearing of the misfortunes of the Piedmontese, took care that the news should reach us as speedily as possible, being ignorant that

we were already fully informed. He therefore sent us, from Padua, Marshal Radetzky's official bulletin, and added words equivalent to a summons to surrender. But he was not long in finding out, that fortune alone is wanting to the Italians in order to convince the world that they deserve independence better than many, who enjoy it because they have never possessed either a Pope, or the intelligence of our republics of the middle ages, whose very virtues were the occasion of that emulation, afterwards changed into fatal rivalry and disunion; just as Greece Proper, and Magna Græcia, terminated their internal quarrels by inviting the aid of foreign arms.

In proof of the heroic national sentiments with which the Venetians were animated, I will mention, that scarcely were the disasters of Charles Albert known with certainty, and with the same certainty their own increasing perils, than their assembly met, and with unanimous acclamation decided that we must resist at all hazards. Nor was this the decision of the inferior orders, who, having nothing to lose, are improvident; it was that

of the first classes both for intelligence and wealth ; who consequently had much to risk, and who fully appreciated the evils to which they exposed themselves. I myself, well used to patriotism and to disregard of life with all the desires for human greatness, admired beyond expression the undaunted minds of these deputy citizens. At the same time, on this 2nd of April, to give greater force to the government, the triumvirate was dissolved, and the whole authority was given to Manin, with the title of President. What most rejoiced me, was to see that the deputies received unequivocal congratulations.

More than once, both before and after the 2nd of April, I had reason to be dissatisfied with the proceedings of the government towards my command-in-chief. Not that they ceased to give me indubitable proofs of their esteem, but they ignorantly prevented me from doing all the good I had in view, and which I had heretofore accomplished with forces no more numerous, and in circumstances no less arduous ; I was, therefore, more than once on the point of moving from the Estuary to some other part of Italy : but

officers of high rank and much esteemed, among whom was Colonel Ulloa, afterwards a General, and a citizen of high credit, said to me, "If you go, in two or three days the army will be dissolved, and the population divided." I believe the greatest sacrifice I ever made to Italy, was that of remaining in Venice, with a patience I certainly never exhibited towards the Kings of Naples, during the three periods at which I commanded their armies. But in thinking of that 2nd of April, I often said, "Not only does Italy deserve from me the so celebrated sufferings of Themistocles, but this magnanimous congress of the 2nd of April, and this dear people of Venice, deserve moreover to be remembered by me while life lasts."

In the meantime, I no longer hoped to carry the war beyond the Lagoon, nor even to execute important sorties; I limited myself to small ones, which, besides the loss of life they occasioned, did not fail to fill the hospitals with wounded. I visited all the islands, where I reviewed the garrisons, and assured myself of the well-being of the



soldiers, which served in great measure to maintain discipline.

In all Italy, the popular Circles, or clubs, produced evil results, and the contrary was a rare exception. Being shut up within the Lagoon, I endeavoured to discover the causes of this calamity. These Circles are similar to the French and Italian patriotic clubs, and to the *vendite* of the Carbonari, who, from 1808 till 1821, had their head-quarters in the kingdom of Naples - but in these there was more order, and they were of more utility to the cause in favour of which they acted. Among other evils produced by the Circles, was the great influence they endeavoured to exercise over the distribution of all places, and especially military posts and grades. I was told that the influence of the Circles induced Charles Albert to name Romarino lieutenant-general, and to give him the command of a division. If this be true, it evinces but little patriotism in the Circles, and great weakness in the King. In Venice, the Circles did rather more good than harm. I recommended some officers of my staff, who formed part of them, to attend to



discipline, and they succeeded admirably. I will transcribe a most trifling letter from the *Circolo Popolare* in Venice to Col. Ulloa :—

“7th April, 1849.

“COLONEL,

“In the name of the people of Venice, we thank you for what you have done to defend our liberties, and to sanction with the report of your cannon the immortal decree of the 2nd of April. To you, son of Guglielmo Pepe, — but enough ! — Spread among your generous brothers this address, which yesterday evening was unanimously decreed by the *Circolo Popolare* to these valiant soldiers. Italy shall still exist, since God seconds your generous ardour.

“F. CABRI, *President*.”

A little time previous to this period, and before the enemy's troops and artillery had been so greatly increased round the Lagoon, the Austrian generals had employed means hitherto not used in war, to obtain the surrender of the coveted Lagoon. They sent a lady belonging to a noble family of Lombardy

to Venice, with the ostensible charge of persuading the members of the government, that the impossibility in which they were placed of continuing a long resistance was such that a speedy surrender would be most advisable. But the lady had also a secret commission, which was to corrupt as many of the officers as possible, and to bring them over to favour the Austrians. The committee of public safety did not lose sight of this lady, so that she was unable to communicate with any one. They took from her a letter of recommendation she had received for a young man in Venice, to whom she was not known, and presented her to another, chosen by the committee itself, making her believe that he was the person to whom the letter was directed. This young man played his part so well that he removed all suspicion from the lady's mind. She ended by being really enamoured. All her secrets were told, and reported to the commission; the lady was sent to prison, and, I believe, she remained there till the enemy entered Venice. To this the Austrians added another attempt no less silly, which diverted the Venetians and all

Italy. I allude to their balloons and other aerostatic devices. After talking of these for two or three months, and after numerous experiments made in the Austrian camp near the Adriatic, and in that of Isonzo, they at last carried them into execution. They sent up some fire-balloons from their war-vessels stationed in the Adriatic, and opposite the Island of Lido. These went high enough to pass over that island, and the enemy flattered themselves that they would arrive and burst in the city of Venice ; but not one ever reached so far. Under these balloons was a large grenade full of combustible matter, and fastened by a sort of cord, also filled with a composition, which, after a certain given time, was to consume itself. As soon as this happened, the grenade fell, and in its fall burst against the first obstacle which it struck. Of all these balloons that were sent up, one only left its grenade in the fort of St. Andrea del Lido. The others were all extinguished in the waters of the Lagoon, and sometimes sufficiently near the capital to amuse the population more than any other spectacle.

## CHAPTER VI.

## SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS IN THE ISLAND OF SICILY.

THE events which took place in Sicily, and which I am about to relate, are taken from the work of a Sicilian who was on the spot ; and though I do not agree with him in every thing, and in some of his judgments he does not seem to do sufficient honour to his country, I shall still follow him in these pages without any modification, because I believe the facts he relates to be correct.

I. The special character of the revolution in Sicily, the position of the country, and the causes of its agitation, merit the most serious attention. • In the actual situation of Europe, and especially of Italy, all should be prepared for a new struggle. It is necessary that the well-disposed should seriously examine the errors of the first movement, in order to avoid in future the rocks against which the

revolution of 1848 split. The municipality of Sicily has been unjustly accused, and we shall undertake its defence. It would, indeed, be grievous that such an error should gain greater consistency in Italy, since the motives of the Sicilian movements were truly Italian, and will ever be such. Let it not be supposed that this is recrimination. Far from us be the thought of preferring ill-judged accusations at a period so propitious for historical narrative, because pregnant with great, and we might almost say, incredible events. To the intoxication of a first triumph, to the cries of the combatants for a country and for civilisation, has succeeded the stupor of unexpected defeat; the silence into which Europe has now fallen, is interrupted only by the musket-shots of a ferocious soldiery, turned against the champions of the liberty of the world. Now then is the time to tell the history of so much misery, in order that men of good will may see the evil, and procure means to avenge it.

From 1815 till 1848, the government of the Bourbons weighed on Sicily with a hand of iron. By a malignant interpretation of the pernicious treaty of Vienna, Sicily was



despoiled of her ancient constitution, which, in 1812, had been guaranteed by England, and sanctioned by Ferdinand I.; and the island was subjected to such tyranny as would amaze whoever examined it attentively. Commerce, agriculture, individual liberty, were all oppressed by a short-sighted and ferocious government. The public offices occupied by Neapolitans, public imposts immeasurably augmented, did but increase the discontent of the island from day to day. The year 1820 seemed to threaten the terrible events of 1848, and found the people ready to shake off the yoke. In fact, their efforts then were not small; but these ideas were not generally diffused among the people, and the aversion felt by the chiefs of the revolution in Naples for the independence of the island, produced discord, which made the insurrection fall to the ground. Notwithstanding this, the Neapolitan troops met with a rough reception under the walls of Palermo, and after a useless siege and infinite loss, they only entered the walls by capitulation.

All the Bourbons being secure, by the universal triumphs of kings over the people, their



dominion became more cruel over the kingdom of the two Sicilies, which in servitude alone were equals ; but the baseness and ferocity of Ferdinand II. stand alone in history.

From 1830 till 1848, Sicily was overrun and wasted by men ready for every infamy, at the command of a man incapable of being stopped by justice and humanity.

The tribunals, public instruction, religion, commerce, the press, all were under the culminating power of the State ; the police exercised its dominion with a cruelty which might compare with the reign of Caroline, and the terrors of '99. Neither the asylum of peaceful citizens, nor the altar, was free from its influence ; even the latter drew its power from the government. The bishops, the Jesuits in office, performed the part of informers ; they kept the country in its ignorance and misery. Theft and assassination alone were protected ; and this was the sole basis of government. By exciting the fears of the rich, and the avidity of the poor, they hoped to render a revolution impossible. Municipal hatreds were assiduously fomented ; and in this alone the Bourbon excelled, in banishing from these

miserable provinces every generous instinct. The military commissions and the extraordinary tribunals marvellously assisted such a system : like the destructive winds from Africa, it dried up all the resources of an agricultural population ; and commerce was always struck with excessive taxes, and iniquitous and vexatious means of exaction.

The monopoly of sulphur was contracted for by a French company, which was afterwards dissolved by the intervention of England ; nor was this the last blow to the national prosperity. To such misery was this people reduced, who were habituated to govern themselves by their own laws, and to live under a representative system which had its origin in the manners and customs of the country. Various insurrectionary movements were set on foot, and one among others would have succeeded in 1835, if the cholera had not raged in the island, and in a short space of time carried off 9000 of the inhabitants of the capital. The army then extinguished the partial movements in Syracuse and Catania ; exile and assassination were legalised by the military junta ; and thus closed that fatal year.

But the liberals did not give up their hopes ; aided by a clandestine press, and by the heroic endeavours of the good, they went over the island, and in the name of liberty and national independence they called on all to unite. I will relate a fact which would seem incredible if men and documents were not ready to confirm it.

From 1837 to 1848 Sicily was a vast field of conspiracy, with which all parts of the country, even the most distant from the centre and from Italy, were in correspondence. They had their archives and their diplomacy, without the government having the slightest knowledge of it. This may serve to show, that though men may seem torpid under slavery, yet they never forget liberty. Finally, in 1848, under the auspices of Pius IX., they were aroused : and this name was no more than an involuntary symbol, the watchword of a revolution already morally consummated. The pacific demonstrations and perfidious kindness of their princes seemed at first to content the people of the Peninsula. Sicily followed the same track, because it was moved and agitated by the same impulse. Hence

continual demonstrations and smothered agitations warned the governments that the island also was expecting liberty ; but they were either ignorant or unconscious of the danger ; they spurned it, and shut their ears to the exigencies of the times. But the Sicilian conspiracy, which was interwoven with that of Calabria, by a premature and partial movement convinced the government of its force, and showed the combustible elements of which it was composed. On the 1st of September, 1847, a band of brave men in Messina attacked the garrison, which, after a fruitless sortie from the citadel, was compelled to retire with the loss of seventy men.

This attempt was ill seconded by the people, who were not yet ripe for arms, and who perhaps still trusted in a pacific accommodation : it was extinguished by a few of the leaders being shot.

Things remained in this state till November. On one side, the liberals were in agitation ; and on the other, the police were more exasperated. Every thing seemed to foretell a speedy rupture. Pacific demonstrations commenced : cries of “ Long live the King ! ” demands for

representative institutions, and a National Guard, were heard.

So little was then requisite to content Sicily! The Bourbon satisfied the desires of the people by fresh arrests, so that, in a short time, the prisons were filled. The commander of the Piazza and of the garrison of Palermo was one Vial, an obscure adventurer, who, from the very lowest ranks of the army, had risen into favour, and who ruled affairs in Sicily. Insolent from unexpected success in the dark practices of the police, he used to repeat haughtily that a charge of cavalry would suffice to disperse the factious. But as early as the beginning of January, at the corners of the principal streets of the city, papers were placarded, which, in a form of defiance, warned the government to concede to Sicily the institutions to which she had a right, and threatened a recourse to arms if by the 12th of January these desires were not complied with.

Disdain, and the arrest of some illustrious citizens, were the only replies of the government. Men became indignant at such blindness; and on the morning of the 12th of



January a handful of citizens attacked the royal troops on divers points. Repulsed with no small loss, the soldiers retired, a part to their quarters, a part into the fortresses and the royal palace.

A revolutionary committee was then formed, and with heroic endeavours it provided for the defence. Four days were spent in skirmishing; and this time was most precious for the insurrection, which, strengthened by the addition of the neighbouring districts, became formidable. On the 16th, ten war steamers disembarked on the coast 7000 men, commanded by General Desauget, and commenced a sharp cannonade. Instead of being discouraged, the energy and enthusiasm of the inhabitants redoubled; and they attacked the enemy with success on divers points.

The enemy amounted to 13,000 men, besides cavalry, and an excellent artillery; they had numbers, means of warfare, and the forts on their side. The people had their own irresistible strength, and a just cause. It would appear incredible, that a handful of men should have been able to defeat so formidable



a corps, yet so it was. The chiefs who commanded it were deficient both in military science and in courage ; they lost their time in vain attempts, and the self-reliance of the soldiers was destroyed. Had a more daring General been at their head, or had he marched directly against the city, perhaps on that day the revolution would have been extinguished, or retarded. The leaders of the movement profited by these errors, and did not cease their attacks ; from day to day it became more impossible for the Neapolitans to hold the city. On the night of the 26th January, they abandoned the royal palace in haste, and forming themselves into a column, they began a disorderly retreat, which might almost be called a flight. The manner in which the troops were embarked was equally discreditable : if they had only taken a small battery, which commanded the portion of the coast lying under the protection of the forts, they might have embarked in all security. But by neglecting this, they were obliged to take a difficult route under the mountains which crown Palermo. Two days were lost in intricate roads, and the troops

were conducted to Solanto, where they embarked.

In this timid march stragglers were continually left behind : the artillery, the horses, the whole baggage, and about twenty prisoners, were left in the hands of the Sicilians. The capital being thus disencumbered from the corps of expedition, it was easy for the people to multiply their attacks against the castle and the Finance Palace. The first capitulated, and the other was taken by assault. At the same time in Catania and in Trapani, after a sharp conflict, the Neapolitans were compelled to lay down their arms, so that towards the end of February the citadel of Messina and the forts of Syracuse alone remained in their power.

II. The limits and nature of this work do not allow of any detail in the account of military events, since I am obliged to enter into the particulars of the political negotiations which took place at this period of the revolution, and place them in their true point of view. It has been said that the English squadron, and the furnishers of arms and ammunition, had aided the movement. I can positively

attest, that the mediation employed in the beginning by the commander of the naval station of England, was of a nature perfectly impartial towards the two parties.

The consuls of the different powers resident in Palermo limited themselves to protesting in a body, in order to put a stop to the bombardment which had been going on for several days.

The English mediation in the affairs of Sicily was sought only by the King of Naples ; it was at his entreaty that Lord Minto, then in Rome, went to Naples, and thence to Palermo, to effect a reconciliation between two parties which by nature were irreconcilable. I will not say that the English diplomatist was averse to taking part in affairs of that sort, since the nature of his mission is now a mystery to no one. England knew full well the agitation which must soon take place in the Peninsulæ, and she had no small interest in mixing herself up with it.

On the other hand, the Sicilians would not depart from the constitutional basis of 1812, since it was their right, to recover which

they had faced the disasters and the immense sacrifices of a revolution.

In fact, to the various proposals of accommodation the committee in Palermo has always replied, that 'Sicily would lay down its arms when the general parliament should have assembled and modified the constitution of 1812, by adapting it to the times.

The decree of the 6th of March, which was sent into Sicily as the basis of mediation, did not suit the Sicilians, not only because the constitution of 1812 was almost unrecognised, but still more on account of a capricious article which destroyed all former concessions. The King limited himself to appointing different ministers of foreign affairs, and of war, for the two kingdoms. These two weak elements of government were insufficient. Where was the promised administrative separation? How, and by whom, were these decrees to be guaranteed? This was not told. The Sicilians did not think they followed an imprudent course in refusing this offer completely. They were not ignorant that a treaty without guarantees, resting solely on the faith of the Bourbon, was only

a diplomatic entanglement. They therefore refused to sign it, perceiving the snare it concealed, and leaning upon Italian influence, represented in the person of Charles Albert, who then appeared likely to succeed very differently from what so unfortunately happened afterwards. .

If Lord Minto was of good faith in these negotiations, as we endeavour to believe, how did he fall into the web so warily woven by the Bourbon? Setting aside the dignity of his name, and that of the power he represented, the English lord was in fact nothing more than a simple bearer of despatches from the chancery of the Neapolitan ministry.

Time was wanting to the Bourbon to betray the revolution in Naples, and then to fall on Sicily with all his forces. The committee was not ignorant of this, and immediately after its refusal of the decree of the 6th of March, it appointed the 25th of the month for the convocation of the general parliament, already decreed for February. All treaties of accommodation being at an end, and the King refusing to recognise any act of the new assembly, it became necessary to



appoint an executive power, composed of a President and responsible ministers. The parliament was inaugurated with immense rejoicings by a people who, for thirty-three years, had not been able to pronounce the name without running the risk of imprisonment and exile. The first act of the chambers was the project of an extended law on the municipality, already impoverished by the inept system of French centralisation, which the late government had introduced. Police, war, and finances, were wisely provided for; and if everything did not reach the end proposed, the fault was in the miserable condition in which the government of Naples had left those branches of the administration. The treasury was emptied of the public money, which all went to fill the coffers of Naples. Sicily being without institutions and military records, though remembering too well the infamous system of Bourbon policy, the organisation of the government was no easy task. The poverty of the treasury was in part repaired by the good will of the contributors, and in the impossibility of organising a police, the National Guard supplied its place.



In this emergency the government was induced to confide a large portion of authority to that body, which served later as a point of reaction. But the most urgent affair was the formation of an army; and unhappily the state of the country was opposed to this. Sicily, exempt from military conscription, had supplied that tribute by money alone. The Sicilian contingent was furnished by the Neapolitan provinces: the Bourbon kept a troop of foreigners in the country, and thus alienated the natives from the career of arms. There were no manufactures of arms, nor military stores, in Sicily, and all this was to be supplied.

True it is, that the enthusiasm of a people ~~is~~ capable of effecting great things, but suddenly to create an army from such negative elements was an impossible work. Messina, which for several weeks had closely besieged the citadel, was obliged to supply the want of all regular means of assault by the courage and enthusiasm of the citizens. But what can courage avail against science and military organisation, which require both time and money? The military achievements at Mes-

sina, though highly honourable, are proofs of the truth of our assertion. •

In the meantime, the government perceived the difficulties of the political position of Sicily, not yet recognised by the other powers, with an enemy in front of her who had time to prepare for her attack. In the sitting of the 13th April, the parliament pronounced the downfall of Ferdinand and his family from the throne of Sicily : a bold act, and a wise one if they had immediately proceeded to the election of a new king.

The political position of some of the representatives, who were inimical to a constitutional régime, was by this decree rudely attacked. In order to leave the way open to the probable triumph of republican principles, they urgently demanded the adoption of another paragraph in the act of expulsion : by this it was declared, that another sovereign should be chosen after the *statuto* was voted. This was unanimously adopted by the chamber, and was one of the first causes which led to the failure of the revolution. We do not therefore mean to attribute the fault to the republican party, for we sym-

pathise with their sentiments, but we deplore those unforeseen errors, which in revolutions are committed by deliberative assemblies. They thwart the power of government, when in extraordinary circumstances it is compelled to employ extraordinary means. The Sicilian parliament, forgetting that the enemy was at our gates, conducted itself as if no crisis was weighing upon the country, which was forced to combat at once with arms and diplomacy. Hence oppositions, divisions, a *Droite* and a *Gauche*, and that struggle of parties, which in ordinary times is perhaps less useful than is supposed, but which became fatal at such a moment. The government, continually mixed up in these parliamentary struggles, could not give unity and force to their deliberations. From the 13th of April, and during the whole of June, the island was governed in this manner; slow advance being made in the formation of an army, and occasion being given to divisions, which are the inevitable consequences of a revolution abandoned to itself. The commissioners who were deputed to foreign governments, in order to obtain the recognition of Sicily as an independent power, were not

successful in their mission. They could only obtain a promise of recognition after the election of a king. On the other hand, Great Britain, mindful of the obligations she had contracted towards the people of Sicily, in 1812, stimulated the government instantly to choose an Italian prince. Therefore, in July, after a very long sitting, the parliament fixed on the Duke of Genoa, second son of Charles Albert. The English and French vessels of war saluted the Sicilian flag, and a deputation was sent to Turin to offer the crown to that prince. Every thing seemed to promise a happy solution, and the recognition seemed almost certain. But already the Sardinian King, the unhappy chief of a most unfortunate army, had been obliged to capitulate under the walls of Milan, leaving the Italian cause almost lost. This fact exercised a fatal influence on the fate of Sicily. The cabinet of St. James's began, under various pretexts, to vacillate regarding the recognition demanded. France, scarcely escaped from the sanguinary days of June, limited herself to a prudent reserve. The Piedmontese cabinet, embarrassed at home, and

threatened with a German invasion, deferred till better times the acceptance of the crown on behalf of the Sardinian prince. The Bourbon did not miss this opportunity. Already a victor in the sanguinary struggle of the 15th of May in Naples, he now prepared a numerous force for the invasion of Sicily. In September, fifteen vessels of war, and many transports, disembarked 15,000 men and a formidable train of artillery in the citadel of Messina. Masters of the citadel, strengthened by a vast territory on the coast opposite Calabria, and possessing great superiority both in the numbers and discipline of their troops, they commenced a sharp cannonade against the city from all the forts. The batteries of the city responded vigorously ; and during three days a shower of bombs, and other projectiles, destroyed the houses, and reduced the defenders of this heroic city to 1000. The Sicilians, without any military organisation to oppose so much force and science, had scarcely a thousand raw recruits, and several bands of peasants. Under such disadvantages the intrepid citizens struggled bravely against an enemy brutally ferocious.



Pillage, incendiarism, and barbarous destruction marked their passage. Finally, after four days of heroic resistance, Messina, abandoned by her intrepid defenders, fell into the hands of the enemy. The Croats of Naples, not sufficiently repaid by their victory, continued during twenty-four hours to bombard a city void of inhabitants, and reduced to a mass of ruins and corpses :—a fearful contrast with the refined principles of civilisation, which were here sunk in a pool of blood and misery!

The great powers looked on curiously at this revolution of 1848, and honoured with their admiration the miserable people who fell exhausted under the cruel wrath of a ferocious despot. The English and French ships were spectators of so much wickedness; and the two admirals interposed in the name of humanity to put a stop to the slaughter, only when a flourishing and generous city was already imbrued in blood and destroyed by the order of barbarians, who, for our shame, are denominated Italians. A provisional armistice was imposed on each side by the Admirals Parker and Baudin, with the



sanction of the two governments of London and Paris ; and a neutral zone was formed round the advanced posts of the Neapolitans, who occupied Messina, Milazzo, and Barcellona, and round the line of the unformed Sicilian army. The misfortunes of Messina were entirely owing to deficiency in the materials of war, and in experienced officers to organise the defence. The people of Sicily desired liberty ; and they now perceived that strangers only brought slavery to those who trusted in their promises.

— They now saw, that in order to sustain a revolution, and lead it to the point aimed at, an army was necessary, as well as the union of persons used to discipline. They knew that on this account alone the Neapolitan arms had vanquished the Sicilian troops, who were greatly superior to them in courage, and in that generous ardour which constitutes the true soldier. They remembered how, in September, at Messina, they had beat the 11th and 12th Swiss battalions, and forced them to retreat, and this with young recruits, who had no shoes, and who had carried a musket only two months. The good people

of Sicily did not forget all this, and called loudly for an army. The government, finally aware that they must not trust to the promises of other powers, endeavoured to reckon only on themselves, and proceeded with alacrity to the formation of an armed force, capable of defending Sicily from the Bourbons. Unhappily, an army cannot be formed speedily ; and therefore the efforts of the revolutionary government were unable to surmount the natural difficulties of such an undertaking. Superior officers were wanting in Sicily ; nor were the subaltern officers sufficiently numerous to form the nucleus of the new army. Artillery was scarce, and there were very few muskets. The ministry did not fail in their duty. They obtained a large supply of muskets from abroad to complete the armament of the battalions, and the national foundries partly supplied the want of artillery. Several foreign officers were engaged in the service of Sicily, and a battalion of Frenchmen who had served in Africa was formed.

Thus, seven months after the taking of Messina, the Sicilians, in the month of March,

had about 10,000 soldiers of the line sufficiently armed and disciplined. But the moral energy of the young troops was singularly affected by want of trust in their captains, who were "chiefly strangers in language and habits. In the meantime, negotiations were carried on, and already the bad faith of the French negotiators was revealed, as well as the lukewarm interest felt for us by the representative of Great Britain. It appeared to France an impolitic act to consent to the independence of Sicily, because the advantages of this change would redound to England. This little jealousy was the true cause, from the commencement, of the devotion of the French minister, Reyneval, to the interests of the King of Naples. The English minister, on the other hand, stood in need of the French alliance for the affairs of Upper Italy; step by step he yielded in such a manner, that it was easy to see he was solely intent on making a merit of his concessions to the French alliance. The intentions of these powers did not escape the Sicilian minister, and, in consenting to the mediation, he only aimed at

gaining time to prepare for the defence. The decree of Gaëta, by which the King of Naples conceded the most miserable political institutions to Sicily, was refused. But again the destinies of Italy, and consequently of Sicily, were decided in the camp of Novara. Austria, mistress of Central Italy, dictated the hardest terms to Piedmont, and with the abdication of Charles Albert closed the heroic struggle for Italian independence. On the evening of the 29th of March, all diplomatic relations ceased ; on each side the amnesty was broken.

The Sicilian forces round Catania, the centre of operations in this war, amounted to 7600 infantry, 200 cavalry, and six mountain pieces. Ruggèa Filangieri was commander-in-chief of the Bourbon forces, which numbered 16,000 men, and 48 pieces of artillery. The formidable citadel of Messina was his base of operations ; his hospitals and magazines were beyond the Straits, at the distance of half an hour's navigation. The Neapolitan general also disposed of 4000 men, whom at pleasure he could transport from Messina to Catania. These formidable

forces, as they advanced, along the coast, were flanked by eighteen vessels, comprising corvettes, steam frigates, sailing frigates, and a number of gun-boats. General Mieroslawski, who was proposed for the command of the small Sicilian corps, was not ignorant of the immense disproportion between his and the enemy's forces. On two conditions alone could we have hoped for victory ; by acting with our whole united forces on a given point ; and by avoiding the exposure of our line of battle to the coast, where the enemy's fleet must render them invincible. Unhappily, the indecision of the Polish general gave the victory to the enemy, and occasioned the loss of all Sicily. Everything seemed to forebode that Filangieri would commence the attack along the coast, between Messina and Catania, and that he would have effected a landing at Riposto. Had General Mieroslawski, with his 7000 men, prevented the landing at Riposto, or had he undertaken to cover Catania, the disasters of the campaign would not have been on our side. Unhappily it was just the reverse ; our forces never operated together, and our line



of battle was on the coast. • This disaster was occasioned by an injudicious plan of campaign conceived by Mieroslawski. It consisted in taking the offensive above Messina, and attacking the citadel. There was a moment at which this plan was abandoned as too perilous ; the General surmised the probability of the enemy's landing at Riposto, and the immense advantages to be drawn from it. But he afterwards returned to his first plan, spoilt the unity of his movements, and dispersed the troops over a line of forty miles, so that small detachments of two or three hundred men had to combat the enemy, who were almost always in columns of 6000 or 7000. Faormina was burnt and destroyed, and the heights which commanded Catania fell into the hands of the enemy. Such were the fatal consequences of so many errors. The Neapolitans, having taken possession of the Casino of Gioeni, which overlooks the city, commenced the cannonade ; and the advanced posts of the Sicilian army, after a short resistance, were compelled to evacuate the town. Such was the end of this war. After



the fall of the second city in the island, Syracuse yielded to a shameful capitulation, which the Polish commander was not ashamed to sign. Thus, in a short space of time, three-fourths of the island were in the power of the enemy. Palermo, ever the centre of the greatest resistance, remained ; and in spite of the discouragement inevitably following a defeat, the inhabitants were disposed to make an obstinate resistance, if Admiral Baudin had not presented himself, and offered his good offices with the Bourbon at Gaëta. This offer, which had no other object than to divide men's minds, and facilitate Filangieri's march on the capital, was productive of sad effects. The parliament, in spite of the minister's observations, accepted the proposal of Baudin, and those of the government who were for resistance were obliged to resign.

The revolution once fallen, all the enemies it ever had, arose to dispute its remains. Those who regarded it hostilely had taken refuge in the National Guard, which began to exercise an influence fatal in its effects. We cannot understand how, as framers of constitutions, we placed the safety of the state

in the keeping of an armed body, which by its nature is a deliberating one.

Facts are the best evidences of the truth ; England and America have no national guards, yet liberty in those countries is the consequence of the just equilibrium of power. As to the National Guard of Palermo, destined to extinguish the last spark of liberty in the country, it derived its force, as we have before said, not alone from the hatred which the people entertained for whatever institutions remained of the Bourbon police, but also from the assistance it had given in mitigating the horrid state in which the Bourbon general had left the island ; for on the day that Desauget evacuated it, he had all the prison doors opened, and about 13,000 malefactors were set at liberty ; such was the iniquitous rule of the Neapolitan King. To these men Desauget confided the not difficult task of disturbing the new revolutionary society in Sicily, and, in fact, he succeeded in his aim.

The evil brought about by so many culprits let loose, was mitigated by the National Guard. Hence the pride of this body, who in all deliberations expected their influence to prevail.

They generally endeavoured to obtain their ends by throwing obstacles in the way of the revolution ; for the chiefs of this body of armed citizens were without any political antecedents, and they used all their power to stifle generous sentiments. When, in the last days of the expiring revolution, more than human force was necessary to raise us up from the low and reactionary condition into which we were fallen, the old adherents of the ancient system, and many perverse persons acting in a mass, and under the banners of this body, adopted every means of covering the revolution with opprobrium and shame. The ministry having fallen, the parliament being closed, the direction of affairs was in the hands of Riso, the commander of the National Guards, and the head of the municipality. The Marchese of Spanaforno, and the Barons Grasso, and Canalotti, assumed the title of Ministers. On them devolved the charge of covering the last heavings of Sicilian liberty with infamy, and their names are remembered by us as tokens of contempt and anger to all good men.

The Syllan proscriptions, which were to

leave so many families unhappy and destitute after the triumph of Filangieri, had their origin during the short and abominable reign of these vile executioners of Sicily. The remainder of the army, which retired in good order to Castrogiovanni, was by their orders dispersed and annihilated ; the fortresses were disarmed ; and the most illustrious among the men of the revolution were driven into exile. The people, stupefied by such rapid and deplorable vicissitudes, were daily deceived by perfidious assurances of concessions and benefits. The Neapolitan general, assured of the good offices of the betrayers, advanced rapidly on Palermo. The burning of the small village of Mezzagno, which crowns the mountains near that city, warned the people too late of the trust to be placed in a Bourbon's promise. They sought to repair their error, and, full of enthusiasm, they went out to combat the enemy. But what could a few men without leaders do against so much force and guile ? After some skirmishing, the English and French consuls interfered, and on the 18th May a capitulation was signed, by which, eighteen months after the royal

troops had been driven from the city, they entered it once again. In the commencement, promises and caresses reassured the timid; but as soon as the people were disarmed, and the military in possession, the greatest cruelties were inflicted on the country. Exile and military executions rapidly succeeded, and heavy taxes put a finishing stroke to our misery. The Sicilians were condemned to pay 54,000,000 of francs. This sum was employed, with ferocious mockery, in paying the Croats and defraying the expense of the bombs, which had reduced to ashes the most flourishing city of the Mediterranean, and destroyed thousands of intrepid citizens.

Fear, the perennial fountain of all tyranny and the basis of the actual Bourbon government, spies, chains, and the axe, are the only means by which, according to them, the happiness of the people is to be hypocritically assured. Vain hope! The smoking masses of the burnt city, the unburied bones of so many brave men, are there to cry out for terrible vengeance. Sicily enraged, silent, but full of hope, united with her Italian brethren, holds herself ready for deliverance. But the heart



is lacerated on thinking of the many chances to be run, and the many tears to be shed for the misery of the nation, which still groans under a yoke of iron.

One smiles bitterly at the pompous title of *civilised*, with which this nineteenth century is qualified by many.

Religion and civilisation were unknown to the barbarians who formerly devastated Europe. These sacred names now serve to cover such wickedness, that posterity will weep over our memory.



## CHAPTER VII.

State of the enemy round the Lagoon, and of the besieged.—Necessity of a military dictatorship.—A decoration and a medal proposed.—The command of Malghera confided to Colonel Ulloa.—Reports of the 3rd and 4th of May from the Commander of Malghera to the Commander-in-Chief.—Endeavours to obtain information from terra firma.—Letter from the Commander of Malghera to General Haynau, and his answer.—Sortie from Malghera on the 9th of May.—Order of the Day.—Meeting of the 10th of May, in the rooms of the War department.—Council of defence on the 13th May presided over by the General-in-Chief.

THE enemy besieging Venice had become very powerful. All their land and sea forces, all their immense artillery, both without and within the forts they occupied, were now turned to the "destruction of the Lagoon, which they so ardently longed to possess. The Lagoon extended ninety miles' in circumference ; it contained nearly sixty forts, great and small, and 200,000 inhabitants.

The garrison was inferior in numbers to that of Dantzic and Genoa when those towns sustained their memorable sieges. Venice

paid and fed a navy sufficiently numerous both in sailors and officers ; but, wherever the fault might lie, it was of no service for the defence, excepting by the use of small barks in front of the attack on the capital, and by supporting in some measure the sorties from Chioggia. The soldiers for many months had been in a piteous state, and even when their position was at the best, they never enjoyed, either in their clothing or lodging, those comforts which European troops generally have. If to these circumstances are added the epidemic maladies which visited us, our contemporaries and posterity will surely see that both the Venetian volunteers, and those of the several Italian provinces who had repaired to Venice, deserve the warm applause of all who appreciate a disinterested patriotism, which undauntedly defied all the evils of this life.

These dear Italian youths, both the soldiers and their officers, showed a quality which is superior to all other virtues, and which the eloquent Milton himself did not dare to put into the mouth of Lucifer, when he was exciting the courage of the bold rebel angels. I allude to the last months of the siege, when

abandoned by all Europe, wanting bread and powder, and unable to receive any either by land or sea, all were convinced, that even if life remained, whether wounded, mutilated, or still sound, yet to reward their valour, their long and severe sufferings, instead of the independence of Italy, or any advantage to themselves, Italy would remain in servitude, and persecution, misery, and exile would be their individual lot. These latter evils more particularly belonged to the Neapolitans. Yet even to the last, the soldiers aspired to nothing but the honour of exposing their lives to the increasing attacks of the enemy. Young men of all Italy who for the love of Italian independence ran to the defence of Venice, where during fifteen months you combated, alternately stimulated by fraternal and emulous affection, you have for ever belied the foreign calumnies which caused your valour, or the universal wish in favour of our country's unity, to be doubted!

A state, whatever its population, which has a vital war to sustain, must infallibly have recourse to a dictatorship, which should be decreed in due time by the national congress.

The Romans adopted this measure even in wars which did not compromise their existence ; it was a sufficient reason to this able people that they were arduous. Who does not know, that after the battle of Waterloo, if, instead of two permanent chambers, there had been a dictator in Paris, by placing himself at the head of the forces remaining round the capital, he would have retrieved the lost battle ?

In Venice, where we were under the fire of the enemy, there was a congress, a government with its president, and a general-in-chief. For some months, instead of a government, there was a triumvirate ; all three being quite ignorant of warlike affairs. During other months we were under a president, instead of the triumvirate. Finally, during the last few months, there was a congress, a president, a general-in-chief, and a military commission with distinct powers. True it is that the general-in-chief presided over the commission ; but in this manner I was tied down without being able to destroy the inconvenience. In truth, I neither desired, nor would I have accepted, the absolute dictatorship ; if

I had aspired, to this, I should have accepted it when the people offered it to me in the Piazza St. Marco, and when I made them a different proposal, as I have before explained.\* But had the assembly conferred on me the sole dictatorship, a true military dictatorship, I could certainly not only have brought the military, the National Guard, and the marines into a better condition, but perhaps at this moment I should be still in Venice defending the city and the entire Lagoon. Bonaparte wrote to the Directory that one mediocre general was worth more than two excellent ones. In Venice, for want of a military dictator, many meddled with military matters. For example, in the reviews which I held of the garrison of the forts, and even without the reviews, I received reports of most valorous actions of the soldiers of every grade. Rarely could I recompense them by promotion; and besides, a soldier who distinguishes himself in presence of the enemy, may deserve a recompense, but not promotion. I therefore proposed to the government that they should create,

\* See vol. i., chap. xi.



with the consent of the assembly, a military order. This was promised, but never performed. One day, on returning from Malghera, where many of the military had greatly distinguished themselves, I requested the government to order two hundred gold medals to be coined, with some motto calculated to excite enthusiasm. They told me that they had no gold whatever for the purpose. I told them that I possessed two hundred napoleons, which they might send and take for an object I had so much at heart. They answered that they would employ the gold as I desired ; and yet afterwards nothing was done that I proposed. In words, they never said No to me ; but in deeds, more than once.

In the meantime the enemy's works advanced visibly. The Commandant of Malghera was odious to the population of Venice and to the military, so much so that I endeavoured in vain by some phrases in an Order of the Day to reinstate him in their good opinion. It was difficult, not only to keep him in Malghera, but to protect him from popular insults ; in fact, on laying down his command, he went on board a French war steamer. The posts and



fortresses of the Lagoon were under the immediate orders of the General-in-Chief. For some time I had desired to confer the command of Malghera on Colonel Geronimo Ulloa, the head of my staff ; but he being a Neapolitan, I deferred, from motives of delicacy, putting my wish into execution ; but the intelligence which arrived of the enemy's preparations was such, that the government spoke to me on the subject, and I gave Colonel Ulloa orders to assume the command of that most important fort.

The Austrian troops around the Lagoon were commanded by General Haynau. On the 3rd of May, Colonel Ulloa wrote to me as follows :—

“ GENERAL,

“ I have scarcely time to write you these hasty lines. From the report which has reached you this morning, you will have learned the works of the day for our own defence, and those of our enemy for the attack.

“ The garrison is animated by the best spirit ; the artillery is active and intelligent.

Will they resist, a strong cannonade and bombardment by the enemy? I hope so; and so far as is in my power, I shall keep the garrison as firm and resolute as possible. There is still much to do; for which reason I dedicate all the hours of the day to insure the success of the defence.

“I have written to Milan to obtain what is needful, and to-morrow, if the enemy does not unmask his batteries, I will send Megacapo to Graziani, to get other necessities from the arsenal. The Minister of War, Graziani, the director of the engineers, and all concerned, proceed with alacrity in providing what is needful for this fort.

“In short, this is what I have asked for :—

“Two mortars; field-pieces; Boldoni's batteries; wood for ordnance trains.

“Sacks of earth.

“Cloth to cover the tents, of which Graziani has already sent me a good quantity.

“Eight for spare gun-carriages.

“We shall also require a great deal of ammunition, of which immense consumption is made.

“ With sentiments of the highest esteem and respect, &c. &c. .

“ G. ULLOA.

“ *Malghera, 3rd May, 1848.*”

The day following (May 4th) I went by the bridge to visit Malghera. At a small distance from that place, I heard and saw a tremendous discharge from the enemy's artillery. On arriving at the bank which leads from the bridge to the fortress, two bombs fell,—one on my right, the other on my left ; and the troops of the garrison, on seeing this, in the midst of the bombs, grenades, and balls, began to shout, “ Long live our General ! ” I passed along the front of their line of battle, and after complimenting them on the intrepidity they had shown, I desired Ulloa to make all who were not on duty return to their casemates. The troops had been expecting me in battle-array, before the enemy commenced their fire, and then, with a certain military vanity, they wished to wait for their general in the same order, and without breaking their ranks by retiring before the enemy's fire. These discharges

proceeded from the numerous batteries of the first marked parallel. Without entering into more details on the operations of that day on either side, I will produce the report made to me, after sunset, by Colonel Ulloa :—

“ THIS day, half-an-hour after mid-day, the enemy unmasked their batteries, and sent a shower of bombs, shells, and shots along all our line.

“ Our soldiers conducted themselves like veterans : they re-organised themselves promptly, and with repeated shouts of “ *Viva l’Italia !* ” prepared for a valiant defence. The artillery were quickly provided, and responded to the enemy’s attack. They eagerly repaired to the points most-menaced to strengthen them ; the engineers, the sappers, all the special corps, ran voluntarily to their posts. And here it becomes my duty to signalise, with peculiar praise, a company of the Sile legion, who, guided by their distinguished Captain Cattabene, at the moment in which we were receiving a shower of the enemy’s balls, went, amidst the shouts and acclamations of the garrison, to the distant

dwelling of their commander, from whence they brought back their flag in triumph, traversing great part of the fort.

“Almost at the same moment, the General-in-Chief arrived in Malghera, and an unanimous shout of joy hailed his coming, and showed him that all thought themselves fortunate that the moment of proving their courage, and love of their country, should be witnessed by a captain whom Italy so loved and admired.

“The fire, commenced with so much fury, seemed to be sustained by five principal batteries which surrounded our bastion No. 6, between the lunettes 12 and 13, and by an innumerable quantity of howitzers, so that the whole of the enemy's trenches seemed one line of fire.

“The ardour of our troops did not relax a single instant; and this fiery ordeal lasted at least seven hours, and did not slacken before night. Our artillery, which was well served and skilfully directed, produced great havoc among the enemy. Now, at eight o'clock in the evening, the guns are almost silent, and only an occasional shot denotes

the wish of our tired enemy still to attack us.

“It would be impossible for me to name those who have most distinguished themselves on an occasion in which the whole garrison, according to the words of the Commander-in-Chief, has conducted itself heroically.

“The head and officers of my staff, the commandant of the fort and of the Piazza, the officers of the engineer corps, the sappers, the soldiers of the legion of Sile and of the 4th of the line, the detachment of the National Guard, the artillery by land and by sea, the marines, the trains of the cavalry and of the ambulance, have all deserved well of their country. The legion of the Bandiera and Moro volunteers has especially shown itself worthy of the name which records the first martyrs of Italian liberty.

“The name of the Lombard rifles should not be forgotten among those who, by their activity and courage, merit particular mention.

“I shall not fail to publish to-morrow the names of the dead and wounded, which must be particularly preserved in the annals of this holy war.



“Among the wounded, I cannot at this moment omit to record Captain Cosenz, of the staff of the General-in-Chief, who, though ill with fever, directed the artillery of the front attack ; and though sick and wounded, would not retire.

“We shall take advantage of the night to repair our small disasters and prepare ourselves for the struggle of to-morrow.

“The Commapdant-Colonel,

“GIROLAMO ULLOA.”

From the 4th of May, till the surrender of Venice, the enemy made more or less use of all their artillery, which exceeded, in number of guns of every calibre, what would have sufficed for the siege of two or three fortified places of the first order ; our artillery-men were all youths of education and intelligence ; they had, therefore, learnt in a short time to serve their guns better than many of the enemy's ; and, what was more, they served with affectionate ardour. I will record a trait to show that the atmosphere of Venice was full of Italian vitality. One of the

batteries of Malghera, of which I do not now remember the name, was served by the immortal Bandiera company of artillery. One of those valorous volunteers, while intent on pointing his piece, was stretched on the ground by a ball of the enemy ; a second takes his place, and is struck by another ball ; a third presents himself, and the same fate awaits him ; this did not prevent a fourth from intrepidly defying the well-directed shots of the enemy. The valiant Major Cosenz tried to dissuade him, saying that we must abstain for a time from making use of a piece which was aimed at so surely ; but he persisted, and succeeded in aiming several shots very well.

We were in the meantime in a total and cruel want of all positive intelligence, and we were obliged to supply the want by means of occasional boats which we received, not without danger, at the entry of the Lagoon, where many of the spies paid for the exercise of their trade with their lives. The consuls obtained from the Austrian squadron what they do not always concede, and *via* Trieste, they often received intelligence of

what was passing in Europe. It was important to us to hear of the war in Hungary, and the end of the strange hostilities between France and Rome.

On the 5th of May, the Commandant of Malghera wrote to General Haynau, who soon after was superseded in the command of the enemy's troops round the Lagoon by Count Thurn. Haynau answered. The two letters follow :—

“THE Colonel Commandant of the Fortress of Malghera.

“The letter of Marshal Radetzky, which you sent this morning, was directed to the President of the Venetian Government.

“Without the express orders of the said government, I do not think myself authorised to suspend hostilities. I must therefore continue firing, and so much the more because you openly show a desire to take unfair advantage of the truce which you propose, by continuing your works, which is quite contrary to the usages of war.

“It is also contrary to those usages to send open letters to the commander of a

besieged fortress, as you have lately done. I have, therefore, the honour to warn you that my advanced posts have received positive orders to consider the bearer of any open letter as a spy, and to treat him accordingly.

“G. ULLOA.

“*To the General Haynau, &c., &c.*”

“L. T. R., Commanding the Second Corps.

“The Commander of the Fort of Malghera is informed that hostilities were suspended by the besieging Imperial troops in order to send the summons, of which the copy is here joined, of Marshal Radetzky to the inhabitants of Venice.

“HAYNAU, &c., &c.

“*To the Commandant of the Fort of Malghera.*”

If the forces in the Lagoon had been sufficiently numerous, I should have made more use of the bayonet, than of the artillery; but sickness, which had rendered the numerical inferiority of the garrison more evident, obliged me to limit myself to the defensive.

Notwithstanding this, on the 8th of May, I repaired to Malghera, and having consulted the opinion of Colonel Ulloa, who had always an eye on the movements of the enemy, I determined to make a reconnoissance on the second parallel of the enemy in the manner he judged most suitable. This is related in detail in the Order of the Day which follows.

“ VENICE, 9th May, 1849.

“ THIS morning, Colonel Ulloa, commandant of the district and of the fortress of Malghera, selected the most opportune moment to execute a reconnoissance planned by him with his usual intelligence. The General-in-Chief here transcribes the circumstantial report of the colonel.

“ The population of the glorious Lagoon will be able from these experiments, more or less limited or extended, to know what confidence they may place in the valour of their defenders, in whose ranks it is impossible to discover any difference between new and old soldiers ; since all are equal in patriotism, and in the desire to conquer.”

*“ The Inspector of the first District of Defence to the Commander-in-Chief of the Troops.*

*“ MALGHERA, 9th May, 1849.*

“THE works of the enemy, which had advanced with alacrity since the 4th, were suddenly suspended at the new parallel which was completed yesterday morning. To ascertain whether the enemy had really retired behind the first entrenchment, or whether, having sufficiently consolidated the new parapets, they were intent on planting other batteries, the inspecting colonel ordered a vigorous sortie this morning. Two columns, of about 500 men in all, pushed forward at half-past eight, a. m., from the two lunettes 12 and 13, towards the enemy's lines. The first was conducted along the railroad by Majors Cosenz and Sirtori; the second advanced under Major Rosaroll on both sides of the canal of Mestre. Both columns charged boldly at a quick step, and repeatedly drove back the enemy from the head of the parallel behind the principal line of trench, and though they found behind this a numerous reserve, supported by many mortars and



howitzers, yet for a long time they fought hand to hand, and maintained the disputed ground. The principal object of ascertaining the enemy's forces and the forwardness of the works being attained, after an hour's fire a retreat was commanded, which was executed in the greatest order, under cover of the guns of the fort. The conduct of the officers and of the troops of every corps, during the entire action, was beyond all praise. After a more minute inquiry, I will mention the names of those who have deserved the greatest encomiums. The high courage of our soldiers, eager to measure their strength hand to hand with the enemy, unhappily made a retreat to the fort difficult, and exposed them to much slaughter. Our loss amounts to four killed and thirty wounded; among the latter are five officers. We have every reason to believe the enemy's loss much greater. They were the mark of our artillery, whose shots, in the opinion of those who were observers, rarely missed their aim.

“The troops were returned at half-past five; but the fire of artillery continued, principally from the enemy's works.

“The observations since made show no progress during the night; the inactivity of the enemy in the new trenches may be principally attributed to the quantity of water, which, in consequence of the late rains, has filled their trenches and rendered it impossible for them to work. •

“G. ULLOA.

“G. PERE.”

The numerous guns and works round Malghera, exceeding what are usually seen even before a place of the first order, clearly showed that it must inevitably surrender in about two weeks more. The bridge which traversed the Lagoon, and extended from Venice to terra firma, had cost the Venetians an enormous sum, and the railroad leading to Verona was on it. It always was a matter of surprise to me that the Austrian masters of Venice should have permitted the construction of this bridge, without forming in it, at the same time, and at certain distances, long drawbridges. To leave this bridge entire would be fatal to the defence of the city; to break a number of its arches would cause great regret in many citizens.

Without my knowledge, and against all military rule, the government held a council in the rooms of the War-office, at which many superior officers of the department were present; among these was Colonel Milani, a most intelligent and active officer, who served laboriously till the last hour of the defence. In this council it was decided that, if the arches were undermined, there would always be time to blow them up. I complained that this council was held without my knowledge; and they sent me the minutes of their deliberations, which I preserve, and which went to prove that the blowing up of the arches, which was indispensable for the defence, might always be accomplished in a few hours. But, as I shall soon show, experience demonstrates that arches, not well-undermined, are not speedily blown up, as they affirmed; and their fragments, on account of the insufficient depth of water in the Lagoon under the bridge, served as stepping stones for the enemy to advance on.

While Colonel Ulloa was defending Malghera with intelligence and valour, I received a letter from him, full of complaints against

the war department, and other agents of the government.

Among other things, he informed me that, without any reference to himself, the committee of safety in Venice had established a sub-committee in Malghera for the internal regulation of the fort. He also informed me that the editors of the Official Gazette narrated according to their pleasure the operations which took place in the fort and in the sorties, praising their favourites in preference to those who had really signalized themselves. Such complaints were well founded, and not calumnious.

I took measures to put a stop to these not inconsiderable disorders. Above all, I authorised Colonel Ulloa instantly to dismiss the sub-committee, whose presence in the fort was an unprecedented scandal. At the same time, I complained to the government, myself, of the editors of their Official Gazette. I endeavoured to console the colonel by my own example ; for he was not ignorant that, through love of Italy, I had practised more patience in Venice, than under five Neapolitan kings.

That those who take interest in military matters may understand the order in which I proceeded with the army in Venice, in the council of defence, I will produce one protocol at the end of this chapter.

*“ Venice. In the quarters of Lieut.-General Baron Pepe, Commander-in-Chief of the Italian troops in the Venetian State.*

*“ Sunday, 13th May, 1849.*

“ PROTOCOL OF THE COUNCIL.

“ After being separately invited yesterday by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, we are this day assembled in a council of war.

“ 1. The General-in-Chief, Baron GUGLIELMO PEPE, President.

“ 2. The head of the Marine Department, Vice-Admiral GRAZIANI.

“ 3. The head of the War Department, General CAVADELIS

“ 4. The Commander-in-Chief of the Civic Guard, Vice-Admiral MARSIELY.

“ 5. The Commodore-General of the Navy, Vice-Admiral MILANOPULO.

“ 6. The Commander of the Garrison, General of Division, SOLERA.



“7. The Director of Artillery and Engineers, General of Division, **ARMANDI**.

“8. Member of the Council of Defence, and Vice-Admiral, General **BERA**.

“9. Commander of the Land Artillery, General **PAULUCCI**.

“10. Member of the Council of Defence, Colonel **MILANI**.

“11. Director of the Infantry at Cavallina, Colonel **FONTANA**.

“12. Adjutant-in-Chief of the Land Army, Colonel **MARCELLO**.

“13. Inspector of the Fifth District of Defence, Captain **RAFFAELLI**, of the Navy.

“14. Commandant of Division, &c., Captain **FIÓZZO** (Navy).

“15. Commandant of the Corps of Engineers and Sappers, Lieut.-Colonel **RANZELLI**.

“16. Commandant of the Marine Artillery, Lieut.-Colonel **MARCHESI**.

“17. Member of the Council of Defence, Lieut. **MAINARDI** (Navy).

“The General-in-Chief opened the conference by referring to the progress of the operations of attack on the fort of Malghera, on the part of the enemy, and by discussing the defence, which, for several days, has been



energetically sustained by our troops. He said that the fort would capitulate only in an extreme case, and after a long, vigorous, and laborious resistance. That, nevertheless, as it was necessary to be prepared even for sinister events, he desired that measures might be taken in time for the regular evacuation of the fort, when it became necessary to abandon it: he added, that he desired to ascertain the orders which ought to be given on the occurrence of this event.

“General Cavadelis, head of the war department, expressed, that it was necessary in the first place to examine and agree as to the point, whether the defence of Malghera could be maintained, and in what circumstances it would be necessary to cede or abandon it, and to withdraw the troops from the successive positions: he remarked that, this point being attained, the moral impression which the cession of the fort would produce, as well as other political views, rendered it necessary that it should be discussed and resolved on in concert with the government, and not treated as a mere military operation.

“After other discussions, it was agreed

that the question should be proposed at another time, and in concert with the government.

“General Armandi, taking occasion from the subject of this conference to refer to the actual state of the armament of the fort, observed that it would be well, in the meantime, to prepare and effect the transport of some of the artillery, and to exchange some of the pieces of heavy artillery for others of smaller calibre ; that this measure would tend to disencumber the fort of what was superfluous ; and that such successive removals would render the complete evacuation more easy, in case we could no longer keep the fort.

“On these observations of General Armandi, it was decided that there should be another conference between the same General, Colonel Milani, Lieutenant-Colonel Ranzelli, and the Commander-in-Chief, as president. On the General-in-Chief's returning to the question proposed, of the case in which we must lose the fort of Malghera, and abandon it, he addressed his interpellations to Vice-Admiral Graziani, chief of the war department, to

know the means of defence by sea, supposing that, after the cession of the fort of Malghera, the war had to be carried on in the Lagoon, and in the fortified islands.

“Vice-Admiral Graziani answered this interpellation by indicating the maritime forces prepared to defend that part of the Lagoon between the railroad at Malghera, and the contiguous shore on the side near Campalto.

“Interpellations were successively made as to the means which the navy could dispose of to prevent a landing from the enemy's squadron, and to repel them where this should have taken place from the coast either of Lido, Malamocco, Palestrina, or other points of the Estuary ; to which it was answered, that the navy could prevent nothing by sea, but that it could concur in the defence of the Lagoon.

“On inquiring what means of defence the navy could furnish for the succour of the fort of Brondolo, Vice-Admiral Graziani gave his opinion, that it could not speedily furnish any other succour than that of the existing vessels already known, and stationed in the part of the Lagoon between Chioggia and

Brondolo ; that the navy had, neither here, nor elsewhere, any other means to add.

“ The General-in-Chief having then made known the necessity that the navy should prepare to attack the vessels of the enemy, he was answered, that the greatest force the Venetian navy could furnish, could do no more than protect the commerce of the coast.

“ After this discussion the conference was dissolved.

## CHAPTER •VIII.\*

## NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN TUSCANY.

THE movement in Tuscany commenced in the beginning of 1846.

The first acts of liberal resistance consisted in signed protestations, and small pamphlets clandestinely published.

On the 28th February, 1846, Pisa protested in a direct petition to the Governor Serristori, against the foundation of ~~an~~ institution of the Sacré Cœur, the authorisation of which had already been obtained from government.

The professors who signed this were admonished, but in spite of the admonition they made a second protest. The government revoked the authorisation. To the Sisters of the Sacré Cœur, Jesuitism was attached, which Tuscany was determined not to admit.

\* This chapter was contributed by the illustrious Montanelli.

The clandestine pamphlets were very moderate, and limited themselves to desiring some civil and administrative reforms.

On the elevation of Pius IX. to the Papedom, and the publication of the amnesty, a subscription was opened in Pisa, and all the other parts of Tuscany, in favour of the indigent who had been pardoned, with the intention of giving practical proofs of national unity. The government would not permit the subscription lists to be printed, and they were circulated in manuscript.

The liberal agitation, feeling strengthened by the name of Pius IX., redoubled its activity in the winter of 1847, and obtained the law of the 6th of May on the press, which permitted a respectful criticism of the acts of the government.

Popular demonstrations commenced; political journals were founded. At Florence, the principal were the *Alba* and the *Patria*; Pisa had *l'Italia*; Sienna, the *Popolo*; Leghorn, the *Corriere Livornese*.

Though the preventive censorship remained, the law was not enforced, and in Tuscany they wrote as freely as in the most liberal countries.



A civic guard was demanded by the journals, by the municipality, and by the people in the streets. The government would not concede this ; menaces were not spared to prevent popular demonstrations, but they were ineffectual on account of the fraternal feeling between the military and the people.

The first place where any acclamations were added to the usual cry of "*Viva Pio Nono*," was Pisa, where in popular demonstrations they added "*Viva l'Italia ! Viva the reforming princes ! Viva the Union ! and Viva Gioberti !*"

The civic guard was conceded in a *Motu Proprio* of the 4th September. This institution was celebrated with federal festivities. The first took place in Pisa on the 6th of September, where the people of Leghorn and Lucca met together ; the second was at Leghorn on the 8th, and the third at Florence on the 12th. Representatives from all the communes in Tuscany met in Florence. The pretext of this meeting was a thanksgiving to the Grand Duke ; in reality, they wished to protest against the foreign oppression in Lombardy, and express their desire

for the Italian league. The tri-coloured flag was displayed in these federal festivals.

Towards the end of September the Marchese Ridolfi and the Conte Serristori, who were of liberal opinions, entered the ministry. The first act of the new ministry was the suppression of the presidency of the Buon Governo.

By the abdication of the Duke of Lucca, which took place in October, 1847, the union of Lucca with Tuscany was anticipated; according to the treaties of 1815, Triviziano and Pontremoli were to be added to Modena and Parma.

The union of Lucca with Tuscany, in spite of the loss of political name, was as agreeable to the people as that of Triviziano was displeasing.

An ardent liberal party declared itself in Leghorn, and took occasion, on the occupation of Triviziano, to make a menacing demonstration on the evening of the 6th of January. A popular deputation was named in the Piazza, at the head of which was the advocate Francisco Guerrazzi. The minister Ridolfi dissolved the deputation; Guerrazzi

and the other chiefs of the exiled party were placed under arrest.

On the 13th February, in imitation of Naples and Piedmont, a constitution was given.

On the 22nd of May the news of the insurrection in Milan had scarcely arrived, when from one end of Tuscany to the other, the young men rose to hasten towards Lombardy. Companies of volunteers were immediately formed; the government was carried along by the popular impetus; they sent about 5000 men in regular troops and volunteers.

The command of the Tuscan corps was given first to General Ferrari, and afterwards to General de Laugier.

The Tuscans encamped under Mantua, at Cartalone, at Montanara, and at Grazie. They performed various feats of arms, and all with honour. They were attacked on the 5th, the 13th, and the 29th of May. On the 29th of May, more than 4000 men, posted between Cartalone and Montanara, were engaged during eight hours with the enemy, who had 30,000 men and many pieces of artillery. The university guard took part in the combat. The

losses of the Tuscans were great, but fruitful for the Piedmontese army, as the glorious achievement of Goito was the result.

The Tuscan troops united to those of Piedmont also took part in the unfortunate combats of Custoja, of Villa Franca, and of Luglio.

The conduct of the minister Ridolfi during the war of independence excited so warm an opposition against him, that he was compelled to retire. The advocate Salvagnoli, editor of the *Patria*, and Guerrazzi (now freed from prison), the editor of the *Corriere Livornese*, both of them deputies, were the chiefs of the opposition. The Ridolfi ministry was succeeded by a ministry under the presidency of Capponi.

Leghorn rose on the 5th of September, and the people remained masters of the city and the forts.

The government treated with the insurgents, who demanded the dissolution of the ministry and the call of Guerrazzi to the government.

Professor Montanelli was sent to Leghorn as governor, and in his programme of the

8th of October, he proposed an Italian *Costituente*. The Capponi 'ministry gave in its resignation, and Montanelli was called upon to, compose a new one. He accepted the trust, and among the ministers he named Guerrazzi; in the ministerial programme he proclaimed the *Costituente*.

D'Ajola, Minister of War, undertook an organic reform in the army. The chambers were dissolved; the Grand Duke opened the assembly the 9th of January, 1849, and in the speech from the throne the proclamation of the *Costituente* was omitted.

One of the first laws proposed by the ministry was the election of thirty-seven deputies for the Italian *Costituente*; both in the council and the senate the law was voted unanimously. During the discussion concerning the *Costituente*, the Grand Duke went to Sienna, where he passed the winter with his family. On the 7th of February he fled, and in a letter written to the President of the Ministry, he alleged some futile pretexts to justify his flight.

At Florence the people and the assembly proclaimed a triumvirate, consisting of Guer-



razzi, Montanelli, and Manzini. They dissolved the assembly, and convoked a Constituent Assembly.

General Laugier with the garrison of Mazza, which he commanded, gave the signal for reaction. Guerrazzi, with General D'Apice, set out from Florence with 4000 men. On approaching the troops of General Laugier they fraternised with those of the provisional government. At the same time, in the night of the 21st of February, the reaction broke out in the environs of Florence and Pietro, but without success.

The Constituent Assembly met on the 25th of March. The triumviri resigned their powers into the hands of the representatives of the people. When the news of the battle of Novara arrived, Guerrazzi was named chief of the executive, with dictatorial powers.

On the 11th of April, there was a conflict in Florence between the Florentines and some volunteers of Leghorn. The partisans of the Grand Duke took advantage of this occurrence, and on the 12th of April the restoration of the prince and of the constitution was proclaimed.



Fifty resolute men would have been sufficient to oppose this reaction. The representatives of the executive power took no measures for this purpose. It is, therefore, believed by many, that, after the unfortunate battle of Novara, the restoration of the Grand Duke was meant to be allowed.

## CHAPTER IX.

Details on the operations of the enemy round Malghera.—Their effects on the place.—The Author's visits to Malghera.—His Parisian valet-de-chambre.—Decree of the 22nd May, for the evacuation of Malghera.—The possibility of prolonging its defence.—Bad effects of not having blown up the arches of the bridge in time.—Promotion of Colonels Ulloa and Cosenz.—Answers of the French and English Governments to that of Venice.—Order of the Day after the evacuation of Malghera.

THE forces and the artillery which the enemy employed in the siege of Malghera, and its obstinate defence, deserve that I should enter into some details.

On the 4th of May, the batteries of the first parallel were completed by the enemy, and on the night of the 23rd those of the second parallel were terminated,—that is to say, they employed nineteen days in cannonading, in spite of the enormous forces they had brought into operation. On the 25th, the parapets were all thrown down, and the sacks of earth which replaced them

were exhausted. Even the platforms were all in a burning state; and the powder-magazine threatened ruin, its side-walls being much injured. The palisades round the covered way were completely destroyed; many guns were dismounted; many of the casemates were so untenable, that on the morning of the said 25th, in No. 1, where the head-quarters were established, the enemy's grenades killed two men and wounded eleven. The fort being thus no longer capable of defence, the enemy might have actively assaulted it, protected by the embankments of the railroad, which ran along the fortress at a short distance. In effect, our spies brought word that the assault would take place on the morning of the 27th. It is to be observed that Malghera has no buildings surrounding it. The water of the ditches is often very low,—a circumstance which is mentioned in General Thurn's report to Radetzky.

The third parallel was opened by the enemy on the 25th, and continued its fire till the night of the 26th, when the defence ceased.

Though I had entire confidence in the zeal and intelligence of Colonel Ulloa, yet I went frequently to Malghera, to comfort the garrison with kind words, and thank them in the name of all Italy for the intrepidity and resignation which they exhibited on every occasion. They read on my countenance an unfeigned affection, so much so that they would not tell me their grievances when I questioned them, for fear of giving me pain.

When I arrived on the place, the enemy's fire, if it had been suspended for a moment, immediately recommenced; and this was attributed to the white plume on my hat, which was visible even in the plains of Mestre.

I had a *valet-de-chambre* named Theodore, who had never before left Paris, nor seen the sea. He showed the greatest courage in all my vicissitudes, and complained that I would not let him follow me when I approached the enemy's fire, and earnestly begged to be allowed to accompany me everywhere. I was surprised at an intrepidity in the midst of balls, bombs, and grenades, which might have done honour to an old soldier of the Imperial Guard. He diverted himself with

picking up the projectiles, assisted by some of the soldiers, and bringing them to my gondola. When I went to Colonel Ulloa's quarters, or to a place where the shots were unusually thick, I told him not to follow me, because he was already sufficiently exposed to peril, without seeking what was needless, and that his loss would be a serious evil to me, for I could not replace him without injury to the public service.

Among other articles published by Vari, a man of intelligent and truly Italian mind, I read that, on returning one evening from the fort, I said to him, "If Tasso had come to Malghera, he would readily find the originals of his heroes." In fact, I had given Lieut.-Col. Rosaroll the name of "Argante of the Lagoon."

I am averse to exaggeration, and I do not exceed the bounds of truth when I affirm, that the wounded of Malghera, while their arms and legs were being amputated, continued to exclaim "*Viva l'Italia*." A Lombard engineer, wounded in the foot by the splinter of a bomb, himself encouraged his companion who assisted in the amputation. In the

lunette, No. 13, the enemy's artillery threw down the Italian flag: Lieut.-Colonel Rosaroll went to replace it, but an artillery man envied him the danger, and ran to the mound where it was fixed, saying, "Do not touch it." An old patrician, a cavalry soldier of Napoleon's, went to Malghera to visit his sons who were in one of the valiant companies of Bandiera and Moro: a shell struck him dead; the son fell on his father to save him, and the shell burst leaving both corpses entwined. I left to some officers the charge of collecting the isolated facts which happened in Malghera, and along the batteries in front of Venice, exposed to the enemy's balls, which facts might show how much patriotism there is in the minds of the Italian youths. I am ignorant whether these desires were accomplished. I remember that I have contracted a debt towards the heroic companies of Bandiera and Moro, a debt which I have not been, and never shall be, able to pay. In one of my many reviews, I was so satisfied with their conduct, that I promised to have printed a statement of their names, of the native communes of each, of the days on



which their entire corps had combated, and of the particular facts by which they had had the glory to distinguish themselves. But the enemy gave us so much to do, that there was no time to execute the promised work.

In the meantime, the government and myself, united in council, came to the following decision :—

“ THE Provisional Government of Venice, considering that Malghera is an artificial and not impregnable fortress, especially in presence of a determined enemy who have numerous forces and abundant materials of war at their disposal ;

“ Considering that the exigences of military honouf are fully satisfied by the signal proofs of talent, courage, and perseverance, which the garrison and their excellent commander have displayed in repulsing the enemy's repeated and furious assaults, and in occasioning them severe loss ;

“ Considering that strategic reasons, and especially the necessity of economising our ammunition and money, in order to prolong the resistance, demand that the defence of

Venice should be reduced within its natural limits which are feally impregnable ;

“ The General-in-Chief and the heads of the Government departments of War and Marine decree,

“ 1. The Fort of Malghera shall be evacuated.

“ 2. Colonel Girolamo Ulloa, Commandant of the said Fort, is charged with the execution of this decree.

“ MANIN, *President*.

“ VENICE, *26th May, 1849.*”

In general, the garrison of a place suffering so much fatigue and so many losses, is rejoiced when surrender or evacuation is announced ; but in Malghera they bade a sorrowful adieu to their cannons, and embraced them with tears in their eyes.

The retreat into Venice was accomplished with so much order and secrecy, that the besiegers were not at first aware of it. Half an hour before midnight the garrison had entered Venice, carrying with them the wounded, the dead, and even their woollen coverings. The enemy were so accustomed to see themselves assaulted, or repulsed with

vigour, that, in spite of the unaccustomed silence of the batteries of the fort, they did not venture on an exploration, but continued their fire till half-past five in the morning of the 27th, and then, with much precaution, they issued from their trenches and occupied the fort.

The losses which the garrison of Malghera had suffered in killed and wounded were about five hundred men. The nearer the enemy advanced, the more their shells increased. The number of their killed and wounded appeared greater than ours in the daily reports, but when the third parallel was opened, the daily loss became exorbitant for their numbers. Had Malghera been an independent place, like Antwerp, we might, for the honour of our arms, have waited for an assault, supposing the loss not to have been such as to compromise the defence. But in Malghera not only had there been more honour earned than was necessary, but its garrison had become essential to the defence of all the Lagoon. Between the killed, the wounded, and the sick, our numbers were alarmingly diminished. Those of the victorious enemy, on the contrary, were always

increasing ; and it is for this reason that it would have been more useful for the defence to have remained even a shorter time in Malghera than we actually did.

After the evacuation of Malghera, the bad effects of not having in right time blown up the requisite number of arches of the great bridge appeared more plainly. In fact, the mines under the arches were badly charged, because this had to be done in haste, and under the fire of the enemy, who were now in possession of Malghera : and, moreover, these mines were beyond the reach of our cannons in the place. The blowing-up of these, with the ruins of the bridge, formed a sort of breach in which the enemy lodged themselves. From thence, in answer to our direct fire (for our battery on the Piazzale had only seven cannons), they attacked us with their parabolic lines.

At the same time, and in spite of my repeated orders, the commander of artillery and engineers had neglected the indispensable defences of St. Secondo and the works which were ordered at St. Giuliano.

The above-named accidents might have

been fatal ; that they were not so, was owing, on one side, to the slowness of the enemy, and on the other to the great activity and intelligence of Ulloa and Cosenz. As both had distinguished themselves most highly in the defence of Malghera, I proposed Ulloa for the rank of General of Brigade, and Cosenz for that of Lieutenant-Colonel, and I obtained the two brevets. I gave Ulloa the command of all the front of the defence, and I left Cosenz under his orders, with the Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, Mezzacapo, and Rosaroll, and Majors Virgilio, and Carrano, who all conducted themselves admirably. They all belonged to my staff, which was composed of officers of several provinces in Italy. Major Pegozzi, a Bolognese, was in bed with a musket-ball in his thigh. Major Cattabene was in Rome, being a deputy there. Fabbrizi was also in Rome, sent there by me. Antonio Mordini was in Florence, Minister of Foreign Affairs. I had known intimately the staffs of Massena in Calabria, and of Suchet in Spain. I had been twice in the squadron, in which were those of Cesar Berthier and Dongolet at Corfu.



My staff in Venice did not yield to either of these, either in intelligence, valour, or activity. And truly, without this activity and intelligence, the errors and neglects I have pointed out could not have been repaired. Thanks to the works which General Ulloa executed on the bridge, and in St. Secondo, the valour of the troops, of the artillery and of the officers of the navy, on light boats, maintained our uninterrupted superiority under the enemy's fire, till the surrender. This fire was continued without interruption day or night, for the space of nearly three months, without forcing us to a surrender, which was obtained only from want of bread, and saltpetre for gunpowder.

In order that Venice and its garrison might be informed of the evacuation of Malghera, I published the following Order of the Day :—

*“ Commander-in-Chief of the Troops in the Venetian States. Order of the Day.*

“ THE garrison of Malghera, which Colonel Ulloa commanded, has merited the admiration of the Venetian government, and of the



General-in-Chief, and will obtain the applause of all Italy, when the history of this siege, sustained against such immense superiority of numbers both in troops and artillery on the part of the enemy, is known.

“ If, for the duration of the defence, I had consulted only the daring, the patriotism, the invincible valour, which feared nothing, which braved all fatigue, and with which the defenders of the place were animated, it might have been sustained some days longer, and our men would have repulsed more than one assault. But the Government, the General-in-Chief, the Council of Defence, all decided on its evacuation,\* reflecting that the loss of Malghera would not compromise the security of the Lagoon ; that the 150 cannons of the enemy would have diminished our means of defence ; that, in fine, we must preserve these intrepid defenders for our city and for the Estuary. Malghera was, therefore, abandoned in the course of last night, and the retreat was effected with the greatest order.

“ If we have many irreparable losses to deplore, the number of the enemy's leaves them no cause for rejoicing. Of our entire

garrison of 2500 men, 400 are *hors de combat*. The people of Venice and of Italy must be aware, that there is no place on *terra firma* which must not yield to a regular siege, and that the enemy employed against Malghera more than sufficient means for the reduction of a place of the first order, while it was at most one of the third order.

“ The enemy will bear testimony to the deplorable state to which Malghera was reduced. The powder magazines, although shell-proof and covered with sacks of earth, were greatly damaged and rendered unserviceable ; the casemates were insecure ; the platforms and parapets were destroyed ; in fine, many guns were rendered useless. Nevertheless, order was so well maintained, that posterity may well say, that the Italians were deficient in nothing, not even in discipline.

“ G. PEPE.”

The menacing activity, and incessant fire which the enemy employed against the capital, did not prevent me from showing the Austrians that their numerical superiority in men and artillery was far from making us

despond. I therefore gave Rizzardi, a General of Division who commanded the district of Chioggia, the necessary *matériel* for a sortie, which I authorised him to make.

My object was to maintain the vivid conviction of their own valour in the minds of the soldiers, and also to obtain as many provisions as possible for the Estuary. The sortie was executed by General Rizzardi. The particulars of it will be found in the following Order of the Day, with the report sent me by the said General.

### *Order of the Day.*

“VENICE, 23rd May, 1849.

“IN order, that the military of Venice, who for a whole year have defended the Estuary with glory and perseverance, may know that their companions in arms of the 3rd district, commanded by the General of Division Rizzardi, conduct themselves on all occasions with zeal and valour, the General-in-Chief transcribes faithfully the report he has received from the said General, with a view to the welfare of the military service.

“G. PEPE,

“*Commander-in-Chief.*”

*Report of the Expedition from Brondolo.*

*“The 22nd May, 1849.*

“THE object of the sorties hitherto executed by me was to reconnoitre the forces and movements of the enemy, and not to obtain provisions. I now feared to recall the enemy in greater force on this side, lest they should rigorously intercept the arrival of provisions, which hitherto had come in daily ; I had not sufficient forces, after the occupation of the extended line of defence from the Brenta to the sea, to open the passages blockaded by the enemy.

“Having discovered that the Austrians intended to make a requisition in the country round us, in order to take away the resources of Venice, I immediately determined to forestal them ; and with great secrecy I prepared the expedition already announced, and with my previous number, of which I will give a detailed account in this report.

“The scope of this was to levy a simultaneous requisition of cattle of all kinds, in the whole territory of which Brondolo forms the centre, and which extends from Piove to the

Adige and the sea ; and thus not to give the enemy time to oppose in future my operations on those tracts of land which I had not explored. For this purpose I divided my forces into three partial columns, of which the first and the strongest was commanded by the brave Colonel Morandj, who on so many occasions had proved his worth ; this was composed of four companies of the Euganeo legion, and 100 men of the 2nd regiment ; 570 in all, who had orders to penetrate along the Bacchiglione, on the right of Brondolo, beyond Casa Bianca, towards Civi, Treporti, and Correzuolo.

“ The second column, commanded by Major Matterazzo, composed of two companies of the Euganeo legion, and 160 men of the Alpine legion, in all 360 men, was to explore all the ground in the centre, that is, on the right and left bank of the Canal of Vale, composed within the Adige, the Cavanella, and the Gorzone.

“ In fine, the third column, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Calvi, and composed of 140 men of his legion, was to beat the ground on the left, that is between Basiola, the sea, and the Adige.



“ These dispositions being made, I ordered the ships of war and the Commander of Engineers, Major Chiavacci, to effect the passage of the said troops from the Brenta ; a difficult passage, as we are deprived of the bridges and boats suitable for it.

“ At dawn of day, on the 22nd, all the troops were in motion beyond the Brenta ; from Brondolo I overlooked all their movements, ready to give the directions which circumstances might require.

“ The expedition everywhere encountered the enemy, and everywhere repulsed them with loss, showing plainly in this encounter the valour and courage of our troops, and of the officers commanding them.

“ The first column encountered the enemy opposite Civi ; they were kept at bay by our vanguard, and by a sharp and constant fire from their muskets. The principal corps of the column then pushed on before Treporti, in order to levy their demands in all the neighbouring territory, and with favourable results ; after which the column returned in military order towards Brondolo, sustaining with imperturbable coolness the redoubled



attacks of the enemy, who, with reinforcements and a field-battery, in vain endeavoured to stop them.

“The second column met the enemy at Cavanella, on the right of the Adige. They first began the fire, but without doing us any damage, as we were protected by the parapets of the fort ; the enemy had a sentinel killed. In the meantime the requisitions were duly made, and the return was effected in good order, under a sharp fire from the enemy, who descended with a force of more than 350 men, and a piece of artillery which they had not time to use.

“The column of Lieut.-Colonel Calvi, having passed the Adige, and effected the requisitions ordered, returned back upon the Porto Cæleri, and took prisoners the entire Austrian corps stationed there, who, however, made a brisk but useless resistance. The same column arrested a man named Vincenzo Belluzzo, a perverse character, and an abettor of the Austrians, who came in the first instance from them.

“The result of the expedition was the bringing in of three hundred oxen, four hogs, twelve

horses of various ages, and a great provision of wine, eggs, poultry, &c.; all which, profiting by the opportunity, entered safely into Chioggia. Besides this, there were eight prisoners, among whom a corporal, an under-corporal, and two scouts, who being dexterous at the oar, are destined to conduct the Austrian patrols along the rivers and canals. Moreover, the enemy must have suffered no small loss both in killed and wounded.

“ On our side, we have only to deplore the loss of one man of the 2nd regiment, Pietro Doni, struck by a ball in the chest in the encounter of Civi.

“ In general I have great reason to praise the discipline and valour of all the troops, as well as the ability, zeal, and intrepidity of the staff, especially of Colonel Morandi, and of Major Matterazzo, and Lieut. Colonel Calvi, commanding the columns ; also of the Major of Engineers, Chiavacci, who made a hasty bridge on the Brentono, and there, with pirogues and armed boats, guarded this important point of retreat. Majors Gandini, Stucchi, Capitani, Maiset, Mataigne, and Lieutenant Matticola, all effectively contri-

buted to the success of the expedition. In fine, Major Gheltof and Captain Sugana made the most laudable efforts in expediting the reinforcements and the reserve. Praise is also due to Basilisco, captain of a frigate ; to Lieutenant Rossi, and in general to the whole navy, for their promptitude in preparing the maritime forces necessary for the operation, and their efficacious assistance in saving the cattle from the waves.

“ Captain Oliveri also, of the Alpine legion, deserves special mention for his vigorous assistance in taking the ‘Austrian prisoners at Caleri ; and I should also recommend for a proper recompense Sergeants Boscurolo and Candiani, and Cuman, a soldier of the Euganeo legion ; the former of these killed two of the enemy ; the second, a subaltern officer ; and all united in effecting the requisition under the enemy’s fire. In fine, I recommend Illich, a marine of the 2nd class, who swam several times beyond the Brenta to aid the passage of the cattle.

“ RIZZARDI,

“ *Inspector-General.*

“ CHIoggia, 22nd May, 1849.”

About this time arrived the answers made by the cabinets of London and Paris to the prayer which had been addressed to them, in the name of Venice, at the beginning of the month. Ware, writing on Venice, thus expresses himself :—" These answers were evidently framed in concert ; they agreed in counselling peace with Austria, and prompt efforts to obtain concessions from that power, in whatever shape. The two despatches differed only in form : that of Lord Palmerston spoke of the Treaty of Vienna, to which Great Britain was a contracting party, and by which Venice was made a part of the Austrian Empire ; that of Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys was not less unjust ; it lamented the irreparable errors committed by Italy ; it expressed compassion for Venice, which must necessarily submit to the consequences, without deserving reproach ; and hinted that a general war, which would be terrible to all, could alone have impeded the triumph of Austria. Thus wrote the French minister, expressing sympathy for the cause of Italian liberty on the 27th of April, that is, only three days before the French army set out to combat that

same liberty under the walls of Rome, and in conjunction with Austria.”

Venice was now deprived of every hope of aid, either by arms or mediation. In the whole Lagoon we combated for the glory of the Italian arms ; we ,combated to show the world that our misfortunes were not merited, and, therefore, that although the wisdom and justice of Providence had permitted them, it would never allow them to be of long duration.

After the evacuation of Malghera, I dictated the following Order of the Day :—

“ VENICE, 30th May.

“ SOLDIERS OF VENICE,

“ A year has passed since the eyes of Europe have been fixed on you ; and the cause which with such alacrity, such valour, and such disinterestedness, you have undertaken to defend, is now confessed to be sacred.

“ It is not unknown, that the months of last summer were passed by you alternately between sickness, privations, and arduous reconnoissances round the Lagoon. The results



of the day of Mestre made Italian hearts rejoice ; and the same will be the case when the defence of Malghera is known, which fort, in a mere strategic point of view, you evacuated with an order worthy of the most expert soldiers. The defence of Brondolo, of Treporti, and of classical Venice will not be less applauded.

“ But in the midst of all the virtues you have given proof of, and which we yet further expect from you, I still inculcate the preservation of that rigid discipline which I admired in your ranks, while you sustained, unmoved, the innumerable shots of which Malghera was the mark. Your retreat from that place equalled a high feat of arms, since no fortress on terra firma is impregnable ; and Malghera is a place of the third order.

“ Continue worthy of your ancestors, and remember that perseverance is the crowning virtue of a soldier. Your glorious antecedents will be forgotten, if discipline is not maintained among you ; by that alone, you can accomplish your firm purpose of conquering at all costs. The more fierce the struggle, the greater the necessity of increasing



order ; thus alone your courage, and that of your leaders, will give you the right to say, with pride, during the rest of your life, ‘I was one of the defenders of immortal Venice.’

“GUGLIELMO PEPE,

“*Lieut.-General Commander-in-Chief.*”

I shall conclude this chapter by transcribing the following particulars from the Gazette of Augsburg, on the evacuation of Malghera.

“At midnight of the 26th, the fire of the fort ceased ; but our batteries continued to bombard till dawn ; then the fort was discovered to be abandoned, and was occupied by our troops. But our joy at the taking of Malghera was soon diminished. Some of the officers went with their men to take possession of the fort of St. Giuliano, and were plown into the air by a mine. Four officers were killed, and one wounded. Many soldiers perished—(hitherto we have found but thirty-five bodies)—and many were wounded. Another mine was discovered, but we were in time to take away the match before it exploded. At half-past eleven, I entered the

fort of Malghera. In every street, on the right and the left, were to be seen horrible traces of the bombardment ; and as I advanced, the scene became still more appalling. It is impossible to form an idea of the state of destruction to which this fort is reduced. It is impossible to walk a step without falling into holes made by the bombs ; the ground is strewed with fragments ; there is not a building, not a cottage, which is not reduced to a heap of ruins. None of the guns can serve again.

“ To honour, praise should be given. The garrison of Malghera behaved most valiantly, and here every one acknowledges that no troops could have resisted longer.”

## CHAPTER X.

Rapid sketch of offensive and defensive preparations in the second period of the siege of the Lagoon.—Letter of Tomaseo on the Dalmatian Company, and answer.—Report of Gen. Rizzardi, from Chioggia, on the enemy's squadron.—The Author called to the Presidency of the Military Commission, with other powers.—Order of the day.—Enrolment for the Navy service. Correspondence with Hungary.—Negotiation with De Bruck.—Letter from the Cardinal Patriarch.—Answer.—Death of Rosaroll.—Order of the day.

WHILE Malghera and its vicinity were exposed to the constant fire of the enemy, and wounds, mutilation, and death, were the daily fate of so many noble volunteers, my mind was in a state of constant anguish, which was increased by the idea that the population of Venice, and of Chioggia, would soon be exposed to the same misfortunes. Chioggia is a city of 30,000 inhabitants; and now that the Austrians have no other enemy in Italy to combat, they may probably besiege that place.

Among the troops then in Venice were many distinguished Neapolitan artillery officers. My

own experience made me know how far the enemy could injure the capital, in spite of all the valorous efforts and the intelligence with which these officers endeavoured to neutralise in part the effect of the vast preparations made by the enemy in front of their attack. In 1810 I was with King Murat, when, with a French army of 30,000 men, he threatened to invade Sicily ; his tent was erected in the camp of Piale, and we, who belonged to his military establishment, had our tents around his.

The English, who defended the island, gave their cannons of large calibre an elevation of forty-five degrees, and they sent the balls from their batteries constructed on the Sicilian shore, not only to our tents, but far beyond them. They continued their fire, night and day, for four or five months ; and at night the bombs and grenades had the appearance of stars describing a parabola, and formed a beautiful spectacle.

In this second period of the defence of the Estuary, that is, after the evacuation of Malghera, the Austrians prepared for the attack of Venice and Chioggia. To become masters

of the latter city they were obliged to besiege the fort of Brondolo. For this purpose they began to construct batteries on the right bank of the Brenta, in order to pass that river, and then attack the entrenched camp adjoining the fort. We shall soon see why their operations were fruitless in that part of the Lagoon, which was distant from Venice twenty miles by water, and forty by land. But, though they did not succeed in making themselves masters of that town, it was certainly much damaged by their attacks.

They established batteries, opposite those which we had on the bridge, in the Island of St. Giuliano, from whence they did us the most injury. They had other batteries on terra firma towards Campalto and Fusino. The enemy's batteries in St. Giuliano were rather more than 3,000 yards distant from the capital.

Our means of defence consisted in the batteries on the bridge, and those of San Secondo, besides many pirogues and other armed boats, all of which took up positions very near the enemy's batteries.

The first battery on the bridge, called the

Piazzale, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz, Colonel Rosaroll, Captain Martini, and two other Captains. All five, alternately, took the command. Two of these were killed by cannon balls, and two were wounded. This battery was almost totally destroyed three or four times, and each time it was rapidly reconstructed. About forty of the mountings, which were struck and broken by the enemy's projectiles, had to be replaced. One day a grenade blew up the powder magazine; thirteen artillerymen were either killed or wounded; but, nevertheless, the others continued their work as if no disaster had happened. Colonel Rosaroll himself commanded the fire of the guns.

San Secondo had also more than one commander. Among them were Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, and Major Virgilio. It would not be easy to describe their activity in creating all the requisites for defence. On taking the command, Sirtori found that everything was to be done; there were few pieces in the batteries, few parapets, neither casements, nor *blindaggi*. All these were made under the fire of the enemy. Seeing



Sirtori under a cloth tent, instead of a *blindaggio*, I wrote and spoke to Vice-Admiral Graziani to have one speedily constructed, in order to protect the officers of the garrison from the bombs and grenades of the enemy, when their duties did not call them to the batteries.

The line of defence was commanded by General Ulloa ; but, when he became a member of the military commission, Colonel Cosenz took the command. I had no occasion in my inspections to recommend activity and energy. But the operation of clearing the waters of the Lagoon under the bridge, filled as they were with ruins of the arches which had been more or less effectively blown up, proved a very arduous one ; and the number of killed and wounded, among the workmen who were in the boats, was very considerable.

Tomaseo, a man of thoroughly Italian sentiments, as all knew, is a native of Dalmatia. Of the strangers who came to defend Venice, the numbers were reduced to one hundred and fifty in all, who formed three companies ; one Swiss, one Dalmatian, and

another Hungarian. For some fault committed, the Dalmatian company was dissolved: and Tomaseo wrote to me as follows :—

*The Dalmatians, to his Excellency General  
Guglielmo Pepe.*

“ You, learned in the arts of war, who have seen so much of the history of Europe pass before your eyes, and have borne a part in it,—you, General, better than myself, know the estimation in which Napoleon held the Dalmatians, and how the Venetian Republic owed them her last victories ; you know in what manner the Dalmatian soldiers united sincerity with firmness, and firmness with impetuosity. Had it depended on you, you would certainly not have permitted, that a company of a few soldiers, of divers countries, should take the title of Dalmatians ; because truth, even in trifling things, should reign among the free, and a name is not a trifling thing. The company was composed of fewer than fifty men, and the Dalmatians among them did not number ten. It being desired that these should be incorporated in a Swiss company,

they complained at having to leave off their native cap, and at being mixed with those whose language was German, and with soldiers who were not their own countrymen. In spite of this, they remained for some time united with the Swiss, and combated one night in their company. They had been for forty hours, not in guard of the lunette, but simply in reserve, when Lieutenant Carava, the descendant of honourable soldiers, a man who fortunately served eight years in the maritime militia without a stain, seeing the rain falling, ordered his company to place themselves under cover, that their arms might remain dry and ready for use, and they obeyed. Carava, by not giving notice to his captain, certainly sinned against discipline,—ever a great fault, but especially in these times, and in Italy, where military discipline, almost unknown, needs to be vigorously enforced. But Carava did not refuse to affront danger; there was no danger to affront. At the first alarm he could, with his men, resume his post; and when, soon after, they went in search of his company, the men were all found under arms. This act, in

short, might be called a caprice, but there was not a shadow of cowardice. At all events, the fault was in him who commanded, and not in the company which obeyed, and which, as I said, was not composed of Dalmatians. The Lieutenant having been placed under arrest, they asked, not tumultuously, but respectfully, for his liberation, because they loved him ; and this sentiment was honourable to both parties, although, in a besieged fort, it was not the manner in which to manifest affection. They were therefore disarmed ; the company was dissolved ; and the men dispersed among other troops. Two only were brought to trial ; and the other soldiers, hearing they had left their post, and believing it was from fear, condemned them too severely.

“ To you, illustrious warrior, to whom honour is as precious as discipline, it will be a satisfaction to know that these few, called to defend a sacred banner, have not shown themselves unworthy, and that they may soon repair the fault of insubordination by noble examples. Accept, I pray, my cordial thanks, and those of many others, for all that

you and your worthy fellow-countrymen have done and suffered for Venice and Italy.

“ Your affect.,

“ N. TOMASEO.

“ VENICE, 3rd June, 1849.”

This letter shows, in the same person, an intense love for his native, and for his adopted, country. I answered as follows :—

“ MY mind is deeply moved by the tenderness you show towards the Dalmatians, whose virtues I have long admired. If, during the past months, the Sardinian Vice-Admiral had condescended, with the squadron commanded by him, to support the expedition I proposed to make in Dalmatia with the Venetian troops, it certainly would have been very advantageous to Italy. Instead of a few Dalmatians in the company bearing their name, an entire legion would have arrived, and have been most useful in the defence of the Estuary.

“ Thanks to the perseverance of immortal Venice, and to so many proofs of heroic valour which the Italians have given in the Lagoon, in Milan, Brescia, Bologna, and

Rome, our cause is not lost. In the midst of the vicissitudes of this war of independence, it is possible that the brave Dalmatians may still appear with glory in the Italian ranks, and may make the world speak of them again, as it did in the war which the Venetian Republic sustained, when her name resounded amid the regions of the East.

“Yours, &c.,

“G. PEPE.

“VENICE, 7th June, 1849.”

To give some idea of the situation of the Lagoon, I will transcribe two reports sent to me from the opposite quarters of General Rizzardi, in Chioggia, and General Ulloa, on the railroad.

*“To the Commander of the Troops in Venice.”*

“CHIOGGIA, 6th June, 1849.

“SINCE dawn yesterday morning, the enemy's fleet had been anchored four miles from our coast. This day their frigate hoisted sail, and, towed by two steam-boats, took the direction of the Levant; the other



vessels followed this example, and went off to the right and left, while the steamers have gone out towards Caorle. At the hour I am writing, one corvette and one brigantine alone remain in these parts.

“Both yesterday and to-day, the fort of Brondolo, as well as the line of the Brenta, discharged a few guns against the enemy’s works, and especially against those which are situated near the Ghiacciaja; they were effectively aided by the fort St. Michael, and compelled the enemy to abandon the position and take to flight. Ca’ Lino, also, and the new fort, fired several discharges against the enemy’s steamers, which endeavoured to approach: they were obliged to put out to sea, and get near Ca’ Leri, out of the reach of our guns. There was said to have been some brisk firing at Ca’ Lino, last night, with the enemy’s patrols and picquets. We had three men wounded.

“INSPECTOR-GENERAL RIZZARDI.”

From the railroad, on the 8th of June, General Ulloa wrote to the Commander-in-Chief as follows :—

“THE useful and zealous service of our batteries and armed boats, still retards considerably the progress of the enemy’s works. Thus, yesterday, about mid-day, a bomb, aimed with singular precision from the battery on the middle bridge, blew up a deposit of powder in St. Giuliano, causing the enemy a considerable loss of time and men.

“Besides the usual reconnoissances from the right wing, two pirogues of the left accomplished, during the night, another bold expedition, under the orders of Major Rudelli, against a work of the enemy which had been observed at the mouth of the canal Botterighi. They approached the point stealthily. While the two pirogues occupied the adversary with a continual fire, fifty brave men of the corps of marine infantry and of the crews of that division, led by Captain Luigi Talento, landed on the opposite shore, and compelled the enemy, after a long and sharp combat, to suspend their fire and give up the position. This affair cost us only four men wounded.

“On the same shores were discovered this morning some fresh pieces, placed there

probably with the intention of taking our left division in flank.

“From the enemy’s eagerness to concentrate on this point all the means of attack they could dispose of, it was evident how much they feared for the safety of their position; and this was a fresh reason to praise the intrepidity of our men, who, in front of a fire every day more severe, and from which we have already experienced many losses, yet remain immovably and perseveringly at their post of honour.

“GENERAL ULLOA.”

“

What most annoyed me and the artillery officers was the scarcity of gunpowder. To injure the enemy’s batteries, and make them, from time to time, suspend or diminish their fire, it was necessary not to spare our own shots, which were sufficiently well directed by our young artillery-men, whose patriotism, and warm desire to injure the enemy, supplied their want of experience. An entire battalion of Neapolitan volunteers was transferred to the artillery service, and, after short instruction, they served the pieces with a

precision of which I should not have thought them capable if I had not witnessed it. The enemy's artillery found it necessary to repair the damage they had received oftener than we did. But these advantages over the Austrians would cease when we were compelled to economise our powder, of which we wanted, using it largely, not less than ten measures a day.

These circumstances, and the many errors in the management of the naval division, and in the various branches of the administration, induced the assembly to nominate a military commission both for land and sea affairs, with ample powers, independent of the President of the government. It was composed of General Ulloa, Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, and Baldiserotti, an officer of the navy. Though the commission was to exercise that part of the military power which had belonged to the government, independently of the Commander-in-Chief, still, as I had told them that, in the state of siege in which we were placed, the Commander-in-Chief was continually paralysed by what was called the Ministry or Direction of War, both the government and

the military commission named me President; and the assembly, at its first meeting, issued the following decree :—

“THE Assembly of Representatives of the States of Venice, in the name of God and the people, decree their sanction of the appointment of the illustrious General Pepe, by the government and the military commission, to be President of the said commission.

“GIOVANNI MINOTTO, *President.*

G. PASINI,	} <i>Secretaries.</i>
G. B. BUFFINI,	
A. SOMNIA,	
P. VALASSI,	

“VENICE, 30th June, 1849.”

My first Order of the Day in my new capacity of General-in-Chief and President of the commission was as follows :—

“SOLDIERS of every grade, on land and at sea, defenders of Italian independence in Venice !

“Called to the presidency of the military commission instituted by the National As-

sembly with new powers, it is my duty to tell you that in these supreme moments, when the enemy's attacks are on the Lagoon itself, we are more than ever called on to show invincible valour, and to surpass even Mestre and Malghera. .

“Strength is ever based on discipline, and that on blind obedience. The higher the grade, the more essential it is, since the example of the first is ever the best. I shall be inexorable in punishing all failures. Whoever in these important circumstances does not justify the faith which the country has placed in him — whoever should entertain, under whatever pretext, the thought of abandoning his post, which has become more arduous in our present condition — will be considered by the country as guilty of the crime of high treason. .

“But you, instead of punishment, will know how to merit rewards, which you will receive both from me and your contemporaries; and these will be more truly appreciated by you, for they will go down to posterity.

“Europe, Italy, have their eyes on you.



The wonderful deeds which for fourteen centuries honoured Venice will receive new lustre from your present virtue.

“Let us prove ourselves worthy of the difficulties in which the destinies of this classical land have placed us. Let us so act, that, even beyond the Alps, men of intrepid hearts may say, ‘Why was not I too among the difficulties and dangers with which Venice, the bravely defended, was environed?’

G. PEPE,

*“General-in-Chief, President of the Military Commission, &c. &c.”*

*“VENICE, 18th June, 1849.”*

Though I knew nothing of naval affairs, yet, if alone, or as president of a commission with other powers, I had, on my arrival in Venice, been entrusted with the organisation of such a naval division as should be capable of combating the Austrians with advantage, I should certainly have succeeded. Public opinion and profound examination would have enabled me to establish a worthy council for sea affairs; and by employing these means with vigour and a determined will, I should have accomplished my purpose.

But the evil was done ; it was irreparable ; and the remedy came too late.

Neither of the three Vice-Admirals persevered in keeping the command of the division ; and neither enjoyed the confidence of their subordinates. In the space of a year, by giving difficult missions to chosen officers against the Austrians in the Adriatic, some among them would have acquired sufficient fame to deserve the command of the active naval forces. Besides this, with great authority and determination, two steam frigates might have been purchased. The Venetian sailors and naval officers were acknowledged, both by the French and English, to be better than the Austrian ; it was, therefore, necessary only to be superior also in sailing and steam vessels.

After I was named President of the commission, all hope of augmenting the feeble number of our vessels being gone, I told the council of defence that we must perform, if not desperate, at least very daring acts, and I pointed out Napier's deeds on the Portuguese coast. But desperate deeds emanate from the minds of those who do them, and

cannot be commanded. The defence of Thermopylæ, the bold manœuvre of Nelson against the Danish fleet, the blowing up of Vigliena, near Naples, were deeds which were performed, but not commanded. Sometimes I thought of placing some of the commanders of war vessels between the alternative of acquiring military fame, or eternal dishonour by degradation in the public piazza. But the members of the commission and of the government said to me, "Too late ! too late !" Nevertheless, my fatal genius, which never despaired, led me on board some of the ships of war, where I endeavoured, by encouraging words, to raise the minds of the officers, the gunners, and mariners. Some time after I reviewed the entire naval division ; and after the review I published the following Order of the Day :—

" *VENICE, 3rd July, 1849.*

" *YESTERDAY*, the General-in-Chief and President of the Military Commission reviewed the naval division commanded by Bucchia, captain of a corvette. The General's first object was to be assured of the spirit which

animates the officers and sailors of the navy. Though it be difficult to read the thoughts of individuals, those of a multitude, when we are in the habit of studying them, are more easily divined. The sailors, and gunners of the marine artillery, showed themselves satisfied with the care of their young and valiant officers. But above all they manifested great impatience to prove by deeds to their contemporaries, that they know how to vie with the land troops in valour and in all patriotic actions. The General then told them that if the military of the Estuary had rendered themselves formidable by the use of the bayonet, the mariners, to follow the same object, must hasten to board ships ; that in this manner Admiral Napier, with a feeble frigate, had taken a vessel of the line from Don Miguel near Lisbon.

“ The General was rejoiced to observe that the sailors needed no spur, and they seemed to say, ‘ The praises which the valorous soldiers in Mestre and Malghera have so justly earned on the batteries which face Venice, seem to take away all honour from us.’

“ Among other unequivocal proofs of the

eager desire to combat, one was given by Lieut. Galandrea, of the Marine Artillery. He belonged to the brigantine S. Marco, and being promoted from a sergeant to an officer, he begged his superiors to let him continue to serve as sergeant, on condition that he should remain on the vessel, honoured by such a classical name, and that they should soon encounter the enemy.

“The General-in-Chief can assure the people of Venice, that the naval division, though weak in numbers, will always do honour to the ancient Queen of the seas.

“G. PEPE.”

A few days before I reviewed the naval division in the hope of obtaining some advantage from it, the commission which I presided over published the following:—

“THE Commission of War and Marine, having full powers; considering that the glory of Venice was always on the sea; considering that by nature and in history she was always declared the Queen of the Adriatic; considering that her collective



forces should be on a par with her history and her elevated destiny;

“ DECREES,

“ 1. That an appeal shall be made to all the young men of the Venetian states for a voluntary enrolment in the service of the navy.

“ 2. The enrolment shall be binding for the duration of the present war of independence.

“ 3. For the city of Venice and the districts of defence, this enrolment shall take place at the commission instituted for this purpose in St. Biaggio, and in the third district at the military transport office, under the superintendence of the local war commission, always with the intervention of a naval officer.

“ 4. The departments of War and Marine are charged with the execution of that part of the present decree which regards them.

“ GUGLIELMO PEPE, *President.*

GIROLAMO ULLOA,

GIUSEPPE SIRTORI,

FRANCESCO BALDISEROTTI.”

“ VENICE, 20th June, 1849.”



The want of powder being as great a calamity as the want of bread, the war commission decreed that all the powder possessed by private persons should be given up. We hastened to fabricate as much as could be made from the raw materials existing in the Estuary, and I often sent to the commander of the batteries to slacken his fire as much as that of the enemy would permit. Admiral Graziani showed the greatest activity and good will in assisting the commanders of our batteries with all the *matériel* he could draw from the arsenal.

At that time the Venetian government was informed of the nomination of Louis Kossuth as President-Governor of the Hungarian republic, and a letter was also received from his diplomatic chargé d'affaires, engaging Venice to resist for two months, and requesting that some one might be sent to treat of arrangement with them: this letter was dated the 19th of May. By means of a French gun-boat, citizen Lodovico Parini, Vice-President of the Assembly, was dispatched. He concluded a convention with the Hungarian envoy, by which the govern-

ment of Debreczin engaged to assist Venice with a sum of money, to expedite two frigates purchased in England, and then (as they hoped) to make a powerful diversion ~~in~~ Italy against the Austrian troops as speedily as possible. Splendid promises, which might have changed the face of affairs, if that generous nation had been in a position to accomplish them. But the communications, intercepted by Austria, were become so difficult, that the Hungarian envoy, to give notice to his government of the urgent peril in which Venice was placed, found no other safe means of sending his despatches from Ancona to Debreczin than by Constantinople. Our hopes on that side, therefore, were sufficiently distant ; and yet we reckoned on them much ! A few days after, the envoy was obliged to fly from Ancona, which was besieged by the Austrians, though at Venice we knew nothing of it.

Parini had not returned from his conference with the agent of Kossuth, and the termination of his agreement was not yet known, when a despatch reached the Venetian government from Signor De Bruck, Minister

of Commerce at Vienna, who was at that moment in Italy to negotiate the peace with Piedmont. Referring to the expressions which Manin had used in his answer to Marshal Radetzky as to the direct attempts at negotiation which might be commenced with the Imperial cabinet, it declared that De Bruck was authorised to receive any communication made from the head-quarters of Mestre. This letter was brought to the assembly by Manin on the same day on which the treaty with Hungary, above related, became known.

It was not without astonishment that the letter of Signor De Bruck was discussed. Austria was now the first to open a negotiation which, fifteen days before, she had so uncourteously repulsed, even refusing a safe conduct to the French ambassador ; and that part of Manin's letter which Radetzky, in his sharp reply, had not deigned to notice, now appeared so important, that the Imperial minister made a journey on purpose that the treaty might be set on foot. Whatever were the motives of this change in the politics of Austria towards Venice, it was observed that the

conference could not be refused, and the assembly made a decree authorising the government to continue the negotiation diplomatically commenced, subject of course to the ratification of the representatives of the people.

Throughout the discussions on this subject, the assembly did not fail to recommend that the basis of this negotiation should be consonant with the instructions given to Signor Valentino Pasini, to guide him in the overtures he had been sent to make at Paris. These instructions permitted him, in the present bad position which prevented any better terms, to admit the scheme of a Lombardo-Venetian constitutional kingdom, but separated from Austria. On the same occasion, and in the same degree which authorised this negotiation, the assembly declared that the land and sea forces by their valour, and the people by their sacrifices, had deserved highly of their country ; and, persisting in the deliberations of the 2nd of April, it expressed its confidence in the bravery of the troops and the perseverance of the people. This was agreed on almost unanimously, and by secret ballot. It was an opportune answer given by

the assembly to certain Austrian journals, which had dared to treat the unanimous vote of the 2nd of April as an act obtained by surprise.

Manin designated two persons of talent, Signori Giuseppe Calaci and Giorgio Foscolo, to confer with De Bruck. They had a conference with the Austrian minister, and afterwards a correspondence with him, frequently asking an explanation of ambiguous proposals, and obtaining replies not more explicit on the same propositions. In substance it was already seen that De Bruck's mission was to allure Venice, after the manner of Austria, into following the fate of a Lombardo-Venetian constitutional kingdom.

The special relations which this kingdom would have with the Imperial Crown were discussed; but it was clearly seen that Austria did not intend to recede from the idea that these provinces should form an integral part of the monarchy, as was said in the famous constitution of the 4th of March by the Emperor Francis Joseph, to which every letter of De Bruck referred.

All this correspondence was laid before the



assembly by the government on the 15th of June. According to custom, the assembly named a committee of reference among its members. As those who were charged with providing provisions and ammunition were in bad odour with the public, it was decided that the commission should at the same time examine the whole state of the country, and thus it was that the military commission was proposed to the assembly. The formation of that commission followed the conferences with De Bruck, although I have been induced to explain it first, while I was on the topic of our means of defence.

That all might proceed with order in Venice, whenever any question arose between the clergy and military, I always endeavoured to satisfy the demands of the Cardinal Patriarch; and when he knew that I was named President of the military commission, &c., he wrote me the following letter:—

“ EXCELLENCY,

“ The decree of the provisional government and of the military commission, confirmed yesterday by the assembly of the



representatives of the state, by which the presidency of the said military commission is given to your Excellency, inspires me with firm confidence that ecclesiastical persons and things, as well as civil, will, in case of need, find in your Excellency a firm and generous patronage, which I now invoke, while at the same time I sign myself, with the highest esteem and consideration,

“ Your Excellency’s devoted servant,

“ J. CARDINAL PATRIARCH.

“ VENICE, 1st July, 1849.”

I answered on the same day :—

“ In reply to your Eminence’s letter, I beg to assure you, that, though I am intimately convinced that it is my duty to defend the Estuary till the last extremity, yet this does not exclude the duty of making the defence weigh as lightly as possible on the citizens, and especially on the clergy. To my sympathy for them is added my reverence for their head, who, during this year, has inspired me with the highest respect and admiration.

“ Your Eminence’s devoted, &c.

“ G. PEPE.”

The month of June terminated sadly for me. The Argante of the Lagoon, the magnanimous Rosaroll, who a few months before had been wounded in Carlo Alberto's army, at length, while he was directing the fire of that battery on the bridge which I called his "god-daughter," met the death he sought for, as I have explained in the following Order of the day :—

*" 28th June, 1849.*

" THE war we are now waging is certainly most afflicting. On a day of battle, to lose a number of combatants, drawn into the ranks either by force or by hope of advantage, is very different from seeing our ranks thinned by the loss of young men who, renouncing the ease and affluence of their families, have run to arms, stimulated by the love of liberty and Italian independence. To read the names of such men among the wounded, the mutilated, or the dead, plunges the mind of the least sensitive leader in grief. Yet some alleviation is imparted to your General's affliction, when he hears of the high-toned feelings with which life is abandoned, and sufferings are

endured, by our companions in arms. The acts of heroism which we observed on many of the most fatal days of Malghera, are now continually repeated in the first battery on the railway bridge. There, dexterity and coolness vie with one another; and thanks to these qualities, the artillery of the enemy, though superior in number, are not so in results: there is manifested the fierce determination never to yield or withdraw.

“The valiant Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz, already wounded three times while commanding the 1st district facing the Austrians, in his daily reports refers to actions in that same battery, which would do honour to the most glorious pages of Greece and Rome. Why cannot the foreigners beyond the Alps, who, by a tendency to material interests and low-minded thoughts, call Italian valour in question, why can they not witness Venetian valour?

“Yesterday, Lieutenant-Colonel Rosaroll, though suffering severely from an attack of fever, would not stay away from the first battery of the bridge. At three o'clock a bomb from the enemy burst a powder deposit;

Rosaroll immediately repaired the damage, continuing all the time the fire from our guns. Five hours later, while from a parapet he was observing the Austrians, a fatal ball struck his right shoulder and he fell. ‘To your guns, to your guns!’ he imperiously cried to the artillerymen who ran to assist him. The General-in-Chief went to him, and found him gasping for breath; he pressed his hand and spoke words of consolation. But the noble warrior, recalling all his strength, said, ‘Not I, expiring, but our Italy, should be the object of your care;’ and a few minutes later his valiant soul had taken its flight to the regions of immortality.

“Soldiers of every grade, if hitherto the names of all the brave, and their deeds, have not been given to publicity by means of the Press, this has arisen from their being in such numbers, that it was necessary, in order to avoid partiality, to take more accurate information respecting the acts which, when they are made known, will honour those who performed them, and all Italy. The world will then see that, though abandoned by men, and placed by Providence in the most trying

position, the soldiers of the Lagoon have proved themselves worthy of the glory which crowned Venice during fourteen centuries, and of our beloved Italy, which, though alternately sovereign and oppressed, is still ever unrivalled.

“ GUGLIELMO PEPE.

“ *Lieutenant-General, &c., &c.*”

## CHAPTER XI.

Fresh conferences with De Bruck.—Fall of Rome.—The battery on the great bridge surprised.—The number of the garrison diminishes.—Decree that 1000 of the National Guard be placed on active service.—Want of provisions.—Preparations of the Austrians to besiege Brondolo; their retreat to the right of the Brenta.—Letter from Count Marcello.—The enemy open their fire.—Vague rumours of the Austrians' doings.—Last Order of the day.

At this period new conferences were opened with De Bruck, and this time he explained more clearly the intentions of the Austrian cabinet with regard to the government of Lombardy and Venice. The two Venetian commissioners made a special report, in which they demonstrated that these intentions did not respect the dignity of the Italian nation, nor correspond with the moral wants of the time and of the country, and could not restore peace.

This report was read to the Assembly in a meeting of the 30th of June, and afterwards a letter from De Bruck was read, treating



more particularly of the conditions respecting the city of Venice, which would be agreed to when the city, by accepting them, should submit. The paper money of the Commune was to be reduced to one half, that of the Patriotica to one third of its value ; permission to depart was conceded to forty persons who had been excluded from the amnesty ; in short, the whole letter was in the style of a conquering barbarian, and the conditions were such as might be imposed by force, but that a people cannot voluntarily accept, while any self-respect remains. The Assembly, in entire accord with the Government, would not take these proposals into consideration. It replied to the insulting offers of Austria by passing to the order of the day at an immense majority, and in a manner which obliged the government to publish all diplomatic papers, in order that Europe might be the judge of what had passed between Austria and Venice. This was the position of unfortunate, but ever valiant, Venice, when the news arrived of the fall of Rome. This bitter event, although foreseen, did not the less afflict the population and the troops, yet

without discouraging them. Not only was the Lagoon left alone in Italy to defend itself against the attacks of a most powerful empire, but that excellent nation by whose arms we had hoped to see the imperial forces, if not vanquished, at least kept in check, the warlike Hungary, appeared likely to fall on the arrival of the Russians, and through her own internal discords. Yet Venice seemed to derive, even from her accumulated adversities, fresh courage, and a firm will to endure the most painful sacrifices for the noble cause which raises mortals to immortality.

I will retail one among the many valorous deeds, which brightened the scene at the commencement of July. Lieutenant-Colonel Cosenz wrote from the railroad, 7th of July, 1849.

“DURING last night the enemy who, during the last three days of unusual firing, perceived they had not been able to subdue the constancy of the defenders of our batteries, tried to obtain by surprise what they had failed in by force. At about one o'clock, after midnight, a fire-boat of the enemy ex-

ploded, between the third and fourth of our parapets on the bridge, without causing us any damage. Half an hour later they sent up rockets in the air, from the side of Campalto, and almost at the same time two other fire-boats were seen descending the canal from the right ; while our fire and our attention were directed to these, a detachment of the enemy succeeded in secretly approaching St. Antonio, under our batteries, and in unexpectedly scaling the parapet.

“ In a few instants the superior reserve, under the command of the Captain of the Piazza, Maistroviela, and composed of Gendarmes, of the Chasseurs of Sile, and of the 1st of the line, ran upon the assailers with irresistible impetus, and after a short but desperate resistance drove them back from the battery.

“ While this was going on, the pirogue Brillante, commanded by Privato, pushed boldly forward, and caught the flying enemy on one side, while S. Secondo aimed at them on the other, so that but few of those who had so desperately thrown themselves into the water avoided being killed. One of the

enemy's fire-boats is in our hands, uninjured. The courage and presence of mind with which our officers and soldiers met the attack of the enemy, deserve the highest praise.

“ENRICO COSENZ,

*“Lieutenant-Colonel in Command.”*

To this report I will only add, that Colonel Cosenz, as modest as he was brave, does not tell that he himself led the assault; and, fighting hand to hand with an Austrian officer, received a sabre cut on the face; and this was the fourth time he had been wounded within about two months.

“The Venetian army diminished visibly, not only by means of the enemy's fire, but by fever, which rendered a great number unfit for service. These daily losses, one after another, of young men, belonging to good families, whose names were known to us all, grieved me to the soul. I was also much afflicted to see the hospitals and barracks filled with the wounded and the invalids, whose greatest agony was that they were unable to fight by the side of their companions.

I began to be alarmed, on seeing how few were in a state to perform the daily service of the vast Lagoon, with nearly sixty forts, great and small, and, at the same time, to furnish the reserve indispensable for the threatened assaults of Venice and Chioggia. To increase the number of the combatants, the assembly decreed that 1000 of the citizens, on whose intrepidity they could reckon, should be enrolled : of these, 100 a day were sent for the defence of Malghera, before it surrendered ; they returned the following day, usually with ten killed or wounded, but not a murmur escaped.

Both the troops and the people bore, with constant resignation, the scarcity and bad quality of the bread; and other eatables, which at the same time were extremely dear. I sent four carriage horses myself to the butcher. In the midst of these events, it was essential not to forget Brondolo, the loss of which would have been followed by that of Chioggia.

The enemy had established several batteries on the right of the Brenta, with the intention of passing it, assaulting the entrenched camp,



and then commencing the siege of Brondolo, the resistance of which place could not have been long, on account of the Austrian's numerous artillery. I sent Major Boldoni into the district of Chioggia; he was a Neapolitan officer, highly instructed, valiant, and of indefatigable activity. I charged him to ameliorate the fortifications of Brondolo, and to construct, on the left of the Brenta, the field works necessary to prevent the passage of the river. Boldoni pushed on the works day and night; he did all I had desired, and exceeded my hopes, as I convinced myself by visiting all the district. The accomplishment of these works, the exactitude of the service, and, perhaps also, illness among the enemy, made them retire from the right bank, and so hastily, as to leave behind them a quantity of balls, shells, and grenades. I never knew the exact cause of this precipitate retreat, which had the appearance of a flight. It completely calmed my anxiety for Chioggia, whose inhabitants I had much affection for, besides that its fall would have been a great blow to the Estuary.

I desired the glory and prosperity of Venice,



as I did that of all Italy, and the reception given me by the affectionate population of the Lagoon inspired me with gratitude. I therefore, endeavoured, as far as depended on me, to contribute to the esteem and affection for the Government, by telling those who complained of its faults, that they were faults common to all governments. Conté Marcello, who had reason to think himself a descendant of the great Marcellus of Rome, was Intendant-General of the army. His excellent qualities, and his patriotism, inspired me with esteem and friendship. He one day wrote me the following letter:—

“ EXCELLENCY,

“ To the most excellent man, to the best of patriots, I send a copy of the document by which I intend to give up all interference in the affairs of the Government, since they are carried on in such a manner that I can have no confidence that the Government is acting for what, according to my poor ideas, is the good of the State. In privately communicating this document to General Pepe, I wish to give him a proof of

the high esteem in which he is held by me, and by all good men; and in proof of the particular devotion I have for him, and of the gratitude I feel for the great kindness he has always evinced for me, I beg him, at the same time, ever to consider me his devoted, &c., &c., &c.

“A. MARCELLO.

“7th July, 1849.”

After reading this letter, I begged the Count to favour me with an interview, and I obtained from him, for the sake of heroic Venice, to continue to hold his post in the army.

Towards the end of July, our disasters accumulated, though without weakening our high Italian sentiments. The Austrians, who could dispose of all the artillery in Verona, Peschiera, Mantua, Trieste, and other places near the latter, brought together a great number of guns of large calibre, and missiles of all sorts. They gave them towards the mouth an elevation of forty-five degrees, and by loading them with an immense charge of powder, their balls, both red-hot and cold,

were made to carry very far, often near the Piazza di St. Marco. The distance which these projectiles were sent was equal to that attained by the English artillery in Sicily in 1810, to which I have already referred.

In the night succeeding the 28th of July, all the guns of which the enemy could dispose (and they were not a few) discharged a storm of balls, bombs, and grenades. If hitherto these projectiles had chiefly fallen in the waters round the batteries on the bridge and at S. Secondo, now that they were directed over a vast capital, all were exposed to danger. The bombs and grenades reached over half of Venice, and the balls over two-thirds.

The attitude of all classes of the population (and at this moment famine and cholera were added to the list of their sufferings) was such as to do honour, not only to the Lagoon, not only to Italy, but to the human race. Providence, in permitting that a people so noble, so energetic, should fall into servitude, seems to tempt our limited understandings to doubt its intervention. The grief of bidding adieu to house and home, the certainty of meeting

with diasters and privations without end, the inevitable sufferings of so many tender youths, never drew from a single mouth the desire of a treaty for peace. When the people saw me in my gondola visiting our batteries, they were the first to bless me. If the enemy's guns were silent for an hour, in order to repair their damages, the whole population were alarmed, and the reader will scarcely believe that it was for fear we should be treating of an armistice.

From the night in which the enemy brought all their pieces to bear against the city, emigration began in every quarter which was exposed to their fire. The inhabitants of those parts which were out of the reach of the bombs, hospitably opened their houses, even to persons whom they did not know. The government, the municipality, and the wealthy citizens multiplied the lodgings in the public establishments for those who wanted them. Yet at first, the piazza, the streets, the gondolas on the canal were filled with families belonging to the poorer classes. Many families of the better classes were compelled to sleep all in one room, inasmuch as the greater part of

their dwellings were crowded with strangers. All this suffering was increased by the hottest season of the year, by the worst food, which even often failed, and lastly, by the cholera, of which I shall say something in the next chapter.

In the midst of these internal disasters, my most anxious thoughts were necessarily turned towards the defence, and I addressed the following letter to Manin :—

“ VENICE, 30th July, 1849.

“ SIGNOR PRESIDENTE,

“ The Government has sanctioned those defensive measures, in case of urgency, which the Council of Defence, presided over by the General-in-Chief, should decree. These require to be much modified since the occupation of the borders of the Lagoon by the enemy ; their attacks against the city may be instantaneous, and, I may say, unforeseen ; since at this moment the Austrians seem decided to make every sacrifice in order to gain possession of the bridge, on the defence of which depends that of this incomparable city.

“ The military commission is seriously



occupied with that defence ; and the measures taken are such as to guarantee it from any attack either by land or sea, if the Venetian garrison act in concert under a single commander.

“ According to these first instructions and arrangements, at a signal agreed on, the troops of every arm, in agreement with the Civic Guard, receive their orders from the General-in-Chief, who alone assumes the command ; but, as alarms may frequently be given during the night, the order for calling out the troops cannot be transmitted otherwise than by military authority, which alone watches over the defence of the city against all external assaults.

“ I therefore repeat that for the safety of the city, and that its defence may be secured, the Civic Guard, in case of alarm, and without any preventive orders, should be at the command of the General-in-Chief.

“ The original regulations for the defence of the city, in case of internal disorders, remain as before determined on ; those only are modified which regard an assault from the enemy.



“ The troop of ordnance and the disposable land artillery are all stationed in the forts, and at the batteries of the 1st district, and will be distributed according to the movements of the enemy. .

“ Out of the four battalions of the two civic legions of Cannareggio and S. Polo, individuals should be chosen to form two corps, called *mobile*, who, under the command of one or two chiefs of the legion, should take a position at the third line of defence, and encamp in order of battle behind the third entrenchment, which includes the three forts of Carlo Alberto, Pio Nono, and S. Marco.

“ The civic guard will double the posts of the garrison, comprehending those guarded by the troops of the line ; half a battalion will take a position at the bridge of the Rialto, and the remaining force will be placed in battalion, in close ranks, their heads turned towards the column of the piazzetta.

“ The gendarmes will be placed according to the existing instructions. The boatmen and boats, which, by the 24th Article of the aforesaid instructions, were to be stationed in their quarters, should now be placed on the railroad.

“ The military forces of the city are thus divided, and occupy two points ; that of the borders of the Lagoon, which includes the first *Circondario* ; and one half of the city. These two points of defence communicate by means of the bridge of Rialto. The command of the first division is confided to a general,—that of the second to the commandant of the civic guard ; but both under the orders of the General-in-chief.

“ The present regulations being approved, the commandant of the civic guard should make a list of the individuals composing the two battalions which are to serve in the first *Circondario*, and of the colonel who commands them. I invoke the patriotism of the commander of the civic guard in making choice of the officers, subaltern officers, and simple National Guards, who are to compose the two battalions called *mobile*.

“ All the arrangements, not contemplated in the present project, remain unchanged.

“ Accept, Signor Presidente, the assurance of my high esteem.

“ G. PEPE,  
“ *General-in-Chief.*”

To the military and political condition in which we were placed, it must be added that we had scarcely sufficient bread remaining to last us a month, or gunpowder enough for a fortnight, if we wished to respond to the enemy with sufficient vigour to force them to diminish their fire.

Many citizens and officers, who were well acquainted with the circumstances I have detailed, in order to make a show of greater patriotism than their neighbours, went about repeating that Venice would never surrender; that if the people would voluntarily arm themselves, and thus augment the columns of the National Guard and of the troops, we might execute a vigorous sortie, and obtain provisions, and saltpetre to fabricate powder. The Committee of Public Safety assured us that this excitement was the work of the enemy, in order to trouble the admirable order which reigned among the people, and the so much lauded discipline of the corps of the garrison. As a first remedy, I published the following Order of the day, which, by many, was considered apt to reinvigorate discipline, and destroy illusions now become

useless, since France, as well as Austria, was hostile to Italy, and Hungarian liberty had already fallen.

*“ Order of the Day.*

“ VENICE, 31st July, 1849.

“ Officers, subaltern officers and soldiers, in order to make a trial of the capabilities of Italians in the career of arms, fortune has placed you in the midst of the most difficult trials which our profession can ever encounter, —privations of every sort, sickness, a long blockade, a siege in which the enemy has availed himself of every means which the best artillery of our times can furnish. To these calamities, others still more grievous are added.

“ We are abandoned by all the world, and menaced with famine. To so much danger, to such long and bitter suffering, you have opposed contempt of life, unparalleled perseverance, and, above all, that calm which is so rare in young soldiers, and which has perhaps been infused into your minds by the holiness of the cause for which you are fighting ;

cause which has inspired the Venetian people with an attitude so sublime, that in all the vicissitudes of my life, I have never seen its like before. I speak of the manner in which they receive, unmoved, the numerous and fatal shots launched by the enemy against this admired city.

“Soldiers, you have tempted me into pride! I am indeed proud to command an army of Italian youths thus pre-eminent in military and civic virtues.

“It remains for me to tell you, that the glory you have so dearly bought, must remain pure from the beginning to the end of your career. It must be like a day in which the horizon, from break of dawn till its decline, is not obscured by a single cloud.”

“Your General-in-Chief assures you, that the chamber and the government will have at heart till the last moment, as much as the firmness and patriotism of upright citizens will permit, the honour of the Italian name, and your welfare. Continue to act as you have done and are now doing; and be assured that, whatever evil days may still await us, you will awaken in the minds of all men,

even of your enemies. envy. and not compassion.

“ G. PEPE,  
“ *Commander-in-Chief, &c.*”

This was the last of my many Orders of the day which I made use of for the space of a year and a half as a means of exciting Italian sentiments, contempt of life, and love of discipline, and of showing the various people of the Peninsula the conduct of the small army of the Lagoon, abandoned by men and by heaven to the barbarous attacks of a great empire. •



## CHAPTER XII.\*

Political events in the States of Rome from 1831 till 1849,  
when the French entered Rome.

WHEN the Bourbons were driven from France in the revolution of 1830, the era of universal liberty seemed to be announced to the nations of Europe. Romagna rose in February, 1831, and declared the temporal power of the Pope at an end. But Austria took armed possession of the legations, and restored the papal power. The new rights of the people which France had proclaimed, she did not also defend. Austria interfered in Romagna in spite of the law of non-intervention ; and the learned orators of France demonstrated in Parliament that the disapproval of intervention did not imply the necessity of combating it ; parliament approved this loyal interpretation.

\* I owe this chapter to the patriotism of Lisabe Buffoni, a deputy of the Roman congress, and a man of truly Italian sentiments.

Abandoned to clerical vengeance, the tyranny which the Legations endured became more cruel. The sect of the San-Fedisti was organised by the government ; concealed hatred became more fierce and intense. The people waited ; the insurrection of 1843, and the timid white flag in 1845, were vain efforts for liberty.

The prisons were daily more crowded when Gregory XVI. died. The people were now ready to break out ; the assembled Cardinals felt the earth tremble beneath them ; they considered with fear the perils of a revolution, and the expense of an Austrian occupation. They therefore desired that the new Pope should be one who could appease the irritation of men's minds, and concede something, without shaking the ancient fabric. With these intentions they elected, in 1846, to the pontifical throne, Maria Mastai Ferretti ; he took the name of Pius IX.

The history of this pontificate is marked by the Italian revolutions of this epoch ; revolutions generated by the mental powers of our ancient stock, as well as by the agency of the whole human race. The populace impute

revolutions to men and time ; but time does nothing, and men are but animated instruments of Providence and of the age—nothing more.

Pius IX. was the instrument, not the cause ; he hastened, but he did not create events. Having assumed the Papacy, he perceived that Austrian arms, and much bloodshed and slaughter, would be necessary to repress the existing state of discontent. He believed a middle course to be possible ; to pacify the people by gentle measures, yet still hold them bridled.

Unhappily he had forgotten history. Had he been the pattern of goodness itself, his position would have changed him. Gregory VII. and Innocent XIII. saw the dangers which, in their days, menaced the church ; they exterminated these dangers with the sword. Leo X. slept over them ; he did not foresee the signs of the German reform ; he was vanquished, and lost a fine portion of Europe.

Pius IX. adopted conciliatory measures, and published an amnesty ; the prisons were opened to the prisoners of state, and their banishment was revoked.

Then commenced that immense burst of exultation which diffused itself more every day, dragging along with it both people and princes.

The city resounded with applause of the Pontiff, with *vivas* and songs; people and Pontiff blessed each other, and for the last time. The Pope pardoned the state criminals; and some of these, the most benignant in council, together with others, first elicited a hope that a revolution might be conceded. This hope invaded men's minds, that liberty might be granted by a Pontiff, and that insurrections are perhaps not necessary.

This hope became deep and universal: the people were prepared for liberty; yet it seemed necessary to dip their swords in some drops of blood. The Pontiff shed the expected drops. A law on the press was promulgated; soon the municipality was constituted on a wider basis; then, the laity were admitted to the supreme magistrature, and a council of ministers was created, all of whom were laymen, except the ministers of foreign affairs and of public instruction; a Consulta was also formed.

Enthusiasm had now reached its highest point, and the people met together as they had not done for five centuries. "*Our Pontiff*," cried the people, "*will prove the father of liberty. He does not yet concede everything, because he fears the enemies of liberty, the universal enemies. Let us then show our power.*"

The people were inebriated; the papal throne was surrounded by a garland of three millions of men, united, moved, and demanding liberty. The movement spread from the Roman provinces to the farthest points of Italy. In every city, on the roads, and in the country, immense multitudes of people congregated, demanding liberty with songs and prayers. Every where the governments yielded, except in Naples, where the tyrant responded with armed resistance. Calabria and magnanimous Sicily took up arms; Messina and Palermo were covered with barricades, and were the first camps of sanguinary revolution; the cowardly Bourbon trembled, bargained, and promulgated a constitution.

At this announcement the impetus of the



people of Rome could no longer be restrained. "The Pope, our divine Pius IX., cannot refuse us what the Bourbon has granted ;"—and the multitude again broke forth in rejoicings on the piazza, more ardent and excited than ever. The supreme hour had come for the revival of a people which Heaven seemed to have raised out of the tomb. The cry of liberty now became menacing : Pius IX., though timidly, breaks the sacerdotal seals, and on the last page of the papal volume inscribes the *Statuto, the fundamental statute of the temporal government of the States of the Holy Church*.

But the civil movements of Rome in 1846 became Italian in the following year, and European after the revolution in France. In 1848 the Italians of the two Sicilies were the first to revolt ; and, last in Europe, fell Rome and Venice.

Paris had overthrown its monarchy, and from France the first republican cry came forth. At this cry Berlin was commoved, and threatened her King : Vienna was in ebullition, and the terrified Cæsar was brought to a reckoning with his people.



• But, before the risings of the people in France and Germany, the generous Lombards had caught the infection from Rome and Sicily, and were inflamed with the new Italian spirit. Milan, the second Rome of Italy, rose and denied the rights of the Austrian Cæsar, as the other Rome had dictated laws to the Papal power. Milan gave a new shock to the yoke ; after five days' battle with the citizens, the Austrian army was driven from the city, and the tricoloured flag floated over the ancient Duomo.

The people are the true founders of enduring monuments. While Pope and Princes timidly granted constitutions and statutes, the Lombards were occupied with far other decrees. They drove out the Croats ; they erected barricades ; they promulgated from thence the independence of nations.

• All Lombardy rose, and no vestige of foreign dominion remained on this side the Alps.

But in Rome there was a Pope. How could the successor of St. Peter make war on the heir of Cæsar ? Could a Pope sanctify insurrection ? The readers of history alleged

the example of Alexander III. ; but feudal times were past. To humble the Imperial power, and the lofty dominion of Cæsar, the supreme rights of the Pontiff over all temporal possessions must be revived. Cæsar alone is supreme over temporals, say the Ghibellines. The Guelphs reply : The Pope alone holds the place of God on earth.

In these days, it is the people who declare themselves sovereign ; they ask for the investiture of their rights neither from Cæsar nor the Pontiff, but derive them from themselves and the barricades.

The rights of revolutions could not therefore be consecrated by a Pope ; by blessing the Lombard insurrection he would have blessed all present and future rebellions, and the Vicar of Christ would have become a revolutionist, a denier of absolute authority, which pretends to derive its eternal rights from Heaven.

If then Pius IX., in the first ardour of enthusiasm in Rome, on hearing of the events in Lombardy, did not dare to oppose, in his own states, a levy of men against the Austrian empire ; if in a few days an army of 20,000

men was ordered to march to the Po; yet, as soon as he was aroused from his first stupor, he openly declared on the 29th of April 1848, in full consistory, that his mind was against all offensive war with Austria. Thus the people again fell into the old and abhorred state; the Pope separated himself from them by refusing to ratify the decree of war against the barbarians, which the Lombards had dictated with their expiring breath.

The people now began to be undeceived: their Pontiff did not believe in the sanctity of the Italian right of independence; therefore it could not be holy, and they could no longer love it. And thus the first fervour of love yielded to as deep and concealed a hatred as ever entered the human heart.

The people became tumultuous, and the Ministry resigned. Pius IX. was terrified, and began to waver: he wrote an autograph letter to the Emperor, to exhort him amicably to cede his dominion in Italy, and to counsel the Germans to recognise the Italian nation as a sister, “*Each reducing its dominion within their natural limits with honourable compacts and the blessing of Heaven.*” But if

this was so, why not make war? If it was unjust, why exhort the Emperor to feeble concessions? If nations have natural limits, it is consequently a natural right to defend them; and those who overstep them offend Nature and God. To have recourse to advice, rather than to arms, was both short-sighted and perfidious. Could the Emperor be moved by words, rather than the power of arms, to abandon Italy?

But the more the Pope was averse to war, the more fatal it became for him to leave a free course to events. Yet he called to the government only the men who were universally popular. Among the new ministers was Terenzio Mamiani, a terse versifier, a studious metaphysician, a man of subtle mind, both prudent and clever: he placed the summit of wisdom in ever pursuing half measures, and balancing all extreme parties by temporisation. The president of the ministry was Cardinal Soglia, who, two months previously, had sent a letter written in cypher to the pontifical Nunzio then residing at Inspruck; this letter was intercepted and published in Milan in the journal *Dell' Italia del Popolo*.

The treachery was veiled in mystery, yet an indication was given in a subjoined postscript, which recommended the Nunzio to persuade the Emperor that the proposals of the Holy Father differed widely from those of his ministers.

Let the world imagine how there could be any compromise between the party which secretly conspired with the house of Austria, and those who wished to combat it ; and how a national militia could agree with treacherous prelates."

The ministers endeavoured to form a league among the Italian princes, who were already suspected on account of the increasing power of Charles Albert, and still more suspected by increasing liberty ; they also determined on the continuation of the war,

On the 5th of June, 1848, the assembly of legislators was convoked in Rome ; they approved the acts, and the expressed intentions of ministers ; they strengthened their authority, and kept the capricious people in check.

In the meantime, the people were rejoiced and consoled by the glorious deeds of the



Roman soldiers who were combating in the Venetian provinces, and memorable were the enthusiasm and the boldness they showed in defending Vicenza. While Charles Albert was besieging Peschiera, the passage of the Alps was left open to the Austrian army. Radetzky increased his army to more than 18,000 men, some of whom arrived before Vicenza, and endeavoured to take it. Vicenza, guarded by 2000 volunteers from the Romagna, and some hundred Lombards, fiercely repulsed the assault.

General Durando, with 5000 men, hastened to the relief of the menaced city; the obstinate Radetzky did not change his purpose; he again sent his battalions to the assault, and again they were repulsed by Italian valour.

But no sooner were the Austrian arms vanquished at Goito, than Marshal Radetzky passed the Adige with 30,000 men, and seventy cannons; and on the 10th of June, by way of Montaguane, he appeared before Vicenza. It was then garrisoned with an army of 10,000 men, commanded by General Durando. The bulk of the Roman militia



was there, with volunteers from all the states engaged in the Italian war. Through want of ammunition, and after a ferocious combat of sixteen hours, Vicenza capitulated to a very superior force. The Roman militia of Vicenza went out with their arms, baggage, and colours flying to the beat of the drum, but under an engagement to abstain from combating the Austrians during three months. They were soon after followed by the troops which garrisoned Treviso ; and thus 15,000 men returned into our state.

New disasters soon followed. The Imperial arms overcame Charles Albert, whose fortune failed him, rather than his courage. Vanquished on the Adige, and pursued by Radetzky, he did not defend the banks of the Adda, but fell back on Milan, promising to bury himself under its ruins rather than yield the heroic city without a struggle : then, despairing of the enterprise, he departed, leaving the capital of Lombardy a prey and a victim to Austrian vengeance. True it is, that Radetzky had promised the vanquished, in that secret capitulation, that the city should be uninjured ; but Austrian

faith could preserve the stones of the city, and strike the citizens. . .

The Roman state, which had sent its soldiers to attack the Austrians, was in turn attacked. General Welden, with 3000 men, passed the Po, entered Ferrara, and then appeared before Bologna. Cesare Bianchetti was then prolegate of Bologna. The senator Zucchini convoked in council the military and civil commanders, and Count Carlo Pepoli, both a commissary and a magistrate, not in order to organise a terrible and bloody defence, as the people desired, and as the duty of patriotism, and the misfortunes of Lombardy, and the necessity of the war demanded, but in order to learn from the senators, from the commanders, from the commissaries, if it were possible to defend the city. It was declared in council by Latour, a Swiss general, by Zucchesi, a colonel, and by others, that, as the greatest part of the troops had come from Vicenza and Treviso, under an engagement not to make war for three months against the Austrians, and as the other forces were insufficient for the defence, it would therefore be better to retire

into the Cattolica, and there wait for the enemy.

We do not understand how troops who had capitulated could combat the Austrians in the Cattolica, and not in Bologna. It is the duty of every one to keep faith ; but to interpret treaties, and to prevent them from becoming snares, is a common right. The treaty not to make war against the Austrians certainly forbade all attack ; but, could it forbid self-defence against a sudden assault, made by stealth in the night ? and if those who were at the head of affairs in Bologna made it a point of conscience not to violate their word, they were not forbidden to defend themselves. The troops having gone out, the barricades remained ; and they had then to cry to the assembled people, from the balconies, “ *Let the Croats sound their trumpets, and we will ring our bells.*”

On the night of the 4th of August, the Roman troops went out of Bologna, and there only remained to defend it some carabineers, some finance guards, and an ardent populace ready to rise. Signor Bianchetti selected a few citizens, and sent them to General Welden,

to protest against the violation of the territory. The Austrian General tore up the protest, dismissed the deputies, and on the morning of the 7th entered Bologna with a part of his troops : he had a short conversation with Bianchetti, and then commanded his Croats to march out by the gate of St. Felix.

But on the first entry of the Austrians the people became furious. They began by jeering and provoking the Croats ; from angry words they soon came to blows and bloodshed. Many soldiers were struck, and one officer was killed. General Welden then ordered his 5000 men to commence the assault.

The people, undaunted, rose with fury crying, " To arms ! " Immediately the city was barricaded and blocked up on all sides ; the bells were rung, and the armed citizens placed themselves to defend the barricades. The combat commenced on the morning of the 8th. The Austrians cannonaded the city from the gate of St. Felix ; then, ascending the hill from the gate Galline, they placed their artillery there, and fired on the city without any obstacle intervening.

The people could no longer contain them-

selves behind the barricades ; they furiously charged the Austrian soldiers, and sustained the trampling of the cavalry, and the continual fire of the artillery. Along with the brave citizens fought the remaining carabineers and Finance Guards. All boldly met the danger, and succeeded in dislodging the enemy from the hill. After four hours of fierce contest, the enemy's infantry and cavalry, who endeavoured to open a passage into the city, were repulsed ; they were driven from all the posts they occupied, and completely routed. Welden fled, leaving several hundred prisoners. The loss on our side was severe, but that of the enemy was much greater.

This was a battle of the people. Sensible, prudent, and temperate politicians, were in despair ; they judged it absurd to make any resistance ; the foolish populace confided in themselves ; senseless and furious, they rushed to the defence and conquered. The people do not possess the rare virtues of wise politicians ; nevertheless, when they will they can do everything, and, like gods, they can build up or destroy. Wise statesmen protest



with their pens, which does not prevent the people from taking arms and fighting. They defend what the others abandon ; they count not their enemies, and, when they strike, they expend blood and life ; in a few hours of strife they accomplish and seal the slow and meditated progress of ages ; they are the executors of the decrees of civilisation, and initiate new social movements.

The popular victory of Bologna, the sudden war, the defeat of Charles Albert, and the intentions of the King of Naples, while all Europe seemed returning to darkness, moved to opposite feelings all the cities of the Roman states. Their hatred to Austria seemed to increase, as well as their suspicions of the papal wiles, their desire to combat, and their hope of victory. No sooner did the late event become known, than the troops which were proceeding towards the Cattolica marched back to Bologna : volunteers came in from all sides, and the whole state was in agitation. General Welden repassed the Po, and the Pope protested. But how did he protest ? In Rome, agitation had reached its climax. The eternal city felt the stroke which over-



threw Milan, and wished to labour for her rescue. The ministers, Mamiani and Campello, proposed from the tribune preparations and ordinances for war, which were immediately approved ; but Pius IX., who had just protested, would not ratify these measures. Count Mamiani, a prudent and most temperate man, could not vanquish the papal determination ; he could not weigh and balance theocracy and democracy, and he resigned his seat in the ministry. "

" The people were then undeceived. Pius IX. was neither an Alexander III., nor a Julius II. ; he would not drive out the barbarians ; he was a Clement IX., he was Austrian, but before resuscitating the dead, he wished to bury the living.

Rome was enraged, and the Pontiff chose new ministers. Doctor Pellegrino Rossi, General Zucchi, the Duke of Rignano, and Professor Montanari, succeeded Mamiani and his colleagues. Grave-diggers, and not ministers, they supported the bier of the defunct papacy.

Rossi wished to give a new direction to the state, to divert men's minds from the Italian war, to make a league with the

Bourbon of Naples, and to join the European reaction : in the meantime, to create a code of laws, to reform the civil ordinances, and introduce better rules of administration. In the government journal, some opinions were expressed against the house of Savoy ; and the defeat of Piedmont and of the King was spoken of.

The people believed themselves betrayed. For them, all reform consisted in driving out the barbarians, and in national liberty ; and before creating codes, they wished to erect the national power. Lombard blood from the banks of the Po cried out to them, "*Arms and Vengeance !*" and they hated all who were deaf to this cry. And why speak of the Piedmontese defeat ? Why not rather forget errors and misfortunes, and speak only of a rescue from Rome ?

The people believed themselves betrayed ; they were tumultuous, and so full of rage, that the cup already overflowed.

On the 15th of November, parliament was convoked. A crowd was assembled round the doors of the palace where the deputies sat. Rossi appeared, and with a disdainful

countenance he passed through the midst of the vociferating crowd. Hearing some jest aimed against him, he raised his eyes, and looked contemptuously. One of the populace then threw himself behind him, and with a knife struck him in the throat, and disappeared.

This act was the spark which lighted the fire. All that day, and the following night, the city was in silent fermentation ; but on the following morning arose one of those fearful and wonderful popular tempests, which overwhelms in its passage whatever it encounters. In the streets and in the piazze were multitudes of armed men. Soldiers and citizens mingled, and organised themselves. The usual flag was displayed ; songs of liberty, and imprecations against their betrayers were uttered ; and the assembled masses moved on in grand array toward the Quirinal. When they arrived before the Pontifical Palace, two cannons, which the populace had dragged along with them, were placed against the door, and with terrible cries and fierce threats, they demanded that a new ministry should be chosen, of men selected by the people.

On this day the revolution was accomplished. From the 16th of November a new epoch commenced—the new life of the Roman people. On that day, the people destroyed with their own hands what they had for so many ages adored, and adored what they heretofore destroyed. They believed that a Pope—the partisan of Austria, the enemy of Italian liberty—had forfeited all right to temporal dominion, and they placed catholic authority under the due command of the nation. From a flock they became a people, and broke the crook of their pastor.

The Pontiff was astonished and confused. He found himself abandoned ; the prelates, the cardinals, and all those who are now sustained by foreign arms, concealed themselves, and dared not speak. Yet some determination was necessary to appease the city, and arrest the tumult. A promise was given that the wishes of the people should be complied with.

The author of this chapter was told that, in the night, the Pontiff shut himself up with some persons of authority and counsel. His countenance was pale with compressed indignation. He inquired to whom he could

confide the government. One of the prelates named two of Rossi's predecessors ; but the Pontiff interrupted him, exclaiming, "*I wonder that any one dares to defile my ears with such names !*" Silence ensued. The Pope then asked a military commandant if his troops were to be relied on. The honest soldier replied, " If your Holiness wishes them to act against the people, I cannot answer for them ;" and Pius IX., striking the table with his closed hand, exclaimed, "*Then I have no other resource left but to invoke the thunderbolts of God against the rebels :*" and he went out, leaving his counsellors astonished.

While Mamiani, recalled to Rome by the fury of the party who desired to have him as minister, assumed the office, and undertook, for the third time, to balance papacy and democracy ; the Pope, in the dead of night, on the 24th of November, secretly left Rome. A carriage, with foreign arms, conveyed the disguised Pontiff to Gaeta, and the Contessa Spaur followed him.

Twice the parliament deputed some of its most distinguished members to supplicate the Pope to return to Rome. Their prayers



were vain. Twice, also, the Pope elected a council to govern the state ; but the office was refused. There was therefore no government in Rome. The parliament chose a provisional giunta, and then dissolved itself. For two months this giunta ruled the state. But the pontifical authority having fallen, the authorities constituted by the Pope also fell ; and, by a decree of the revolution in Rome, an appeal was to be made to all the people of the state.

By order of the giunta, the people assembled in committees to elect, by direct and universal suffrage, a constituent assembly. Out of a population of 2,800,000 souls, 343,000 citizens voted in the committees. On the 6th of February, the representatives of the people met in Rome ; and on the 9th, after about fifteen hours of solemn discussion, the fall of the papal power in the Roman states was decreed, and the republic was proclaimed from the Capitol, in the midst of the immense applause of the people. The government was confided to an executive committee.

But while new-born liberty was thus being organised in Rome, both in Rome and in all



Italy it received the last blow by the defeat of the Piedmontese army at Novara. Charles Albert abdicated; his son and successor acknowledged himself vanquished, and the war was terminated by an armistice. Magnanimous Brescia rose in the rear of the victorious Radetzky; it returned to the yoke after horrid butchery. In vain did Genoa protest and refuse to submit to the armistice, still crying "War against Austria."

About the same time a multitude of armed peasants, incited and paid by the partisans of the fugitive Duke, broke into Florence, and another government succeeded to that of Guerrazzi.

When the news of these events reached Rome, the Triumvirs, Giuseppe Mazzini, Saffi, and Armellini, who had already been elected by the assembly, and invested with absolute power, found themselves surrounded by enemies, and abandoned to themselves; yet they did not despair, and on the 14th of April they published a declaration, that they would never yield or treat.

Instead of being extinguished, the republican ardour seemed to gain new force. The

government applied itself to reorganising the dispersed soldiers; they made the exiled General Avezzana, who had returned from Genoa, Minister of War. They expected the arrival of 8000 Lombards; arms were provided; a foundry was instituted; expert officers commenced organising the artillery, and in the course of a month the republic had 40,000 men to defend it.

General Guglielmo Pepe proposed to the Triumvirate, from Venice, that 10,000 men should be assembled on the Neapolitan frontier, of whom the greater part had combated under him in the Lagoon, in order to establish a new government in that country devoted to the Italian cause.

The government of Rome proposed to commence a third Italian war, with better fortune (no longer a regal, but a popular war,) and to enter Lombardy.

But while the almost unarmed republic was preparing the necessary ammunitions for so much warfare, its territory was occupied, not by the Austrians, not by the royalists of Naples, but by the republicans of France, who on the 24th of April reached the shores of Civita-

Vecchia. Thus was every future enterprise stifled at its birth. General Oudinot, representing the French people, commanded the expedition, which was sent neither to defend, nor to overthrow, our government. They would not interfere in political matters; they came purely to counterbalance the power of the Austrian arms; the people were to be interrogated regarding their form of government, and the army would pay in ready money all goods and services. The tree of liberty was planted, surmounted by the French and Italian banners conjoined. Certain Frenchmen made great parade of liberty and fraternity, and of the great benefit Heaven conferred on us by sending to the help of our endangered state the powerful assistance of French alliance.

But neither the people nor the government were allured by these false pretences. The Roman assembly *protested in the name of God and the people* against this sudden violation of territory, not preceded by any announcement, as barbarous and piratical. They admonished the French general to respect the sovereignty of the Roman people, who had deliberately

chosen their supreme magistrates, and their new political ordinances ; and to respect the constitution of his own country, which declared that the French nation did not make war on the liberties of other nations. They added their firm determination to resist.

The assembly and the triumvirate sent two deputies to the French general ; and the general, in his turn, sent deputies to the government ; but an ambuscade was laid, on the discovery of which all negotiation proved fruitless. To General Oudinot's deputies the Romans and Triumvirs answered, that the French army must either be friendly, hostile, or neuter ; that if neuter, they could not understand for what reason they occupied their neighbours' houses ; that if they were not enemies, they must be friends come to defend the state, and in that case they requested them to return to the frontiers, and remain in Civita-Vecchia. Rome was not in need of their assistance. Oudinot's deputies replied, that it was the will of their government that they should occupy Rome : and having said this they advanced.

On the 26th of April the Triumvirs made

known to the assembly the intentions of the French general. The assembly deliberated, and made the following short and memorable decree :—

*“ The Assembly, after the announcement made to it by the Triumvirs, commits to them the salvation of the State, and charges them to repel force with force.”*

The people in the surrounding tribunes applauded vociferously; the deputy Cernuschi, pale and agitated, mounted the tribune; he exhorted the people to accomplish the decree of the assembly, and ratify it with their blood. Then, taking from his breast the band which he wore as representative, he displayed it, exclaiming, “ Your legislators, O people! will fulfil their duty; and you, when to-morrow you are called to battle, will fulfil yours: girded with these ensigns we will lead you to the fight, and either conquer or die with you.” And the people rushed out exclaiming, “ *To arms! To the barricades!*”

The dispersed troops, which could be assembled in Rome, amounted to 7000 armed men. They were divided into four brigades. The



first, commanded by General Garibaldi, defended the environs of Porta Portese, as far as the Porta St. Pancrazio. The Villa Corsini, which is situated on the hill in front of that gate, and commands the walls of the city, was guarded by the first company, and their banners extended to the Villa Pamfili. The second brigade joined the left wing of the first, and defended the environs as far as the Porte Angelica. The fourth was stationed in the Piazza Ccsarea, and in the Chiesa Nuova, ready to act as a reserve. The cavalry of the third brigade were drawn up in the Piazza Navona.

It was the last day of April. At nine in the morning the first French battalion appeared in the estate of Brevetta, in front of Garibaldi's brigade; there the vanguard stationed itself. The enemy approached on the left hand, then turning towards the cupola of St. Peter, and directing their course on that side, they vigorously assaulted the Porta Angelica and the Porta Cavaleggieri, defended by the second brigade. Garibaldi then pushed forward and attacked the French in flank. They, to turn him, executed a counter-movement towards the Villa Pamfili. Garibaldi was



obliged then to rally his men, and to fall back on Villa Corsini. Finally the bastions of the Vatican were assaulted. The reserve squadron then moved; the carabinieri hastened to reinforce the bastions; the fourth brigade boldly marched to the succour of the first, and the battle became general. Our troops retook the positions they had lost; they drove back the enemy from the Porta St. Pancrazio, and the French placed themselves steadily before the Vatican. The first and fourth brigade advanced impetuously and simultaneously. The enemy then precipitately sounded a retreat, leaving 300 soldiers and seven officers, among whom was a major, prisoners in our hands. The French assembled again in Brevetta, three miles from the city, whence, after a short halt, they fell back to the castle of Guido. While the French artillery was thundering round Rome, the armed populace and the civic militia defended the bastions and guarded the barricades, at each of which were seen the representatives of the people armed with their decorations, and exhorting the combatants.

The people behaved like a disciplined army:

they obeyed the orders of their magistrates, and ran wherever the danger was greatest.

In the meantime, events crowded on. Royal Europe had decreed the fall of our republic. The royalists of Naples, the Spaniards, the Austrians, followed the example of France. The Bourbon arms occupied Velletri and Albano; the Spaniards appeared before Fiumicino, and the Imperialists attacked Bologna.

Garibaldi was sent to drive back the Neapolitans. He arrived at Palestrina, where he halted. The Neapolitans sent a column to attack him; but after a long resistance, they were repulsed.

At this period, valiant Bologna fell, after being assaulted twelve days; vanquished at last by superior forces, after emulating the daring of Brescia, after several times refusing to treat, after the most energetic efforts, it fell like a hunted lion, and fell gloriously.

The Imperialists then turned their arms against Ancona. All around we were encircled with armies and hostile governments, and no ray of hope appeared to lighten the darkness of reactionary Europe.

The assault of Rome created much agitation

in the assembly at Paris. The intentions of those who had proposed the expedition were now clear, and the government was invited, in a public declaration, no longer to turn it from its true object. Lesseps was despatched to Rome. A truce was concluded with France. One treaty of peace was refused; another was proposed by the assembly, and accepted by the two parties. But in France the Legislative Assembly succeeded to the Constituent. The government of France, certainly with the consent of the new legislature, then ordered General Oudinot to recommence the attack; and Oudinot refused to ratify the treaty that Lesseps had signed in his name.

The armistice was declared at an end; but at the same time a promise was made to defer the assault till the 4th of June. This was on the night of the 2nd. The troops had been left in their barracks, not to tire them uselessly: only the advanced posts were on watch. The estate of Villa Pamfili, which backs the city, includes on the left hand a pleasure garden, and on the right a wood. It was guarded by only four hundred soldiers; and on the 3rd

of June it was attacked early in the morning by two brigades,—one commanded by General Molière, and the other by General Jean Levaillant. They advanced together,—the first towards the garden, the other towards the wood. Two other brigades supported these. A large detachment of infantry effected a breach, and entered the villa. Our vanguard, which was stationed in the garden, assembled at the Casino Corsini and at the church of St. Pancrazio; but those who defended the wood found their road intercepted by the enemy's troops, which had entered the villa by the middle gate, and they were taken prisoners. But the others, who had retreated to the church St. Pancrazio and the Casino Corsini, kept up a constant fire of musketry against the enemy, and resisted the attack of at least 8000 French. Vanquished by numbers, they retired to a large house called Vascello, and rallying there, they again advanced against the Casino Corsini, and got possession of it.

At the rumour of this battle, the city was roused, and at five in the morning the division commanded by Garibaldi rushed

impetuously out of the city, and met the enemy's troops.

The combat lasted sixteen hours. The Villa Corsini and the Villa Valentini,—both positions necessary to the French to commence the siege,—were retaken by them ; they were again regained, and again retaken. The Roman combatants were not military men ; their commanders were inexperienced in the science of war, but patriotic love supplied all deficiencies.

Twice the French troops turned back, and twice the battle was renewed by the accession of new forces.

Italian valour was at last vanquished by superior numbers, and by treachery ; the enemy remained masters of Villa Pamfili, Villa Corsini, and Villa Valentini. If the battle had been loyal, if Oudinot had kept his word, and not commenced the siege on the eve of the day he fixed, we should have conquered, and a second victory would have proved to our proud invaders that we are still apt for warfare.

In the night, the enemy began their parallels, and the siege commenced. At the same



time the Austrian army surrounded and attacked Ancona, while the French artillery thundered against Rome. But Rome resisted till the last extremity ; the whole universe was against her ; but she protested, while combating and profusely shedding her blood.

The government did not capitulate. The assembly heard the opinion of General Garibaldi, who, after weighing all the chances of war, declared that it would not be possible to resist longer than the 1st of July, and he remained at his post. The French army entered Rome the following day, the 3rd of July, and while the enemy's battalions were encamped on the piazza of the Capitol, the legislators of Rome proclaimed the constitution in the midst of the acclamations of an immense multitude, which remained at the Capitol till French bayonets drove them from that sacred asylum.

But as the grandeur of pagan Rome was transmitted to the minds of catholic Rome, so from the ruins of papacy will arise one day the power of the Roman people, and the third epoch of Italian civilisation.



## CHAPTER XIII.

Venetian navy.—Sortie from Brondolo.—Cholera in the capital.—The Patriarch menaced.—Letter to the Committee of Public Safety.—Attempts at disorder provoked by the enemy.—A battalion in the island of Lido on the point of setting a bad example.—Severity towards a General of the army.—Expedient used to cure the imaginations heated by the erroneous idea of a general sortie.—The author elected a representative of the Assembly.—Declaration which arrived from the General of the National Guard.

I EXPLAINED, in a former chapter, the discontent felt by the government, by the military commission, the entire population, the patriotic circles, and the press, with the Venetian navy. Many officers in small vessels did pretty good service, attacking the enemy, and watching their minutest movements. But when an attack on the squadron outside the Lagoon was discussed, no attempt of any importance could ever be obtained from them. Instead of an energetic law, condemning to infamy those who should prove backward in encountering dangers and

difficulties, the congress, animated by ill-founded hopes, decreed a levy to supply the losses in men which the navy had suffered. This levy, on account of various opposing circumstances, never took place; and it ended in our placing no confidence in the naval division, which was, in fact, our only remaining hope for the prolongation of the defence: since if that division, by a desperate attack, had either destroyed or forced the enemy to retreat from the waters of the Adriatic, we could have obtained bread, and materials for the fabrication of powder, which would have enabled us to return shot for shot.

Towards the end of July, I had obtained in the district of Chioggia the object of my wishes, which was, the retreat of the enemy from the left of the Brenta. Instead of attempting to pass that river, they were obliged to go to a distance, after completing many temporary works, and making vast preparations for the passage. But in warfare we must ever play the part of the wolf, and not of the lamb; that is, we must always threaten, even when we scarcely have the

means of defence ; I therefore gave orders to Colonel Novara, who commanded that district, to make small but continual sallies, in order to keep up a menacing attitude. I afterwards authorised him to extend the numbers of his column in a sortie to 1000 men, in case the spies brought favourable accounts of the enemy's movements. Lieutenant-Colonel Sirtori, who was ever anxious to distinguish himself, was then in Chioggia. Colonel Novara confided to him a column of 1000 men. Pushing forward on the side of Conche, he dislodged the enemy from their strong positions, took a flag belonging to the 18th regiment, and brought back near 200 oxen, with wine and corn. If I am not mistaken, this was the only Austrian flag which fell into our hands during the war for independence.

The enemy always contrived to procure useful spies, and to spread reports of all kinds to alarm the population and the garrison. Thus, when the first account of cholera having appeared at Chioggia reached me, I attributed it to these false and alarming rumours ; but it was only too true.

Neither I, nor others, failed to foresee how fatal this malady must prove in Venice, where the population was crowded into one quarter of the city. The houses in that inhabited quarter were so full, that whole families were obliged to sleep in one room; the season was even unusually hot, and the provisions were bad. All these circumstances hastened the progress of the contagion, which, when once arrived in the capital, daily struck a multitude of individuals, and especially those who were obliged to sleep either in the streets, or in boats of all sizes. In fact, about a week after the malady first appeared, nearly 150 persons died daily, and even more, according to some of the medical reports. A suitable sanitary commission being established, the government hastened with much zeal, and at no small expense, to provide the poor with all that was needful; and especially to enforce the observance of that separation, which experience has shown to be necessary. One of the obstacles to the cure of the malady was the want of the necessary medicaments. The fires which the bombs occasioned in the uninhabited quarters, created

alarm and confusion ; for the proprietors of the burning houses, braving the danger, went to ascertain their losses.

While Venice was thus labouring in the midst of calamities, the combat on her frontiers was carried on with redoubled vigour, and the enemy's endeavours only succeeded in exciting one unaccomplished act of disorder, which, being unique, could not serve as an example. I speak of a tumult directed against the Patriarch, who sympathising, as is ever the case with ecclesiastics, with that power which best and most constantly favoured him, was more attached to the Austrian, than to the republican government of Venice. The exceptions to this are rare : how often is a Capececiattro found at Tarento in the kingdom of Naples ; or a Sibour, Archbishop of Paris ? This sympathy, this affection, induced the Patriarch to sign an irritating letter to the government. Two or three citizens of ill fame, wishing to pass for exalted patriots, availed themselves of the Cardinal Patriarch's folly to excite a tumult, and had him followed to his house to arrest him. But instead of his apartment, they entered one next to it, which



belonged to the Conte Quirino, and during this time the Patriarch escaped elsewhere. The tumult lasted a very short time ; for, on the appearance of some officers and some patriots, and among them Tomaseo, it subsided. A few of the military, either seduced by the civilians, or ignorant of the affair, were among the rioters. Though no trace remained of the tumult, yet to prevent its recurrence, I had the military arrested with the intention of bringing them to judgment. But the civilians, who were the prime authors of the disorder, passed with impunity in the public streets. On this, I wrote the following letter to the Safety Committee, for I saw with grief that the noble and heroic conduct of the population of the Estuary was likely to be sullied.

*“ To the Committee of Public Safety. .*

*“ 4th August.*

“ ON perusing your letter, I must remark that the event which took place at the Patriarchal palace yesterday has caused me much sorrow ; for I see honest citizens exposed to the insolence of immorality, and the



magnanimous conduct of the inhabitants of the Estuary, during the space of sixteen months, a conduct which has led to immense sacrifices of blood and treasure, is now likely to be tarnished in the eyes of all Italy.

“Already four soldiers (two of whom belong to the corps of Bandiera, and Moro, which I so highly esteem) have been brought to judgment; others will be so; and many of the least culpable will be punished by me; while officers, not in active service, who by their discourses in the Piazza of Venice incite to disorder, will be sent to another place of residence.

“But as the real instigators of the infamous pillage yesterday in the house of citizen Count Quirino Stampalia were the civilians, it is indispensable that they should be severely punished; and the least culpable banished from the city of Venice. It will not be difficult to learn the names of these perturbators, for they have already been pointed out to me. If they are not speedily punished, it is impossible to foresee the new shame to which we may be exposed.

“Though my task is only to defend Venice

and the Lagoon from external enemies, yet, as an Italian, I am so humiliated by the disorders of yesterday, that, if the citizens who were the first instigators to the fault in question are not punished, I shall feel myself obliged speedily to resign the command-in-chief. . . .

“G. PEPE,

“*Commander-in-Chief.*”

After the elements of the above-mentioned tumult, the origin of which was the Cardinal's imprudence, had been completely destroyed, there arose in the army one of those plots, which, if not repressed in time, entirely destroy discipline.

Some superior officers, of small merit and great presumption, who complained of not having obtained the advancement in rank which they deserved, endeavoured to persuade some of the younger officers, that thousands and thousands of the populace might have been armed, and that, accompanied by a column of soldiers, they might make a vigorous sortie, and return with a vast quantity of provisions, cattle, and saltpetre for gunpowder, or even bring into Venice the

powder itself which was fabricated on terra firma. In consequence of these absurd and evil suggestions, many officers, belonging to the whole army, but among the least esteemed, met to deliberate on the measures to be taken, and on a memorial to be addressed to me, relative to what they termed the grand sortie. I gave orders that evening that the chiefs of corps, and the most ardent members of the commission, should come to me. After showing them the absurdity of their demand, I added that, being in presence of the enemy, all meetings for the purpose of deliberation were a capital crime ; that I should pardon it this first time, but that in future I should cause all who met to deliberate on any subject whatever to be arrested and decimated. At the same time I commanded all the superior officers, and particularly the heads of corps, to repair to me every morning at eight o'clock, a.m., with a verbal report of all that concerned discipline and the welfare of their subordinates.

These measures put a stop to all further disorders in the garrison of the city and district of Venice.

But in the neighbouring island of Lido, a battalion of which, for the sake of its valour and the services it had rendered, I will not mention the name, refused to embark for Treporti in order to garrison that fort. Without losing an instant, I charged General Cavadelis to repair immediately to Lido, to form the battalion into a square, and to tell these soldiers that their disobedience had obliterated the remembrance of their own former valorous deeds, and those of their companions in arms. He was to add, that if they did not obey, I should myself go and have them fired on by the two campaign batteries which were there. The battalion obeyed without hesitation.

A general who commanded in an island not far from the capital, forgetting my rigorous orders, which obliged the officers of every grade not to leave their posts, came daily to Venice. I warned him of the fault, which in presence of the enemy became a crime, and I did this in vigorous language. The general wrote me a letter which was injurious to subordination. Among other things he threatened to have recourse to the government to obtain

justice for my sharp proceedings against him. I immediately sent to tell him, through General Cavadelis, that, if he did not write to ask my pardon for the contents of his first letter, I should expedite a detachment of gendarmes to arrest him, and a council of war should on the following day decide his fate. The letter I desired was not long waited for. By these prompt acts of rigour, the most distant indications of insubordination disappeared. In truth; they had very rarely showed themselves in the ranks of the Italian army which defended Venice, and which amounted to nearly 30,000 men, including the three battalions of Charles Albert, the four Roman legions, and the Morandi and Zambecari battalions, of whom part were recalled, and part remained in their provinces.

I was not contented with having prevented the officers by rigorous means from deliberating on a general sortie; I wished to convince them of the bad faith and ignorance of those who had propagated the idea. I sent the most meddling of them, who was a colonel, to an island near Trepòrti, and I there wrote to him officially, that I had in



mind to accomplish a strong sortie, and to give him the command of it, in case I could not take it myself; that the first object was great booty for the provision of Venice. The colonel was much confused on receiving this letter; he endeavoured to demonstrate to me the immense difficulties of such a sortie, and the impossibility of collecting victuals or saltpetre round that part of the Lagoon, where the country was most unsuited to such attempts. Many copies of this reply were circulated, and exposed him to complete derision.

At that time the population of Venice wished to give me a proof of their esteem by naming me deputy. I knew nothing of this nomination when I received the following decree :—

“ THE Provisional Government of Venice.

“ The officer of the 14th Electoral *circondario* informs H. E. General G. Pepe that, by the votes of that *circondario*, he is elected a representative in the new assembly convoked by the decree of the 17th July of the present assembly.

“ GASSMY, *President*.

“ VENICE, 12th August, 1849.”



Had Venice remained free, I should not have accepted the honour of being a deputy. Except in certain cases, I should always refuse to serve my country in the quality of deputy in a national assembly.

The cholera, and the increasing fierceness of the enemy's fire, obliged the citizens to abandon their habitations, and take refuge in others not yet touched by the Austrians, or in other islands of the Lagoon. At the same time the ranks of my soldiers were thinned by death, wounds, and above all by sickness, whether cholera, or the annual contagion which visits the islands of the Lagoon, and the marshy lands round Brondolo and the Brenta.

We endeavoured to change the men who mounted guard every twenty-four hours. I applied to the general of the civic guard to give me three hundred of his men during the day, whom I should send to the places least exposed. The general pointed to the causes I have named, and told me with grief how few men he could give in the circumstances in which we were placed, circumstances truly distressing.

## CHAPTER XIV.

Admirable conduct of the Venetians.—Meeting of the Assembly and its decree.—The total want of powder and bread forces the Government to treat with the enemy.—The Author's irrevocable determination if the enemy had not granted an honourable capitulation.—Wants of the military provided for.—The Author quits Venice.—Letter from the Municipality, and answer.—Address to the Neapolitan soldiers on the Lagoon.—Conclusion, on the events of the Peninsula.—The Author's address to his countrymen.

THE month of August was advancing, and the Venetians gave examples, new to history, of unbounded patriotism. Without wandering among the pages which tell of ancient prowess, we may admire the vigour of Masaniello's fellow citizens; then that of the people of Genoa; and afterwards the Neapolitans, when, outside the walls of the capital and in open campaign, they combated the French army commanded by Championet. Lastly, we have heard with wonder of the deeds done in Milan, Bologna, Brescia. But the desperate valour of the people of Naples, Genoa, Milan, &c.,

we admire and understand : they returned shot for shot. But the people of Venice, surrounded by a Lagoon, and by internal canals, could not fight their assailers ; they were compelled to endure patiently bombs, grenades, balls cold and hot, cholera, and famine ; and they did indeed fearlessly await and support all these scourges with a resignation I never before either saw or heard of. When in my gondola I went to inspect the batteries in front of the enemy, even women, and persons of every age, down to children, applauded me with their lips and their hands, calling for a long defence ; that is to say, for a prolongation of suffering for them all. Among the other disasters which fell on the rich as well as the poor, was the duty of receiving those who had abandoned their homes when within reach of the enemy's fire. Both hosts and guests were straitened for room in that hot summer. To these sufferings, want of food was added ; but the courage of the Venetians failed not, and their desire of liberty remained invincible.

On the 6th of August, the assembly met to deliberate on their country's fate. The

deputy Vara thus writes :—"No one wished to precipitate matters ; but it had become necessary that some one should have authority to provide, in a prompt and extraordinary manner, for urgent events. Some wished to defer, because the exact condition of the powder magazines was not known, nor that of the public provisions (to continue on alive three weeks longer, the bread was obliged to be deteriorated by mixing rye-flour) ; others wished to defer, because they still hoped in the navy ; some feared that a change in the form of government might be regarded as a signal of approaching death, and as such, disturb the order of the troops, and promote turbulence in the city."

These objections did not prevail. The assembly centred all the powers of government in the President Manin, reserving to itself the ratification of any decision on its political state.

A last effort was made to induce the naval divisions to fulfil the expectations of the people ; and at the same time some intercourse was attempted to be renewed with the Austrian authorities, but all in vain. The

complete want of bread and gunpowder decided the final fate of these magnanimous forces. The President declared the impending necessity of acts in which neither the representatives of the people, nor any power derived from them, could take part. He abstained from the government, and left the affairs in the hands of the municipality.

If in Venice there had been no assembly ; if its surrender, or the prolongation of its defence, had depended on me ; if there had been bread and powder for two or four months, or even longer, I should have resisted even at the price of still greater sacrifices to the population and the garrison ; because greater glory would have redounded to the Italian name from our defence, when Europe saw us resisting a great empire so long.

But, as we were unable to hold out two more months, or even one, I should have preferred surrendering the Estuary eight days before it was actually surrendered ; since those eight days added nothing to our glory, and, in the meantime, many victims fell, and great suffering was occasioned by



the fire of the enemy, by the cholera, by the worst food, and the agglomeration of people in confined quarters.

As soon as I knew, in a manner which admitted of no doubt, the small quantity of powder and provisions remaining, being certain, at the same time, that the enemy was not ignorant of our situation, I could not believe that we should obtain an honourable capitulation. I then thought that it could never be fitting for me to say to so many valiant soldiers, among whom were many officers of high merit : “ You have done honour to the Italian name, you have suffered immensely ; I feel myself compelled, notwithstanding, to leave you at the mercy of the enemy, and myself to embark on a French steamboat, in order to spend some pleasant days in Paris.” I had determined, on the contrary, to say to them, “ The enemy, abusing our miserable position, has placed us between death and dishonour ; you have shown so much virtue that I cannot doubt your choice. Follow me, therefore, to terra firma, where we will, at least, die not unavenged.”

Fortunately, we were not compelled to such



a duel of death : for we could not have obtained a more honourable capitulation, if we had had remaining to us gunpowder and provisions enough for one year, instead of for one day.

The government did not forget to provide the soldiers with the necessaries for their journey, and with subsistence for some time. The communal council co-operated in this first measure.

The Commission of War, &c., of which I was President, had, some days before, freighted and provisioned a considerable number of vessels, which were destined to transport to Greece, and, if I mistake not, also to Smyrna, more than 1000 officers, subaltern officers, and people in military employments who preferred leaving the Lagoon by sea.

Thus fell Venice, not vanquished by a great empire, but because she had neither bread nor powder. She fell after sustaining a thousand misfortunes, and after sacrifices on the part of the population which are almost incredible.

I did not interfere in the treaty of surrender, and on the 25th of August, as soon as I was

assured that the military in all the Estuary had maintained strict discipline, I embarked on a French war-steamer, with four officers of my staff,—General Uhoa, Colonel Cosenz, Lieutenant-Colonel Assanti, and Major Cur-rano. A moment before I embarked, I received from the municipality the following letter, which proves that those noble minds were heedless of pleasing an enemy expected so speedily to lord it over those illustrious provinces, which had so well deserved, not thralldom, but liberty.

*“ To his Excellency the illustrious General  
and eminent Citizen, Guglielmo Pepe.*

“ EXCELLENCY,

“ Venice has had you for the companion of her sacrifices and the sharer of her privations. Your noble deeds have ever equalled the warm interest you have expressed in her fate. Venice must ever regard you as a brother and a friend.

“ You have consoled her with that affection which can only be felt for a beloved country. You have been to her generous beyond all

example. She must ever entertain for you the most true and heartfelt gratitude.

“In these last moments, when the heart seeks some alleviation by expressing its feelings, deign, Excellency, to permit the civic representatives of Venice, the faithful interpreters of the wishes of the whole city, to express to you their affection, and, while bidding you farewell, to wish you the happiness you deserve.

“GIOVANNI CORRER, *Podestà*.  
FRANCESCO DONOR, *Assessor*.  
MUZIO ZORZI, *Secretary*.

“*From the Municipality of Venice, Aug. 23rd, 1849.*”

Answer to the preceding letter :—

“*Signori of the Municipality, and its worthy Chief.*”

“Since my earliest youth, I have ever admired Venice, and fancied that her deeds might worthily compare with those of Greece and Rome. When, after a lapse of many years, I was at the head of an array, and knew that the city of my admiration was in danger, I crossed the Po to hasten to her

assistance ; but followed by those alone who, inspired by true glory, dared to defy exile and misfortune.'

"During the fifteen months that it has been my fate to defend the Estuary, I have perceived that, in spite of their cruel fortune, the character of the Venetians is unchanged.'

"In fact, they have yielded, not to the overwhelming force of a great empire, not to the artillery which has destroyed two-thirds of their city, not to the destructive pestilence of cholera, but solely to the failure of gunpowder and food.

"Such an heroic resistance is due, not alone to the desperate valour of the garrison, but also to the sacrifices and perseverance of this admirable city.

"To so many virtues in the Venetians is constantly added a rare amiability ; and of this your letter of to-day, Signori, is a proof which does me great honour, while at the same time it excites my deep emotion.

"Be assured. I shall ever feel towards every Venetian the sentiments of a friend and brother."

"To men of generous natures like your

own, my constant ill fortune will not make you appreciate less my sincere affection.

“G. PEPE.”

I thought it, at the same time, indispensable to bid adieu to the Neapolitans, who, for the love of Italy, had followed me over the Po, and had combated with such valour and intelligence as to have honoured the Italian as well as the Neapolitan name. I said to them :—

“OFFICERS and soldiers of Naples, who followed your General-in-Chief over the Po for the defence of Venice, as soldiers you have shown yourselves firmly devoted to discipline, and as citizens you have proved yourselves to possess sentiments truly Italian.

“During fifteen months in Venice, you have been the example of every virtue. You have defied mortal maladies, want, the balls of the enemy, and daily mutilation more severe than death.

“In every reconnoissance, the number of the slain which covered the field was larger, in

proportion, from your corps than from any other.

“ Malghera was commanded by a Neapolitan when it became a mass of ruins.

“ The most exposed batteries, the defences on the bridge, and those of St. Secondo which sheltered Venice, the threatened batteries on the Brenta, were all commanded by Neapolitans.

“ The Argante of the entire garrison was Rosaroll of Naples, who died gloriously as he had lived in defending the battery of St. Antonio, which he had commanded. In the sortie of Mestre, worthy of long remembrance, Alessandro Poerio, also of Naples, met death while advancing with desperate valour.

“ Most brave were all the soldiers who so admirably upheld Venice, and you were bravest among the brave. During these last days, when not the destruction of two-thirds of the illustrious capital, not the cholera which thinned your ranks even more than the artillery of the enemy, but the want of gunpowder and food alone made surrender imperative, you to the last fearlessly maintained discipline inviolate, and won the



admiration of the Venetians, who will never forget you.

“Not your General only (who for the third time is going into exile) thanks you for your unparalleled magnanimity, but all Italy, and especially your countrymen, thank you : even the Sicilian King, whatever may be his policy towards you, must still from the bottom of his heart admire you.

“I shall ever be proud of having led you to glory, which will endure while the history of Italian misfortunes continues to be read.”

My task is finished. I have been careful in these pages that the reader should meet neither with exaggerated facts nor want of accuracy.

From what I have advanced it must be clear, that we Italians, though not free, are as capable of independence and liberty as other nations who are in possession of those highest blessings ; that we might have acquired them without foreign aid, if evil fortune had not been adverse to us in the most important moments. Yet foreigners will still continue to say, “The

Italians are not ripe for liberty ;” “ The Italians are not yet in a state to act alone.” These are not the phrases of conviction, but of that jealousy to which the human race is condemned, like him who voted for the ostracism of Aristides. The superiority of the Italians, which is read of in history from the earliest ages, becomes wearisome ; it is annoying to see them sometimes exalted, sometimes oppressed by Fortune, but ever favoured by Nature, ever chafing and unsubdued.

I confess that in myself patriotism is stronger than philanthropy ; and that if I were not an Italian, I too should be annoyed at hearing the palm, sometimes for one thing, sometimes for another, always given to the Peninsula. When the Etruscan greatness ceased, that of Magna Græcia and Sicily commenced, and was often superior to the fame of Greece itself. When Tarënto, Sibari, Reggio, Cotrone, Metaponto, Agrigento, and Syracuse, declined, behold Rome embracing the known world by the power of mind and arms. The great empire fell, not without leaving immortal traditions, and there arose Venice, Florence,

Genoa. The whole of their population would scarcely equal a quarter of London, yet the fame of these cities filled the world; and, even at this day, history is full of this people, of their power, their deeds, their civilisation. That the conquerors of the world, that Rome should have produced the greatest captains, was to be expected; but that the same Peninsula, without land or sea armaments, should have produced a Doria, a Columbus, a Montecucoli, Eugene of Savoy, Massena, Bonaparte, seems miraculous. Again, foreigners, when they visit Italy in order to know what is most beautiful and admirable in art, seem to pay a forced tribute. But what more than anything else disquiets the Ultramontanes, is to see this people of enslaved Italy, corrupted by their own and by foreign despots, enfeebled by the fine arts and by every refinement, still from time to time taking up their arms, and using them better than the most warlike nations. Though the Italians have not burnt another Moscow to expel their invaders, yet a brawl in Palermo expelled the House of Anjou from Sicily; and a fisherman in Naples drove out the

Spaniards, who were supported by a fleet and by three castles. The Genoese did the same by the Austrians shut within their walls. Half a century ago the Neapolitans abandoned their city, and met the French army under Championet in open campaign. The Milanese latterly, after five days' combat, vanquished and drove out the Austrian army, who were supported by a strong citadel; and the valour of Milan was soon after renewed in Brescia. But neither these facts, nor the destruction of 20,000 Austrians round Venice, will prevent it from being said, "The Italians do not fight."

When the valour which was displayed in the defence of Rome cannot be denied, the deputies of a generous people exclaim, "It is true they fought in the defence of Rome, but the combatants were foreigners." These foreigners were from the Roman provinces and Rome itself, assisted by Lombards, Bolognese, Neapolitans, Sicilians.

Is it not evident that, beyond the Alps, the constant superiority of Italy, in every enterprise, cannot be pardoned?

It is to you, Italians, that are now addressed these first words of your fellow-countryman, of your brother, the veteran in the field, and in the internal movements of the last fifty years, with the hope that my counsels may still be of some use to you. I will here write down my act of faith, which may be collected from every action of my life, but which I will shortly recapitulate.

The republic is in my heart, and has been there since I first lisped the pages of ancient story.

In my fifteenth year I shed my blood for the Parthenopean republic. The heroes of these provinces, dear to nature, who had renounced riches and social honours to fraternise with the people, so exalted my young imagination, that chains and privations seemed to me jests, and I even envied the martyrs who suffered on the scaffold.

When, after being driven into exile, I crossed the great St. Bernard with the republican army of Marengo, amid which I fought, my thoughts were continually transported to Rome, Sparta, and Athens. After



passing alternately through camps and prisons, I arrived at the highest military grade, and found myself in an abject court, which never dazzled me. My illusions had vanished with my early youth, but the love of liberty never left my breast.

In 1819, at the risk of losing my rank and liberty, I sent away from my head-quarters at Avellino the Lieutenant-Colonel Lanzetti, because he had been one of the judges who had condemned to death Murat, their late King. But whilst this same Murat reigned, I, his general, conspired three times in order to oblige him to give a constitution to my enslaved country.

Man is weak by nature, and in servitude he becomes low and despicable; liberty alone, by exalting him, cancels in great part his natural defects. These reflections never abandoned me. I, who in my political vicissitudes had never once the misfortune to cause blood to be shed, yet highly admired Sylla, I saw the most honoured courtiers, at the approach of misfortune, betray their King and country; but the exile Sylla, not to abase



the glory of Rome, then ruled by his rival ~~Marius~~ <sup>Marcellus</sup>, proud<sup>ly</sup> refused the assistance of Mithridates.

The year 1820 approached, and I was on the point of obtaining a guarantee of high independence for Italy; when sad destiny prevented me from making the Emperor Francis, Ferdinand I., Metternich, and Medici my captives. Not long after, at the head of 40,000 men I entered Naples, and while demanding wide institutions from my King, I sent a man who cried "*Viva la Repubblica*" to the castle of St. Elmo; and I did this because I loved my country better than a republic, and in the condition of Europe at that moment I asked not what I most desired, but what was most useful.

In May 1848 I commanded the Neapolitan army which was to combat the Austrians; instead of obeying the order for their recall I consulted the interests of Italy, passed the Po, and hastened to defend the Venetian republic. Yet I was afterwards a partisan of the fusion with Sardinia. "How," I heard it said, "do you like a King?"

Certainly I am for him, since he has compromised himself in the cause of independence, since he can dispose of nearly 100,000 men, and form by the fusion a kingdom of 11,000,000 of Italians, including Genoa and Venice. During the short period of the fusion a citizen of note, who had belonged to the last government, presented himself to me and said, "There are reports current, that Charles Albert is sending a large body of troops into Venice with evil views; what will you do if this is verified?"—I should oppose their entrance into the Lagoon, since their mission should be, not to encumber it, but to combat the Austrians.

A month later, before the disasters of Novara, I wrote to the Sardinian King, that, though by character averse to kings, I should be the first to proclaim his Majesty King of all Italy, as soon as he passed the Isonzo. Thus, in the midst of apparent contradictions, my aim has ever been Italian independence.

In reference to past events I blame those who, instead of encouraging Charles Albert, deserted him on inopportune pretexts. I blame the patriots in Naples, who ran

arms on the 15th of May. But towards each I should add, that, where their intentions were right, my blame is that of a brother.

As to the future, since it is impossible to foresee coming events, I will only exhort my countrymen to be united, and to let their first and dearest object ever remain the expulsion of the Austrians.

THE END.











